

1 **Large Gaps in Monitoring Urban Air Pollution in the Majority World Due to Adverse**  
2 **Economic and Political Conditions**

3

4 Maja Schoch

5 ETH Zurich

6 Institute of Science, Technology and Policy (ISTP)

7 Haldeneggsteig 4

8 8092 Zurich

9 Switzerland

10 Email: [maja.schoch@ir.gess.ethz.ch](mailto:maja.schoch@ir.gess.ethz.ch)

11

12 Camille Fournier De Lauriere

13 ETH Zurich

14 Institute of Science, Technology and Policy (ISTP)

15 Haldeneggsteig 4

16 8092 Zurich

17 Switzerland

18 Email: [camille.fournierdel@gmail.com](mailto:camille.fournierdel@gmail.com)

19

20 \* Thomas Bernauer

21 ETH Zurich

22 Institute of Science, Technology and Policy (ISTP)

23 Haldeneggsteig 4

24 8092 Zurich

25 Switzerland

26 Phone: +41 79 770 4916

27 Email: [thbe0520@ethz.ch](mailto:thbe0520@ethz.ch)

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35 **Abstract**

36 Ambient air pollution has highly adverse effects on public health and the  
37 environment, particularly in urban areas of the Majority World. Systematic air quality  
38 monitoring (AQM) is a precondition for effective policies to mitigate this problem, and  
39 making AQM data publicly available also signals commitment to take action. Thus far, little  
40 is known about the global capacity for public AQM, and how it varies across geographic  
41 location, pollution exposure, and socio-economic characteristics. We thus constructed a  
42 novel, geocoded dataset on AQM behavior in more than ten thousand urban areas of low to  
43 middle-income countries. In almost 90% of these urban areas, we are unable to identify any  
44 monitoring activity, and the form and extent of AQM in the remaining 10% varies greatly.  
45 Income levels and characteristics of political institutions (democracy) turn out to be key  
46 drivers of variation in AQM activity, with urban areas in more democratic countries more  
47 likely to respond with more AQM to high air pollution levels. The evidence provided here  
48 can serve as a wake-up call for public authorities, international institutions, and civil society  
49 stakeholders to invest far more than hitherto the case into AQM, particularly in under-  
50 monitored, less affluent, and less democratic settings.

51

52 **Keywords**

53 Air pollution; policy; air quality monitoring; lower income countries; Global South

54

55 **Synopsis**

56 Air quality monitoring in urban areas of lower income countries systematically varies across  
57 geographic location, pollution exposure, and socio-economic characteristics.

58

59 **Introduction**

60 Ambient air pollution has deleterious effects on human health, the environment, and  
61 the economy worldwide. <sup>e.g. 1-6</sup> Urban areas in low- to upper middle-income countries, which  
62 we call the Majority World, face particularly serious problems in this realm due to rapid  
63 population growth and expanding industrial activity.<sup>7</sup> For instance, according to the Health  
64 Effects Institute<sup>8</sup>, air pollution is estimated to be the second leading risk factor for death in  
65 Africa, following malnutrition, with more than one million estimated deaths in 2019 and  
66 around 14 percent of child deaths under age five linked to air pollution.

67 It is widely acknowledged that systematic air quality monitoring (AQM) is  
68 indispensable for effective clean air policy.<sup>9</sup> Yet, the apparent shortage of data hampers not

69 only problem-solving efforts upfront. It also precludes continuous evaluation and  
70 improvement of existing intervention strategies. Conversely, AQM that generates reliable,  
71 publicly available information could enhance public awareness and support stronger action  
72 against air pollution.<sup>10,11</sup> As suggested by one recent study<sup>11</sup>, the presence of AQM at US  
73 embassies in more than 40 cities may have contributed to lower air pollution levels in the  
74 respective cities. And as succinctly noted by Harrington: “*Measurement is the first step that*  
75 *leads to control and eventually to improvement. If you can’t measure something, you can’t*  
76 *understand it. If you can’t understand it, you can’t control it. If you can’t control it, you can’t*  
77 *improve it.*”<sup>12</sup> Several studies observe, moreover, that policymakers gain or lose public  
78 support because of improving or deteriorating air quality, thus underscoring that AQM is  
79 closely tied to processes of political accountability. e.g. 13,14

80 It is worth noting in this context that remote sensing data on air quality are becoming  
81 more widely available, e.g. for fine particulate matter (PM2.5). However, their accuracy  
82 remains disputed because ground-level pollution needs to be estimated from data on large air  
83 columns, and their spatial and temporal resolution is widely regarded as insufficient for  
84 designing and implementing well-targeted clean air policies.<sup>15-18</sup>

85 Existing literature points to important monitoring gaps in the Majority World and  
86 suggests reasons for such gaps, but does not yet offer a systematic characterization of spatial  
87 patterns in AQM. e.g. 2,7,19,20 As a consequence, systematic analysis of political, socio-  
88 economic, and other drivers of variation in AQM is also missing.

89 Here we characterize spatial patterns of AQM throughout the Majority World and  
90 identify potential drivers of variation in AQM, focusing on thousands of urban areas across  
91 low- to upper middle-income countries, rather than countries as a whole. The reason is, that  
92 aggregating AQM activity to the country level would blur differences between and within  
93 countries. Our analysis focuses on three key drivers of environmental policy preferences and  
94 behavior, which are also presumed to influence behavior with regard to AQM. These are  
95 economic resources, political institutions, as well as environmental problem pressure, and  
96 responsiveness to it.

