How media coverage shapes the effect of IOs on public attitudes: Quasi-experimental evidence on mass opinion about Russia's leadership in 49 countries*

Christoph Mikulaschek† Michal Parizek‡

January 16, 2025

Abstract

A large literature shows that international organizations shape mass opinion about salient issues when they endorse or condemn political actors and actions, but it leaves open the question how mass media conveys signals from international organizations to public audiences. We argue that the signaling effect of international organizations' decisions varies depending on how mass media transmit and refract them. First, international organizations' visibility in media coverage affects whether cues from international organizations reach public audiences or not. Second, media framing effects moderate citizens' attitudinal response to international organizations' decisions. To test this argument, we combine original news media data with nationally representative survey data from 49 countries to estimate the causal effect of a seminal 2022 United Nations resolution condemning Russia on mass attitudes toward Russia's government. Leveraging the exogenous timing of interviews, which were ongoing when the United Nations rebuked Russia, and a news corpus of more than 300,000 articles in 37 languages published shortly before or after the resolution, we identify the impact of international organizations' signals and media coverage by comparing responses gathered just before the resolution to those obtained in the same country shortly thereafter. We find that media visibility of the United Nations and media frames in United Nations coverage had a decisive impact on how public opinion about Russia's leadership changed. In the wake of the United Nations resolution, mass opinion soured on Russia's government when mass media covered the United Nations and focused on the stance and rationale of the resolution's proponents - unless media coverage emphasized divisions in the United Nations over the merit of condemning Russia. In conclusion, media coverage is a critical link between international organizations' signals and mass publics' attitudinal responses.

*We are grateful for helpful comments by Matthew Blackwell, Joshua Kertzer, and Jakub Stauber. Michal Parizek acknowledges funding from the project GLOWIN, Global Flows of Political Information (https://glowin.cuni.cz/), a PRIMUS project at the Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University (PRIMUS/21/HUM/012).

†Assistant Professor, Harvard University. Email: mikulaschek@gov.harvard.edu.

‡Associate Professor, Charles University. Email: michal.parizek@fsv.cuni.cz.

A large literature has established that international organizations shape public attitudes when they publicly endorse or condemn political actors or actions (see, e.g., Chapman 2011; Bearce and Cook 2018; Schneider 2019; Mikulaschek 2023). Studies on the signaling effect of international organizations have in common that they black box the question how the media transmit signals from international organizations to mass publics. This is problematic because we know that news media vary in terms of how they report international news, and that news media coverage affects public attitudes (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Baum and Groeling 2010). We argue that the impact of international organizations' decisions on salient political issues varies depending on whether and how the media reports them to the public. Specifically, international organizations' media visibility determines whether publics are exposed - and have a chance to respond - to signals from international organizations or whether those signals never reach public audiences. Building on elite cue theory (Zaller 1992), we also expect that media coverage that emphasizes vocal dissent by a minority of member states conveys two conflicting cues (from the majority and minority in the organization) to the public and thereby diminishes the mass attitudinal impact of the organization's signal compared to coverage that highlights the content of the decision and the majority's rationale for adopting it.

We test this argument by analyzing the causal effect of a seminal 2022 United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution, which condemned Russia's annexation of four Ukrainian provinces, on public attitudes about Russia's leadership in 49 countries. To conduct this event response study, we leverage the fact that the UN censured Russia while Gallup had a survey in the field around the world, and that the timing of interviews in a given country was exogenously determined. This research design opportunity enables us to estimate the impact of the United Nations' signal on mass opinion about the Russian government by comparing

survey responses gathered just before the UN resolution to interviews conducted in the same country shortly after this event. To analyze how media coverage of the UN resolution shaped the public's response, we combine this survey data from 49 countries with original news media data consisting of 300,000 articles in 37 languages that appeared in these countries shortly before or after the resolution. Since differences between national news environments correlate with observable and unobservable country characteristics, an estimate of media effects based on cross-sectional differences would be confounded. Therefore, we estimate how media coverage moderates the effect of the UN's signal by leveraging within-country temporal variation in the UN's visibility and in media frames between different news cycles before each respondent's interview, whose timing was exogenously determined.