97 Economic resources are widely regarded as a key enabler of more stringent  
98 environmental policies and, as a corollary, also environmental monitoring.<sup>10,21 22,23</sup> According  
99 to the hierarchy of needs argument<sup>24</sup>, higher average income levels eventually induce more  
100 public demand for cleaner air, and by implication also more demand for measuring air  
101 quality. Moreover, higher income levels go hand in hand with more resources that are  
102 potentially available for AQM. Both mechanisms are deeply intertwined and thus hard to

103 separate analytically because higher income levels are likely to induce both more demand for  
104 AQM and capacity to meet this demand. One noteworthy recent development is that  
105 technological innovations are offering new opportunities for low-cost monitoring, which is  
106 especially relevant in lower-income contexts, though much more expensive reference-grade  
107 monitors are still considered the ‘gold standard’ in AQM both for reliability and  
108 regulatory/legal reasons.<sup>27</sup> Consequently, we distinguish between two types of AQM,  
109 expecting monitoring activity to increase with income levels with this effect being more  
110 pronounced for low-cost than for reference-grade AQM.

111 Previous studies highlight the impact of democratic institutions on environmental  
112 policy choices and their outcomes. They provide both theoretical arguments and empirical  
113 evidence in favor of the expectation that democratic political institutions make societies more  
114 likely to implement more ambitious environmental policies and achieve higher levels of  
115 environmental system quality. e.g. <sup>28–31</sup> On the demand side, democracy makes it easier for  
116 scientists, citizens, civil society, and other stakeholders to identify environmental problems  
117 and aggregate and organize various demands into ways and means that put pressure on  
118 policymakers to act. On the supply side, in democracies, policymakers have stronger  
119 incentives to meet the demands of a broad range of citizens, relative to autocracies that tend  
120 to be governed by a small elite.<sup>32,33</sup> The key reason is that democratic policymakers need to  
121 be (re-)elected.<sup>34–37</sup> We thus expect that demand and supply mechanisms are, jointly, likely to  
122 result in a positive effect of democratic institutions on AQM.

123 As a corollary to the democracy argument, we also expect that urban areas are more  
124 likely to respond to higher pollution levels with more AQM in settings characterized by more  
125 democratic institutions. The reason is that, as air pollution increases, the issue is more likely  
126 to become politically salient in a democratic setting, and there is thus likely to be more  
127 pressure on policymakers to offer solutions to the problem. A first step towards such solutions  
128 is usually improved AQM.

129

## 130 **Methods and Materials**

### 131 Unit of analysis

132 To characterize the spatial distribution of monitoring activity, we construct a new  
133 dataset by geo-matching the location of monitoring stations from which air pollution data is  
134 reported with the coordinates of so-called Urban Centres (UC). These are urban centers housing  
135 a population of at least 50’000 and having a population density of 1’500 or more per square  
136 kilometer. To qualify as a UC, cities must also have commuting zones that are socio-

137 economically integrated into the city.<sup>41,43</sup> We use UC and the term city synonymously  
138 throughout the paper.

139 Even though air pollution is widely regarded as having disproportionately negative  
140 effects on people in low-income countries,<sup>44</sup> current studies on clean air policies are strongly  
141 biased towards high-income countries, underscoring the need for a comprehensive analysis of  
142 lower-income nations<sup>9,45</sup> where incomes are, on average, around four times lower than in high-  
143 income countries.<sup>46</sup> We therefore focus on UC in non-OECD countries and exclude high-  
144 income countries.

145 The complete dataset includes 11'106 UCs, most of them in India or China (see Fig. 1  
146 and Fig. 2). To obtain a balanced dataset and avoid over-representing these two countries, we  
147 randomly subsample UCs from these two countries, resulting in 500 cities each for China and  
148 India, matching Ethiopia, the third-largest country in terms of UCs. This process yields a final  
149 dataset of 7'106 cities, of which 1'365 have at least one monitoring station. As a robustness  
150 check, we use different samples from the full dataset as well as the full dataset including all  
151 cities in China and India.

## 152 Data Sources

### 153 *Monitoring stations*

154 With UCs as the unit of analysis, we merge data on reported terrestrial AQM activity  
155 from three different sources with global coverage, monitoring any activity up to mid-April  
156 2024. The databases differ in monitoring instruments, including (low-cost) air sensors and  
157 reference monitors, and coverage focus.<sup>38-40</sup> The inclusion of all three sources ascertains that  
158 we cover different parts of the world as well as different monitoring systems. While the Purple  
159 Air source focuses on low-cost sensor monitoring stations, the WAQI and OpenAQ include  
160 mostly reference-grade monitoring stations. Because the inclusion of PurpleAir sensors  
161 extends our coverage to otherwise under-represented regions (South America, Africa), we  
162 decided to include both types.

163 We are aware that not all AQM activities show up in OpenAQ, WAQI, or PurpleAir.  
164 For example, companies, local AQM campaigns, or specific countries might opt not to make  
165 their data publicly available. Furthermore, OpenAQ and WAQI are continuously adding new  
166 public reports of air pollution data, which need to be machine-accessible, adding technical  
167 barriers to what kinds of data are being ingested in these databases. Also, OpenAQ ingests data  
168 in raw units (e.g.  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  for  $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ ), whereas WAQI compiles different pollutants into a  
169 comprehensive Air Quality Index, and can ingest such indices, which explains why these

170 datasets offer different spatial coverage. Differences in what gets added into OpenAQ and  
171 WAQI, as well as what is available in the PurpleAir database lead us to consider any AQM  
172 reporting in our analysis: various raw pollutants and Air Quality Index-related data. This allows  
173 us to cover any public AQM, which is what “ordinary” citizens would access to inform  
174 themselves about the air quality where they live. We are confident that our dataset is  
175 representative of the publicly available AQM data around the globe.