We find that the UN's condemnation of Russia did not shift public attitudes about Russia's leadership, on average. This robust null result masks substantial heterogeneity in effect size depending on how much and how media in respondents' home countries covered the UN. Thus, a one-standard deviation increase in UN media visibility *after* the resolution's adoption reduced favorable views about Russia's government by five percentage points. As expected, more UN visibility shortly *before* this event did not shift attitudes about Russian leaders, and the cleanly identified difference between these effects is significant. Further analyses confirm that media framing effects moderated the effect of the UN signal on public attitudes. Thus, media coverage that highlighted divisions in the international community over Russia's use of force muddled the UN General Assembly's message and prevented it from impacting public opinion. In contrast, coverage that focused on the UN majority's stance and rationale led to a particularly strong public opinion rally against Russia's leadership.

Our study makes several contributions. First, by showing that the impact of international institutions on public attitudes is conditional on how much and how the news media covers international organizations, the study speaks to the large literature on signals from

international organizations to mass publics. It concludes that a single signal from a given international organization will have diverging effects on public audiences exposed to different mass media cues, which will polarize public opinion as a result. Second, this study contributes to UN scholarship by conducting the first analysis of the impact of a General Assembly resolution on public opinion. The finding that the General Assembly can shape mass political attitudes when the media cover its decisions plausibly explains a puzzling pattern observed by previous studies: Even though General Assembly resolutions are non-binding and cannot be enforced, great powers make costly side payments to win votes in this institution (Dreher and Sturm 2012; Carter and Stone 2015). More generally, this finding enhances our understanding of naming and shaming in world politics (Terman and Byun 2022; Tingley and Tomz 2022). Finally, the study contributes to the quickly growing literature on the Ukraine war. While others have examined the war's impact on public opinion (Thomson et al. 2023; Aksoy, Enamorado and Yang 2024; Mader 2024; Stolle 2024) and media framing of the conflict (Pavlichenko 2022; Chernov 2023; Omoera and Nwaoboli 2023; Parizek 2023; Rafeeq 2023; Zollmann 2023) in various world regions, this study is the first to investigate how international organizations and media coverage of their work has shaped public opinion about the government that started the most fatal ongoing war in the world.

1 Public opinion about foreign affairs

How do publics form opinions about foreign affairs? Two strands of the literature present contrasting answers to this question. A first school of thought argues that publics form attitudes about foreign affairs based on cost-benefit calculations, which may be informed by their identity and values. A number of studies point to expected personal gains and losses as drivers of mass opinion about international issues. Thus, highly educated citizens, who are better able to compete in an integrated labor market, tend to be more supportive of

international economic integration than others (Gabel 1998; Hobolt 2014), and low-income citizens who fear losing welfare benefits oppose fiscal transfers to other countries (Kleider and Stoeckel 2019). Sociotropic considerations also inform public opinion about foreign affairs. For instance, trade attitudes are informed less by self-interest than by the perceived impact on the national economy (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). Moreover, citizens who are neither in the military nor draft-eligible form their attitudes about military interventions abroad based on the number of casualties (Mueller 1973) or their rate (Slantchev, Alexandrova and Gartzke 2005) or trend (Gartner 2008) or the probability that their country will prevail (Eichenberg 2005).

How citizens perceive international issues and actors depends on their values and cultural identity. Thus, moral values and core dispositions shape foreign policy attitudes (Kertzer et al. 2014; Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017). Cosmopolitan values (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit 2014; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2016), altruism, and leftist values (Daniele and Geys 2015) help explain support of global governance institutions and of fiscal transfers to other countries. At the same time, persons who conceive of their national identity as inclusive of other territorial identities are more likely to support supranational governance than those who hold exclusive national identities (Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005).

A second strand of the literature starts with the premise that publics tend to be rationally ignorant about foreign affairs (Holsti 2004) and know less about them than about domestic policy (Edwards 1983; Sobel 1993; Canes-Wrone 2006). Publics are nonetheless able to form coherent attitudes about foreign affairs, because they use cognitive shortcuts (heuristics and cues) as substitutes for policy information. First, citizens extrapolate from the more familiar terrain of domestic politics to international affairs (Harteveld, van der Meer and de Vries 2013; Hobolt 2012). Second, publics take cues from peers in their own country (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017), from foreign voters (Walter 2020), and from domestic or foreign elites

(Dellmuth and Tallberg 2023; Guisinger and Saunders 2017). Elites whose cues are capable of influencing public opinion about international affairs include leaders of political parties (Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007; Baum and Groeling 2009; Dür and Schlipphak 2021; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2023), policy experts (Guisinger and Saunders 2017), military leaders (Golby, Feaver and Dropp 2018), NGOs (Davis, Murdie and Steinmetz 2012; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021), foreign governments (Hayes and Guardino 2011; Murray 2014; Tingley and Tomz 2022; Egel 2024), and international organizations (see below).