176 We identify 68 monitors placed at US embassies and exclude them from the main  
177 analysis because the installation of such monitors is exogenous to the drivers we wish to  
178 explore in our analysis.

### 179 *Economic resources*

180 Economic resources are measured using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (p.c.)  
181 of each UC for the year 2015, as provided in the OECD dataset. The database enumerates GDP  
182 estimates computed using global figures for the annual total GDP based on purchasing power  
183 parity (PPP) within the Urban Centre 2015, denominated in US dollars (base year 2007). As  
184 these figures are accessible at a 30 arc-second resolution (about 1 km at equator), it enables us  
185 to use information on GDP for each city and not only on a standardized country level.<sup>47</sup> To  
186 capture the prosperity of an UC, not influenced by its size, the variable is divided by the  
187 population size in the same year (2015), which results in the GDP p.c. of an UC. Inspecting the  
188 OECD dataset, we found that there are 314 out of 11’106 UCs with a GDP PPP value of 0,  
189 which is unrealistic. 151 of these UCs are situated in Ethiopia or India. Given that none of these  
190 UC has an observable monitoring station, we opt to exclude these 314 entities. Also, the  
191 average PM<sub>2.5</sub> level across the UCs differs only very little (0.012µg higher average PM<sub>2.5</sub> level  
192 after exclusion) whether these 314 UC are excluded or not. To achieve a normal distribution of  
193 the variable, we use the logarithm of the GDP p.c. in our analysis.

### 194 *Democracy*

195 The measure for democracy employed in our analysis is the Electoral democracy index by V-  
196 Dem. It consists of five sub-components that together capture Dahl’s seven institutions of  
197 polyarchy: freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, elected executive, freedom of  
198 expression, and alternative sources of information.<sup>48</sup> The resulting index ranges from 0 (low  
199 performance) to 1 (best performance). We average V-Dem values between 2000 and 2015 and  
200 consider a country as democratic when the V-Dem Electoral democracy index is > 0.5, and as  
201 non-democratic if its rating is equal or below that value.

202 *Air pollution*

203 To measure air pollution, we use remote-sensed estimates of PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentrations, expressed  
204 in µg/m<sup>3</sup> as the total concentration of PM<sub>2.5</sub>, averaged for every UC during the 2000-2016  
205 period. This provides us with an exogenous measure of air pollution and a consistent scale  
206 around the globe. These remote-sensed estimates of PM<sub>2.5</sub> are built from models that rely on  
207 ground measurements, and thus carry more uncertainty in areas that do not have terrestrial  
208 AQM<sup>42</sup>. Nevertheless, because we average values over 17 years, we minimize potential biases  
209 from monthly measurements. This is, to our knowledge, the most adequate data source of air  
210 pollution available for our study and there are only two missing values for this variable in all  
211 UCs in the dataset, both situated in Russia.

212 *Conflict*

213 To measure conflict, we use data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, version  
214 23.1.<sup>49,50</sup> This dataset offers a range of information about conflict, including aspects such as  
215 intensity, conflict type, and the start and end date of the conflict. Given that a conflict can  
216 significantly shape the development of a whole country and considering the complexities of  
217 aligning the conflict location with the UC dataset, we opt to incorporate the conflict variable at  
218 the national level and use it as a dummy variable that identifies if a conflict has resulted in over  
219 1000 battle-related fatalities since its inception. As a country is also highly affected by the  
220 aftermath of war, the main variable considers any onset of a war from 2000 until 2022.

221 *Corruption*

222 To measure corruption within a country, we rely on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),  
223 created by Transparency International and use the average levels between 2012 to 2022. The  
224 CPI ranks countries based on perceived public sector corruption, aggregating data from  
225 different sources that reflect expert and business evaluations of public sector corruption.  
226 Depending on the year in question, the index is formulated using roughly 12 distinct data  
227 sources, drawing upon various institutions that have recorded perceived corruption levels in  
228 the respective country. The CPI is standardized on a scale from 0 to 100, ensuring year-to-year  
229 comparability. While within the index itself, a lower score signifies higher corruption and a  
230 higher score indicates lower corruption, we adjust the variable so that a higher value denotes  
231 increased corruption, and a lower value signifies reduced corruption. This makes the  
232 interpretation easier and simplifies comparisons across variables.

233 *Other control variables*

234 For control variables, we included the 2015 population size of each UC as an indicator of  
 235 urbanization.<sup>51</sup> Due to the significant skewness of this variable, we apply a logarithmic  
 236 transformation before inclusion in the regression models. Additionally, we included a dummy  
 237 variable that denotes whether an UC is the capital of a country.<sup>51</sup> This variable is important as  
 238 it is likely that many (monitoring) policies are first rolled out in a country’s capital before being  
 239 adopted in other urban areas. Additionally, we include dummy variables for China and India to  
 240 control for fixed effects within the many UC in these countries.

## 241 Data Analysis

242 To explore the determinants underpinning monitoring behavior and address the outlined  
 243 hypotheses, the initial approach uses bivariate analyses. This involves comparing mean values  
 244 across distinct groups, and significance tested with permutation tests because firstly, visual  
 245 inspection of the data revealed non-normality in the distribution of the groups, and secondly,  
 246 unequal sample sizes can bias Welch tests towards lower p-values.<sup>52</sup> We used the *perm* library<sup>53</sup>  
 247 with a Monte Carlo Approximation using 1’000 permutations. This approach is robust to non-  
 248 normality and differences in sample sizes between two focal groups. To account for all  
 249 theoretically defined factors discussed earlier, including interactions between these factors, we  
 250 employ two multivariate analyses. We model the presence (or absence) of at least one  
 251 monitoring station within an UC using binomial logistic regression. We also model the number  
 252 of monitors in UCs, using a Poisson regression model<sup>54</sup>, because of the zero-inflated nature of  
 253 our dataset, with most UCs not reporting AQM.

254

$$\text{Presence of AQM}_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{GDPp. c. (log)}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Democracy}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{PM2.5}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{PM2.5} * \text{Democracy}_{it} +$$

$$\beta_5 \text{Population(log)}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{Conflict}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{Corruption}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{Capital}_{it} + \beta_9 \text{India}_i + \beta_{10} \text{China}_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

255

256

257 To assess the robustness of the results, we use different combinations of decisions  
 258 throughout the analysis and test them using multiverse analysis.<sup>55</sup> The multiverse package is  
 259 useful for adding transparency regarding methodological decision-making and its impact in the  
 260 analysis. The package offers a syntax that allows scientists to test consistency when using  
 261 different combinations of methodological strategies, in an easy-to-test and report syntax,  
 262 instead of reporting one of them. While for the main analysis, we use a sub-sample for China  
 263 and India, 500 UCs each, we also run the regression using the complete dataset that includes  
 264 all UCs in China and India. In another regression, we exclude PurpleAir AQM stations, which  
 265 focus extensively on low-cost air sensors, thus the remaining dataset mainly contains reference-



266 grade monitors. For another robustness check, we run the analysis with a second pollution  
267 dataset, the UC-level pollution dataset from “Urban Centre spatial domain based on Global  
268 Burden of Disease (GBD) 2017”, derived from older remote-sensing estimates.<sup>42</sup> Finally, we  
269 also run our analysis by including US embassy monitors. As Supplementary Figures. 1, 3, 4,  
270 and 6 show, none of these adjustments strongly influence our main finding.


271 We also test the sensitivity of findings to the random sub-sampling that we use to reduce  
272 the overrepresentation of China and India. To do that, we repeat our analysis 1000 times, each  
273 time selecting a different sample of the 500 UCs in China and India. We plot the coefficients  
274 of the interaction between pollution levels and non-democracy in Supplementary. Figure 6.

275 As we find that democracy influences AQM at the city level and democracy is a country-  
276 level variable, we model the number of monitors at the country level using a Poisson regression.  
277 To do that, we use the country level variables such as corruption, conflict, and democracy, and  
278 summed up the total number of monitors in UCs for each country, as well as the total population  
279 living in UCs, the GDP p.c. at the country level, for the population in UCs, and the average  
280 pollution in UCs, for every country included in our analysis. The results show that our findings  
281 are robust at the country level, with more democratic countries having more publicly reporting  
282 monitoring stations with increasing pollution, while non-democracies have more AQM if less  
283 polluted.

284


## 285 **Results**

286 AQM activity in the cities of interest here is unevenly distributed around the world,  
287 with high monitoring density in China and India, and very low monitoring density in Africa  
288 and South America (Fig. 1). The three data platforms from which we extract locations of  
289 AQM provide varying coverage across different regions of the world, making it useful to  
290 include all three in our analysis (see Methods). There is little overlap between data from the  
291 air sensor provider PurpleAir and the two other data sources that focus more on Eastern  
292 Europe, China, and India.



294 *Figure 1: Highly Uneven Geographic Distribution of AQM. Points on the map represent locations of AQM provided by the*  
 295 *three data platforms we consider in our analysis (OpenAQ, WAQI, and PurpleAir). The histogram shows the number of*  
 296 *monitors and overlaps for coverage by the three data platforms. Countries/areas excluded from the analysis (OECD and high-*  
 297 *income countries) are coloured in grey.*

298           China and India account for more than 2'100 and 380 monitors respectively, and over  
 299 1'800 and 3'100 cities respectively, with some cities among the most polluted globally (Fig.  
 300 2). This high concentration of AQM in China and India, and the high share of reference-grade  
 301 (as opposed to low-cost sensor) monitoring in these countries requires special attention when  
 302 exploring drivers of variation in AQM (see Methods). However, it is also worth noting that  
 303 China and India only rank 11<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> when normalizing the amount of AQM by urban  
 304 population (Fig. 2). Figure 2 also shows that a large share of AQM in China and India takes  
 305 place in cities experiencing medium to high levels of air pollution (remotely sensed). A much  
 306 larger share of AQM in cities of other countries focuses on areas with relatively low to  
 307 medium pollution levels (again remotely sensed). Again, this implies that we need to pay  
 308 special attention to China and India when exploring the drivers of AQM, most notably how  
 309 political systems and problem pressure act in combination.



310

311 *Figure 2: Number of reference-grade and sensor (i.e. low cost)-based monitors per country (upper left) and per country*  
 312 *normalized by population size, and number of cities with AQM in China, India, and other countries by pollution level.*

313

314

315

316

317

318

319

320

321


322

323

324

325

We now move to identifying the conditions under which we are likely to observe AQM when comparing cities across the Majority World. Figure 3 offers some first, bivariate insights. We are more likely to observe AQM in cities with higher income levels ( $p < 0.01$ , permutation tests), while AQM activity does not seem to be associated with the level of democracy ( $p > 0.32$ , permutation test). Less polluted cities are more likely to be monitored, and cities in non-democratic settings tend to be more polluted ( $p < 0.01$  &  $p < 0.01$ , permutation tests). Moreover, cities located in democracies that exhibit AQM are, on average, significantly less polluted, while cities in non-democracies that exhibit AQM are, on average, not significantly different in pollution levels ( $p < 0.01$  and  $p = 0.054$ , permutation tests) from those which do not monitor air quality. This observation aligns with the assertion that cities in democratic settings are more responsive to increased air pollution, in the sense of engaging in AQM.