2 How the news media moderate the effect of IO cues on public opinion

A large literature shows that cues from international organizations shape public opinion about international affairs. Thus, publics tend to be more supportive of military interventions when they are conducted with the approval of the United Nations or NATO than they are without multilateral endorsement (Chapman and Reiter 2004; Chapman 2011; Grieco et al. 2011; Tingley and Tomz 2012; Wallace 2019; Mikulaschek 2024). This signaling effect does not only shape mass attitudes in the intervening country but also in allied nations (Johns and Davies 2014; Ikeda and Tago 2014; Tago and Ikeda 2013). Cues from the United Nations are also able to shape public attitudes on policies outside the issue area of international security (Greenhill 2020). Similarly, signals from the European Union (EU) (Walter et al. 2018; Mikulaschek 2023) and the World Trade Organization (Bearce and Cook 2018) shape public opinion attitudes about economic policy, regional cooperation, and migration. While international organizations' approval enhances popular support for the endorsed course of action or its proponents (e.g., Thompson 2009), international institutions' criticism has the opposite effect (Koliev, Page and Tallberg 2022). This conventional wisdom informs our expectation that an international organization's condemnation of an actor will deteriorate

public opinion about this actor (*hypothesis 1*).

What all these theoretical arguments have in common is that they black box the question how signals are transmitted from international organizations to publics. Thus, most scholarship on how international organization's decisions shape public opinion echoes "[earlier] political science scholarship [which] reduces the media's role to a 'conveyor belt' that passively transports elite views (Jentleson 1992; Brody 1991) ... to the public." (Baum and Potter 2008, 40). The lack of theorizing about the role of media in transmitting cues from international organizations to publics is problematic because a large literature in political communication has shown that media reporting affects the public's views on many issues (Kuypers 1997; Paletz 2002; Graber and Dunaway 2018) including foreign affairs (Baum and Groeling 2009). Journalists shape the news by choosing which stories are news-worthy and how to report them (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Patterson 1993). Norms of balanced coverage are not consistently applied across news environments and outlets - especially in an era of partisan news sources (Tuchman 1972; Graber and Dunaway 2018). Therefore, media coverage of international organizations varies over time (King and Lugg 2023) and between news outlets (de Vreese et al. 2006; Boomgaarden et al. 2010).

Several recent studies have started to open the black box of how the media transmit international organizations' cues to publics. Creamer and Simmons (2019) demonstrate that international human rights institutions' reports affect press coverage but do not examine downstream effects on public opinion. Brutger and Strezhnev (2022) offer a compelling account of how media coverage of states' and firms' state-investor dispute filings shape mass attitudes but leave open the question of mass attitudinal effects of international arbitrators' decisions. Chaudoin (2023) convincingly shows that domestic actors' responses to international organizations' signals affect public opinion.[1]

[1]Others have combined survey experiments with a news media content analysis to show that experimental stimuli are similar to those found in actual media context (Mikulaschek 2023, 2024), but they cannot trace

Building on this literature, this study investigates how the media transmit international organizations' cues to publics by theorizing that variation in the intensity and tone of media coverage of international organization's cues shapes citizens' responses to these signals. First, we expect that variation in international organizations' media visibility shapes mass attitudinal responses to international institutions' cues. Citizens rely on information from the media when forming political attitudes, especially on issues that they perceive as abstract and distant - such as signals from international organizations (Page and Shapiro 1992). Journalists tend to focus on reporting the opinions of authoritative elites who are in a position to influence policy outcomes, and thus they often cover international organizations' stances on salient topics (Baum and Groeling 2010, 4). At the same time, potential media reports about international organizations' cues compete with other news events in the market of newsworthiness. This introduces temporal and cross-sectional variation in international organizations' visibility across news cycles and between media environments. When international organizations receive little media attention, their signals do not reach the public and cannot sway mass opinion. Previous studies that rely on survey experiments to investigate the impact of international institutions' cues yield estimates that are conditional on exposure to information about these signals; and their claims of external validity rest on the assumption that similar real-world signals from international organizations are transmitted to citizens (e.g., Grieco et al. 2011; Bearce and Cook 2018; Wallace 2019). In contrast, we argue that the transmission of signals from international organizations to publics varies as a function of international organizations' visibility in the media, which changes across news cycles and between news environments. In turn, we expect that variation in the intensity of media reporting about an international organization moderates the mass attitudinal impact of international institutions' signals. Ceteris paribus, we expect that an international organization's condemnation of an actor will have a more negative effect on public opinion

individual-level attitudinal effects to variation in individuals' news media exposure.

about that actor when the institution is highly visible in the news media than it is at other times (*hypothesis 2*).