326

327

328

*Figure 3: Potential drivers of variation in AQM activity. Dashed lines indicate the mean values for the explanatory variable displayed in each graph, for cities with AQM (yellow) and those without (blue).*

329


To better understand structural facilitators and obstacles to AQM, we control for confounders based on a regression analysis. Figure 4 shows predicted effect sizes for the main variables of interest (left side), and for a set of other factors (right side) frequently referred to in the literature on AQM.

333

The results indicate that AQM is more likely to be present in cities that are (within the income range of the countries we consider) wealthier, located in more democratic countries, and have higher pollution levels, particularly in democracies. This means that more polluted cities in democracies are more likely to have AQM than similarly polluted cities in non-democracies. Cities in countries where there is a war also exhibit a higher likelihood of AQM. Larger populations and capital city status increase the probability of AQM as well. Conversely, high corruption levels reduce the likelihood of AQM. The results differentiated for reference-grade and (low-cost) sensor-based AQM are shown in the appendix in Supplementary Figure 1.


342

343



344 *Figure 4: Effects of explanatory variables. The marginal effects are calculated by fixing a variable at a specific value and*  
 345 *running predictions in the model, keeping all other variables at their observed average values. Marginal effects for continuous*  
 346 *variables are calculated at the first (in the figure referred to as 'low') and third (referred to as 'high') quartiles of the observed*  
 347 *distribution. Categorical variables' marginal effects are calculated for both levels of each variable (e.g. 'At war' vs 'Not at*  
 348 *war'). The model building the ground for this figure is a binary logit regression that includes the variables listed in the figure.*

349 Adding further evidence for the democratic responsiveness argument, Figure 5 shows  
 350 how the predicted probability of AQM being present changes with increasing pollution levels  
 351 for cities in democratic and non-democratic countries (pollution levels are again captured  
 352 with remote sensing data to avoid endogeneity bias). Supplementary Figure 2 in the appendix  
 353 shows the same interaction effect for different economic contexts. It shows that this  
 354 interaction effect materializes mainly in economic contexts other than very low and very  
 355 high-income settings. Irrespective of democracy, very poor cities have a very low predicted  
 356 probability of AQM being present, and very rich cities in our sample have a very high  
 357 probability, even if they are moderately polluted.



358


359 *Figure 5: Predicted probability of AQM relative to pollution levels (PM<sub>2.5</sub>) from 2000-2016 in cities located within a*  
 360 *democratic or non-democratic setting. The model pictured here is the same binary logit regression model as in Figure 4. It*  
 361 *includes all variables described in the methods part. The variables not shown in the graph are set to the mean of the*  
 362 *observed values. The grey histogram shows the distribution of the pollution levels across the cities included in the*  
 363 *regression.*

364

365 We examined the robustness of our main findings in several ways. These include  
 366 using a different dataset for remotely sensed air pollution (“Urban Centre spatial domain  
 367 based on Global Burden of Disease (GBD) 2017 data”), different random sub-samples of  
 368 cities in China and India, data for all cities including those in China and India, excluding  
 369 AQM activity captured with data from air sensors of PurpleAir, and including or excluding  
 370 AQM by US embassies (Supplementary Fig. 3).

371 The results indicate that the presence of AQM is associated with higher pollution  
 372 levels in cities within democratic settings. Although the effect is weaker for reference-grade  
 373 monitors, it remains statistically significant when applying what we consider the most  
 374 appropriate estimation strategy (Fig. 6). The effects remain significant when using a Poisson  
 375 regression to predict the number of monitors (rather than the presence or absence of  
 376 AQM), accounting for the zero-inflated distribution of AQM, with robust results across  
 377 different regression models and datasets (Supplementary Fig. 4). Because democracy is  
 378 ultimately a country-level variable, we also conduct a Poisson regression analysis to predict  
 379 the number of monitors in each country based on the average income level, population, and  
 380 air pollution levels of all cities in a given country. We find similar results with weaker  
 381 statistical significance (Supplementary Fig. 5 and Supplementary Table 1). Finally, we  
 382 examined whether the presence of US embassy-based AQM may crowd in or crowd out other

383 AQM in the respective city. We find that when controlling for other factors, such as income,  
 384 population, and democracy, there are fewer reference-grade monitors, and more air sensors,  
 385 in capital cities that host a US embassy monitor, but find no effect when not differentiating  
 386 monitor type (Supplementary Table 2).



387  
 388 *Figure 6: Robustness of main results. This figure shows that the main pattern of how AQM activity behaves with increasing*  
 389 *pollution levels in democratic and non-democratic settings remains similar when using different data sources for remotely*  
 390 *sensed pollution, including all cities or downsized samples for China and India, including only reference-grade or low-cost*  
 391 *air sensor AQM or both, and including or excluding AQM by embassies. Numbers on the top right of each graph display the*  
 392 *effect size of the interaction term between democracy and pollution, along with its significance level. The graph in the black*  
 393 *frame corresponds to the main analysis that is displayed in Figure 5.*

394  
 395 **Discussion**

396 Air pollution constitutes a major public health challenge worldwide, particularly so in  
 397 urban areas of the Majority World. Air quality monitoring is as an important tool for making  
 398 progress towards cleaner air. Remote sensing data is increasingly available, but ground-level  
 399 estimates of air pollution levels still need to be calibrated with data from on-site monitoring,  
 400 and regulatory monitoring still relies on reference-grade monitors. Indeed, the spatial and  
 401 temporal resolution of remote sensing data on urban air pollution is still inadequate for  
 402 localized action in terms of identifying pollution hotspots, building public awareness,  
 403 enforcing regulations, tracking progress, and ultimately reducing pollution levels.

404

405 The present paper is, to our knowledge, the first to describe variation in AQM across all cities  
406 in the Majority World and explore potential drivers of such variation. Besides observing a  
407 glaring gap in AQM across a vast part of the urban Majority World, our analysis highlights  
408 economic and political conditions as key drivers of variation in AQM. While the positive  
409 effect of income levels on AQM probably lines up with common intuition, the fact that the  
410 effect of increasing pollution levels is contingent on democracy is in our view quite  
411 intriguing. All else equal, public authorities in more democratic settings appear to be more  
412 responsive to increasing pollution levels, probably both by engaging and allowing others to  
413 engage in more reference-type and low-cost sensor-based AQM. Differences between  
414 reference-grade and low-cost sensors suggest that in non-democracies, governments set up  
415 one reference-grade station and commonly leave it at that, whereas low-cost sensors  
416 proliferate particularly in highly polluted areas of the democratic Majority World. Our  
417 observation that non-democracies are more likely to monitor in lower pollution areas also  
418 suggests that the choices of monitoring locations are politically biased.

419 While providing a wake-up call for public authorities, international institutions, and  
420 civil society stakeholders to invest far more than hitherto the case into AQM, particularly in  
421 under-monitored poorer, and less democratic settings, our research also points to various  
422 interesting avenues for further research. Focusing in greater depth on the cities with  
423 (currently) observable AQM could provide interesting insights into variation in the spatial  
424 and temporal density as well as pollutant coverage of monitoring, variation in how public  
425 authorities and other actors are making pollution data public, and which efforts are made (or  
426 not made) to improve monitoring networks. Such work could also examine whether there are  
427 socio-economic biases in AQM, e.g. more monitoring in more affluent areas of a city, and  
428 vice versa. It could also study the conditions under which improvements could be achieved  
429 with low-cost sensors that are operated by both governments and independent actors (private  
430 individuals, NGOs, companies engaging in transparency). In identifying AQM activity,  
431 further research could also investigate potential biases when picking up AQM from reported  
432 pollution data. If, as one might suspect, non-democratic regimes measure air pollution, but  
433 withhold the data from the public to avoid criticism, this could explain why cities in  
434 democratic settings seem to be more responsive to high levels of air pollution. The fact that  
435 our data identifies AQM activity in non-democratic settings implies that such bias is probably  
436 limited. Nevertheless, more work is needed to understand underlying mechanisms leading to  
437 the limited extent of AQM in most polluted non-democracies.



438  
439  
440  
441  
442  
443  
444  
445  
446  
447  
448  
449  
450  
451  
452  
453  
454  
455  
456  
457  
458  
459  
460  
461  
462  
463  
464  
465  
466  
467  
468  
469  
470  
471  
472  
473  
474  
475

We believe that AQM and environmental monitoring in other domains for that matter, are a key element in societal efforts aimed at improving environmental conditions and deserve more scientific attention than is currently the case. We thus hope that the present paper encourages others to explore further the inferences we can draw from reported environmental data for the preferences and behavior of public authorities and other stakeholders.



**References**

1. Abera A, Friberg J, Isaxon C, et al. Air Quality in Africa: Public Health Implications. *Annu Rev Public Health*. 2021;42(1):193-210. doi:10.1146/annurev-publhealth-100119-113802
2. Alvarez CM, Hourcade R, Lefebvre B, Pilot E. A Scoping Review on Air Quality Monitoring, Policy and Health in West African Cities. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*. 2020;17(23):1-26.
3. Anenberg SC, Henze DK, Lacey F, et al. Air pollution-related health and climate benefits of clean cookstove programs in Mozambique. *Environ Res Lett*. 2017;12(2):025006. doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aa5557
4. Cropper ML, Simon NB, Alberini A, Arora S, Sharma PK. The Health Benefits of Air Pollution Control in Delhi. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*. 1997;79(5):1625-1629. doi:10.2307/1244393
5. WHO WHO. Improving air quality in Accra, Ghana by integrating health into policymaking. 2023. Accessed February 7, 2023. <https://www.who.int/about/accountability/results/who-results-report-2020-mtr/country-story/2021/ghana>
6. Yang H, Huang X, Westervelt DM, Horowitz L, Peng W. Socio-demographic factors shaping the future global health burden from air pollution. *Nat Sustain*. 2023;6(1):58-68. doi:10.1038/s41893-022-00976-8
7. Amegah AK, Agyei-Mensah S. Urban air pollution in Sub-Saharan Africa: Time for action. *Environmental Pollution*. 2017;220:738-743. doi:10.1016/j.envpol.2016.09.042
8. Health Effects Institute. *The State of Air Quality and Health Impacts in Africa. A Report from the State of Global Air Initiative*. Health Effects Institute; 2022. Accessed March 7, 2023. <https://www.healtheffects.org/announcements/new-state-global-air-special-report-air-quality-and-health-africa>
9. Martin RV, Brauer M, van Donkelaar A, Shaddick G, Narain U, Dey S. No one knows which city has the highest concentration of fine particulate matter. *Atmospheric Environment: X*. 2019;3:100040. doi:10.1016/j.aeaoa.2019.100040