Second, we expect that the effect of international organizations' cues on mass opinion depends on *how* the media covers them. Journalists constantly frame current events in response to pressures to make news accessible to their audiences while retaining access to politicians and officials who promote their preferred frames (Baum and Potter 2008). The frames that journalists choose reveal what they view as most relevant to the topic at hand (Gubitz 2019). Frames in media communication play an important role in shaping how the media audience thinks about the issues covered in the news. Thus, news media frames affect mass political attitudes (Iyengar 1991; Nelson, Clawson and Oxley 1997; Iyengar and Kinder 2010) including public opinion about international institutions (Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006; Schuck and de Vreese 2006) and about foreign countries (Brewer, Graf and Willnat 2003). The conflict frame predominates in media coverage (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Neuman, Just and Crigler 1992; McManus 1994) including in news about international organizations (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000; Chaudoin 2023), because emphasizing conflict helps the media capture audience interest and abide by journalistic norms of 'presenting both sides of the issue' . When citizens are just provided with one interpretation of an issue, it tends to move opinions, but this framing effect on attitudes tends to disappear when respondents are confronted with two contrasting frames (Sniderman and Theriault 2004; Druckman 2011).

Applying these insights to international organizations, we argue that two complementary ways of framing cues from these institutions moderate the effect of these signals on public opinion: On the one hand, the media can focus on the organization's communication and the rationale of its proponents for proposing it. On the other, it can highlight conflict in the organization over the institution's stance. When media coverage focuses on the substance of the organization's decision and the stance of proponents of the international organization's

cue, it enables these proponents to shape how the audience interprets the international organization's signal. Importantly, the audience can use the organization's decision (and the rationale for adopting it) as a simple heuristic when forming an opinion about the issue without having to work through the details. In contrast, media coverage that prominently features vocal dissent in the organization gives the institution's cue a very different meaning: by confronting the audience with a contradicting cue from the minority, coverage that highlights conflict in the institution reduces the heuristic value of the majority's cue. Thus, survey experiments show that cues from a united international organization have a stronger effect on public attitudes than those conveyed by a divided one (Mikulaschek 2023, 2024). In a similar vein, dissent by a small minority of scientists evaporates the effect of scholarly consensus on public attitudes (Aklin and Urpelainen 2014; Maliniak, Parajon and Powers 2021), and dissenting opinions diminish public opinion rallies triggered by unanimous court decisions (Zink, Spriggs and Scott 2009). Analogously, divisions between the leaders of a political party muddle the party's message and weaken its influence on public opinion (Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994; Ray 2003; Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007). Similarly, we expect that media coverage that frames an international organization's cue in terms of conflict within the institution muddles the organization's signal and evaporates its impact on public opinion (*hypothesis 3a*). In contrast, coverage that focuses on the majority's decision and rationale will result in a public opinion rally in support of the majority's position (*hypothesis 3b*).

The argument is different from (but compatible with) previous studies of the effect of media coverage of international organizations on public opinion. While previous communication scholarship has examined how the EU's media visibility (Brosius, van Elsas and de Vreese 2019; Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006) and media framing (Vliegenthart et al. 2008; Schuck and de Vreese 2006) affect public attitudes about this institution and its policies, we argue that international organizations' media visibility and media framing effects influence the

ability of international organizations to shape mass attitudes by endorsing or condemning actors on the world stage or their conduct.