- 476 10. UNEP UE programme. Actions on Air Quality: A Global Summary of Policies and  
477 Programmes to Reduce Air Pollution. UNEP - UN Environment Programme. March 9,  
478 2021. Accessed November 11, 2022. [http://www.unep.org/resources/report/actions-air-](http://www.unep.org/resources/report/actions-air-quality-global-summary-policies-and-programmes-reduce-air-pollution)  
479 [quality-global-summary-policies-and-programmes-reduce-air-pollution](http://www.unep.org/resources/report/actions-air-quality-global-summary-policies-and-programmes-reduce-air-pollution)
- 480 11. Jha A, Nauze AL. US Embassy air-quality tweets led to global health benefits.  
481 *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*. 2022;119(44):e2201092119.  
482 doi:10.1073/pnas.2201092119
- 483 12. Harrington HJ. *Business Process Improvement: The Breakthrough Strategy for Total*  
484 *Quality, Productivity, and Competitiveness*. McGraw-Hill Education; 1991.
- 485 13. Bellani L, Ceolotto S, Elsner B, Pestel N. The political fallout of air pollution.  
486 *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*. 2024;121(18):e2314428121.  
487 doi:10.1073/pnas.2314428121
- 488 14. Yao Y, Li X, Smyth R, Zhang L. Air pollution and political trust in local government:  
489 Evidence from China. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*.  
490 2022;115:102724. doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2022.102724
- 491 15. Alvarado MJ, McVey AE, Hegarty JD, et al. Evaluating the use of satellite observations  
492 to supplement ground-level air quality data in selected cities in low- and middle-income  
493 countries. *Atmospheric Environment*. 2019;218:117016.  
494 doi:10.1016/j.atmosenv.2019.117016
- 495 16. Frackiewicz M. The Advantages and Limitations of Satellites for Air Quality Monitoring  
496 and Prediction. *TS2 SPACE*. Published online July 2, 2023. Accessed August 3, 2023.  
497 [https://ts2.space/en/the-advantages-and-limitations-of-satellites-for-air-quality-](https://ts2.space/en/the-advantages-and-limitations-of-satellites-for-air-quality-monitoring-and-prediction/)  
498 [monitoring-and-prediction/](https://ts2.space/en/the-advantages-and-limitations-of-satellites-for-air-quality-monitoring-and-prediction/)
- 499 17. Mejía C. D, Alvarez H, Zalakeviciute R, Macancela D, Sanchez C, Bonilla S. Sentinel  
500 satellite data monitoring of air pollutants with interpolation methods in Guayaquil,  
501 Ecuador. *Remote Sensing Applications: Society and Environment*. 2023;31:100990.  
502 doi:10.1016/j.rsase.2023.100990
- 503 18. World Bank. *Getting Down to Earth: Are Satellites Reliable for Measuring Air Pollutants*  
504 *That Cause Mortality in Low- and Middle-Income Countries?* International Bank for  
505 Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank; 2022. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-  
506 1727-4
- 507 19. Bainomugisha E. How we're measuring air quality in Kampala - and why it works for  
508 African cities. *The Conversation*. August 26, 2020. Accessed February 7, 2023.  
509 [http://theconversation.com/how-were-measuring-air-quality-in-kampala-and-why-it-](http://theconversation.com/how-were-measuring-air-quality-in-kampala-and-why-it-works-for-african-cities-143006)  
510 [works-for-african-cities-143006](http://theconversation.com/how-were-measuring-air-quality-in-kampala-and-why-it-works-for-african-cities-143006)
- 511 20. Naran B, Strinati C, Stout S, Connolly J, Rosane P. *The State of Global Air Quality*  
512 *Funding 2022.*; 2022. Accessed February 7, 2023.  
513 [https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/the-state-of-global-air-quality-](https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/the-state-of-global-air-quality-funding-2022/)  
514 [funding-2022/](https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/the-state-of-global-air-quality-funding-2022/)

- 515 21. National Research Council. The Role of Monitoring in Environmental Management. In:  
516 *Managing Troubled Waters: The Role of Marine Environmental Monitoring*. National  
517 Academy Press; 1990. doi:10.17226/1439
- 518 22. Grossman GM, Krueger AB. Economic Growth and the Environment. *The Quarterly*  
519 *Journal of Economics*. 1995;110(2):353-377. doi:10.2307/2118443
- 520 23. Panayotou T. *Empirical Tests and Policy Analysis of Environmental Degradation at*  
521 *Different Stages of Economic Development*. ILO International Labour Organization;  
522 1993. Accessed June 20, 2024.  
523 <https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/iloilowps/992927783402676.htm>
- 524 24. Maslow AH. A theory of human motivation. *Psychological Review*. 1943;50(4):370-396.  
525 doi:10.1037/h0054346
- 526 25. Beck L, Bernauer T, Kalbhenn A. Environmental, political, and economic determinants of  
527 water quality monitoring in Europe. *Water Resources Research*. 2010;46(11).  
528 doi:10.1029/2009WR009065
- 529 26. Walter I, Ugelow JL. Environmental Policies in Developing Countries. *Ambio*.  
530 1979;8(2/3):102-109.
- 531 27. Sawant V, Hagerbaumer C, Rosales CMF, Isied M, Biggs R. *2022 Open Air Quality*  
532 *Data: The Global Landscape*. OpenAQ; 2022. Accessed January 20, 2023.  
533 <https://documents.openaq.org/reports/Open+Air+Quality+Data+Global+Landscape+2022>  
534 .pdf
- 535 28. Bättig MB, Bernauer T. National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies  
536 More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy? *International Organization*.  
537 2009;63(2):281-308. doi:10.1017/S0020818309090092
- 538 29. Bernauer T, Koubi V. Effects of political institutions on air quality. *Ecological*  
539 *Economics*. 2009;68(5):1355-1365. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.09.003
- 540 30. Læg Reid OM, Povitkina M. Do Political Institutions Moderate the GDP-CO2  
541 Relationship? *Ecological Economics*. 2018;145:441-450.  
542 doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.11.014
- 543 31. Neumayer E. Do Democracies Exhibit Stronger International Environmental  
544 Commitment? A Cross-country Analysis. *Journal of Peace Research*. 2002;39(2):139-  
545 164. doi:10.1177/0022343302039002001
- 546 32. Deacon RT. Public Good Provision under Dictatorship and Democracy. *Public Choice*.  
547 2009;139(1/2):241-262.
- 548 33. Olson M. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. 1993;87(3):567-576.  
549 doi:10.2307/2938736
- 550 34. Li Q, Reuveny R. Democracy and Environmental Degradation. *International Studies*  
551 *Quarterly*. 2006;50(4):935-956.

- 552 35. Papadopoulos Y. Understanding Accountability in Democratic Governance. *Elements in*  
553 *Public Policy*. Published online February 2023. doi:10.1017/9781108973823
- 554 36. Policardo L. Is Democracy Good for the Environment? Quasi-Experimental Evidence  
555 from Regime Transitions. *Environ Resource Econ*. 2016;64(2):275-300.  
556 doi:10.1007/s10640-014-9870-0
- 557 37. Schaffer LM, Oehl B, Bernauer T. Are policymakers responsive to public demand in  
558 climate politics? *Journal of Public Policy*. 2022;42(1):136-164.  
559 doi:10.1017/S0143814X21000088
- 560 38. WAQI TWAQI. World's Air Pollution: Real-time Air Quality Index. waqi.info. 2024.  
561 Accessed June 13, 2024. <https://waqi.info/>
- 562 39. OpenAQ. Fighting air inequality through open data. 2024. Accessed February 7, 2023.  
563 <https://openaq.org/>
- 564 40. PurpleAir. Real-time Air Quality Monitoring. PurpleAir, Inc. 2023. Accessed February 7,  
565 2023. <https://www2.purpleair.com/>
- 566 41. Moreno-Monroy AI, Schiavina M, Veneri P. Metropolitan areas in the world. Delineation  
567 and population trends. *Journal of Urban Economics*. 2021;125:103242.  
568 doi:10.1016/j.jue.2020.103242
- 569 42. van Donkelaar A, Martin RV, Brauer M, et al. Global Estimates of Fine Particulate Matter  
570 using a Combined Geophysical-Statistical Method with Information from Satellites,  
571 Models, and Monitors. *Environ Sci Technol*. 2016;50(7):3762-3772.  
572 doi:10.1021/acs.est.5b05833
- 573 43. OECD. Metropolitan areas in the world. Accessed February 5, 2023.  
574 <https://www.oecd.org/regional/regional-statistics/metropolitan-areas.htm>
- 575 44. Brauer M, Freedman G, Frostad J, et al. Ambient Air Pollution Exposure Estimation for  
576 the Global Burden of Disease 2013. *Environ Sci Technol*. 2016;50(1):79-88.  
577 doi:10.1021/acs.est.5b03709
- 578 45. Leffel B, Tavasoli N, Liddle B, Henderson K, Kiernan S. Metropolitan air pollution  
579 abatement and industrial growth: Global urban panel analysis of PM10, PM2.5, NO2 and  
580 SO2. *Environmental Sociology*. 2022;8(1):94-107. doi:10.1080/23251042.2021.1975349
- 581 46. The World Bank. World Bank Open Data. 2023. Accessed March 27, 2023.  
582 <https://data.worldbank.org/>
- 583 47. Kumm M, Taka M, Guillaume JHA. Gridded global datasets for Gross Domestic  
584 Product and Human Development Index over 1990–2015. *Sci Data*. 2018;5(1):180004.  
585 doi:10.1038/sdata.2018.4
- 586 48. Coppedge M, Gerring J, Knutsen CH, et al. “V-Dem Codebook v13” Varieties of  
587 Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Published online 2023.
- 588 49. Davies S, Pettersson T, Öberg M. Organized violence 1989-2022 and the return of  
589 conflicts between states? *Journal of Peace Research*. 2023;Forthcoming.

- 590 50. Gleditsch NP, Wallensteen P, Eriksson M, Sollenberg M, Strand H. Armed Conflict 1946-  
591 2001: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*. 2002;39(5).
- 592 51. Florczyk A, Corbane C, Schiavina M, et al. GHS Urban Centre Database 2015,  
593 multitemporal and multidimensional attributes, R2019A. Published online 2019.  
594 doi:<https://data.jrc.ec.europa.eu/dataset/53473144-b88c-44bc-b4a3-4583ed1f547e>
- 595 52. Curtis D. Welch's t test is more sensitive to real world violations of distributional  
596 assumptions than student's t test but logistic regression is more robust than either. *Stat*  
597 *Papers*. 2024;65(6):3981-3989. doi:10.1007/s00362-024-01531-7
- 598 53. Fay MP, Shaw PA. Exact and Asymptotic Weighted Logrank Tests for Interval Censored  
599 Data: The interval R Package. *Journal of Statistical Software*. 2010;36:1-34.  
600 doi:10.18637/jss.v036.i02
- 601 54. Cameron AC, Trivedi PK. *Microeconometrics Using Stata*. Stata Press; 2009.
- 602 55. Steegen S, Tuerlinckx F, Gelman A, Vanpaemel W. Increasing Transparency Through a  
603 Multiverse Analysis. *Perspect Psychol Sci*. 2016;11(5):702-712.  
604 doi:10.1177/1745691616658637
- 605