3 Context of UN General Assembly's condemnation of Russia

We test our argument by examining how media and public opinion around the world responded to the UN General Assembly's condemnation of Russia's military intervention in Ukraine in October 2012. Before we introduce our research design, we briefly summarize events in Ukraine and at UN headquarters and explain why this UN resolution constitutes a hard case to test our argument. Following the 2014 Ukrainian revolution that ousted a pro-Russian president and triggered protest in Eastern Ukraine, Russia militarily intervened in Southern and Eastern Ukraine and annexed Crimea. Two pro-Russian republics in Ukraine's East declared their independence. The United Nations recognized neither the annexation of Crimea nor the two republics' independence. Two agreements signed in Minsk failed to end the conflict and were followed by a low-level armed conflict. On 21 February 2022, Russia recognized the two self-proclaimed pro-Russian republics of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent countries. Three days later, it launched an invasion of Ukraine, thus starting the largest conflict in Europe since World War II.

Following a rare request from the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly opened a Special Emergency Session on Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Five days after the start of the war, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that deplored Russia's invasion and demanded the withdrawal of its military and of Russia's recognition of the republics of Donetsk and Luhansk (Nations 2022*a*). In late March and April, the General Assembly reiterated these demands in two additional resolutions and suspended Russia's membership in the UN Human Rights Council (Nations 2022*b*,*c*). In addition, the European Union and G7 imposed a series of sanctions on Russia, the Council of Europe expelled Russia, and

the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against Russia's president and other Russian officials.

A successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in Eastern Ukraine led Russian forces and their local collaborators to hold referenda on Russian annexation in four Ukrainian provinces between 20 and 27 September 2022. The results in favor of joining Russia were announced on 27 and 28 September, and Russia annexed these provinces on 30 September. On the same day, the Security Council deliberated on a draft resolution condemning the referenda and annexation, which was vetoed by Russia. On the following day, Ukraine counteroffensive ended with the conquest of Lyman. On 3 October, Albania and Ukraine wrote to the President of the General Assembly to request the resumption of the body's Special Emergency Session to deliberate on the annexation. On 10 and 12 October, the General Assembly met to discuss and adopt a draft resolution, which once again demanded Russia's withdrawal from Ukraine, condemned the "illegal so-called referendums" and the "attempted illegal annexation" of four Ukrainian provinces, and called on states not to recognize these regions as part of Russia (Nations 2022*d*). In a public vote held in the afternoon of 12 October, 143 countries supported the resolution, 5 voted against, 35 abstained, and 10 did not vote.[2] 80 states spoke in the General Assembly, and many government leaders commented on the resolution (e.g., Biden 2022).

The UN General Assembly resolution adopted in October 2022 represents a hard case to test our argument on how media and publics respond to signals from international organizations. This is because it was the fourth General Assembly resolution that condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In consequence, publics had already been pre-treated by three

[2]Belarus, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Syria voted against the draft resolution. Abstaining countries included China, India, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan. Azerbaijan, Iran, and Venezuela were among the absentees. 143 yes votes were cast by a diverse set of countries, which included Western countries, many democracies, and even some states with relatively friendly relations with Russia such as Serbia and South Africa.

similar cues from the same institution. For the same reason, media around the world devoted less attention to this resolution than they did to the one adopted at the start of the war. Seven months into the war, publics had already updated political attitudes in response to the conflict, and it was an uphill battle for media coverage of the General Assembly's resolution to further shift mass attitudes. For this reason, we expect that our estimates establish a conservative estimate of the effect of international organizations' cues on the media and public opinion about salient topics.

4 Research design

This section summarizes our design-based approach to causal inference, public opinion and news media content data, measures, and statistical model.

4.1 Identification strategy and public opinion data

To investigate how the UN General Assembly's condemnation of Russia affected the media and mass publics, we leverage a survey that was in the field around the world when the resolution was adopted. We combine this data with original data on daily news coverage in 164 countries. The timing of each interview was exogenous to the adoption of the resolution and to media coverage of the UN before the interview. Therefore, respondents who were interviewed before the resolution's adoption and those surveyed in the same country soon after this event should not be systematically different, in expectation. Neither should those who were interviewed during news cycles with high UN visibility exhibit systematic differences from others surveyed in the same country at times when the UN's media visibility was lower. Indeed, covariate balance tests reported below confirm that these groups were similar to each other on key determinants of political attitudes. This enables us to estimate the effect

of the UN's condemnation of Russia by comparing the attitudes of respondents interviewed just before the UN decision to those who took the same survey shortly thereafter in the same country. To analyze how the UN's media visibility moderates this effect, we examine the impact of within-country temporal variation in the UN's visibility in the news; in other words, we compare the effect of the resolution on the attitudes of respondents interviewed during news cycles with high UN visibility to the corresponding impact among those who took the survey in the same country when the UN's visibility in the news was lower.

Gallup conducted the 2022 World Poll in more than 150 countries. Interviews were conducted in person or by phone in the major conversational languages of each country. Samples were probability based and nationally representative of the resident adult population. Unless population data was unavailable, sample selection for in-person interviews was based on probabilities proportional to population size. The number of primary sampling units per country was at least 33, and respondents were selected from 100 to 125 ultimate clusters (sampling units) in each country. Random route procedures were used to select sampled households, and a Kish grid method was used to identify a respondent. Phone interviews used random-digit-dial or a nationally representative list of phone numbers, and they were only conducted in countries where phone networks cover at least 80% of the population or where phone interviews were the customary survey method.

For our main analyses, we focus on the 15,319 interviews conducted in 49 countries within ten days before and after the UN's condemnation of Russia to mitigate the risk that other events confound the estimation of the impact of this event on public attitudes. At the same time, the results are robust to including all survey responses gathered within two weeks before or after the resolution (increasing the sample size by 39%) or to restricting the analysis to responses gathered within just one week or four days before or after the event (reducing the sample size by 34% and 63%, respectively). Since it took Gallup up to eleven weeks to com-

plete data gathering in each country, neither of these four samples contains all respondents surveyed in each of the 49 countries, because the exogenously determined timing of each interview determined inclusion in each sample. Therefore, the national subsamples are not nationally representative, but covariate balance tests do not detect significant differences between respondents who were included in the analysis because they were interviewed in temporal proximity to the UN resolution and those who were not (see Appendix Table A.5). Moreover, the results are supported by four different samples whose size and composition greatly varies, and thus they are not driven by idiosyncratic sample composition. Following standard practice for multicountry survey research (see, e.g., Ghassim, Koenig-Archibugi and Cabrera 2022), responses were weighted to ensure that each country has an equal weight in our analyses. A series of robustness checks sequentially drops countries with relatively few responses in the sample to verify that our results are not sensitive to upweighting interviews conducted there (see Appendix Table A.17).

The set of 49 countries in our main sample includes states in all UN regional groups and two non-states (Hong Kong and Puerto Rico). The composition of the set is a function of the schedule for rolling out Gallup's World Poll, which was determined long before anyone knew whether and when the UN General Assembly would condemn Russia in October 2022. While the set of countries in our sample is regionally imbalanced (Africa and Eastern Europe are overrepresented while Asia-Pacific, Latin America and Carribbean, and the UN's Western Europe and Others groups are underrepresented), the sample is indistinguishable from the underlying population of all states in terms of GDP size, political regime characteristics (VDEM), government effectiveness, 2021-2 UN General Assembly ideal points, and UN media visibility (see Appendix Table A.12).[3] This renders us confident that the findings from our study generalize beyond the 49 countries in our sample.

[3]The only covariate imbalance relates to population size, which is consistent with the fact that large multicountry surveys fielded by Gallup and other polling firms typically omit microstates and small island nations.

4.2 News media data

To analyze how media coverage of the United Nations resolution shaped the public's response, we analyze an original corpus of online news articles that appeared within ten days before or after the UN's condemnation of Russia. Our news corpus includes 303,224 news articles that were published in 709 media outlets and in 37 languages in the 49 countries in our main sample.[4] Newspapers and news magazines (tabloids and quality papers) all feature in this news corpus. Compiled for this study, it is drawn from the dataset of project GLOWIN, which traces online news media coverage across up to more than 180 states (Parizek 2024), but it extends the GLOWIN dataset and analyzes 14 times more daily news articles during the time period examined here.

The underlying list of news articles analyzed was provided by GDELT, the only publicly available database that traces news media content across virtually all states of the world (Leetaru and Schrodt 2013; GDELT 2022). Instead of relying on GDELT's own processing of the news media content, the GLOWIN dataset and this study merely use GDELT as a source of a list of article URLs, retaining full control over all steps of the analysis and applying a rigorous quality management procedure. To identify those websites that constitute news media in GDELT and to assign the domains correctly to their audience states, GLOWIN and this article rely on three independent external sources.[5]

[4]The robustness checks that examine longer or shorter time periods examine 403,032, 224,494, and 137,834 articles that appeared no more than 14, 7, and 4 days before or after the resolution.

[5]The first is the Amazon Alexa Ranking, a commercial Amazon database that traces website traffic and their audience geography for internet domains globally until early 2022 (Service 2022; for a review, see Alby and Jäschke 2022). We use information from this database to identify those domains that count among the 500 most widely accessed website in each country. To further clean the resulting list, trained research assistants manually explore every domain in GDELT that satisfies this criterion to determine whether or not it constitutes a news media site (as opposed to, e.g. the domain of another business). Moreover, only news media outlets published in languages that are widely spoken in a country are considered in the assignment of a news media outlet to that audience country. The other two sources used to identify news media sources are two datasets of national news media outlets across most states of the world: the SCIago media rankings (SCImago 2024) and the w3newspaper database (W3newspapers 2024). The advantage of both is that they represent curated lists of nationally identified news media outlets, in the case of SCImago media compiled based on a transparent methodology. The further advantage is that they explicitly assign domains to

We use the resulting list of media outlets and individual URLs to access the full text content of the articles, and we employ regular access procedures and the readability heuristic (van Cranenburgh 2022) to extract the article body content from the article html code. The full text content of media outlets in other languages than English – around 60% of the content – is machine-translated to English using Google Translate. An inevitable limitation of this procedure is that we cannot collect media content behind paywalls.

We estimate the UN's visibility in the media with the use of a dictionary of search terms for the various various ways in which the United Nations is referred to (e.g., United Nations, the UN/U.N., United Nations General Assembly). Appendix Table A.19 reports the full dictionary. The search procedure uses the *vaex* Python package and its regular expressions flavor (Breddels and Veljanoski 2018). An article is marked as referring to the UN if it contains at least one reference to at least one UN-related search term. A series of validation steps is implemented, including disambiguation of related terms, replicating the process applied in previous studies on the UN news media visibility using this dataset (Parizek 2023, 2024).

To capture media framing in coverage of the UN resolution, we also use a dictionary of search terms (Parizek and Stauber 2024) to detect references to countries that dissented from the UN's condemnation of Russia or supported it (see below for details). The lexicon uses a series of keywords for each state and additional NLP tools – classification based on natural language inference (Laurer et al. 2024) and generative AI (OpenAI 2024) – to disambiguate particularly difficult classification cases, such as Georgia (a US state vs. a

audience states, which renders external data on audience geography unnecessary. The disadvantage is that, unlike the Amazon Alexa Ranking, they only assign media outlets to individual states, effectively ignoring the fact that the same outlet is accessed also by audiences in different states. For this reason, our list of countries' media outlets combines the three lists based on Alexa website rankings, SCImago media rankings, and the w3newspaper database. Based on the audience geography data from the Amazon Alexa ranking database, where a media outlet may have detectable audience in more than one country, there are 516,332 article-country observations.

country), Dominica (a personal name vs. a country) or China (ceramic vs. a country). For each article, we detect references to the states and calculate the number of references to states that supported the UN resolution, that voted against it, that abstained, and that were absent. We shorthand the latter three categories collective as dissenting states.[6]

4.3 Variables

Our main dependent variable captures attitudes about Russia's government. It is a dichotomous measure based on the following survey question: "Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Russia?" Respondents could choose between the answer options "approve", "disapprove", "don't know", and declining to answer; the latter two are treated as non-responses. Listwise deletion of these item non-responses would bias inferences if the UN resolution or media coverage altered respondents' calculus about expressing an opinion about Russia or declining to do so. For instance, it would be theoretically possible that the UN's condemnation of Russia increased social desirability pressures against expressing a favorable view of Russia's leadership, thus increasing the frequency of non-responses. However, covariate balance tests in Appendix Table A.14 do not detect any evidence of an effect of the UN resolution, UN visibility, or news frames in UN coverage on the likelihood of item non-response. On average, 44% of respondents in our main sample gave Russia's leadership a favorable rating. Figure 1 displays strong cross-sectional variation in attitudes about the Russian government, with the highest approval ratings in Western Africa, Kyrgyzstan, and Serbia and some of the lowest levels of approval in the Baltic countries.

Observable and unobservable differences between countries and their media environments would confound the estimate of media effects based on a cross-national comparison of media coverage. For this reason, we investigate media effects by examining within-country temporal

[6]On strategic absences from General Assembly votes, see Morse and Coggins (2024).

Figure 1: Attitudes about Russia's leadership by country



Note: For each country in our sample, the figure displays average approval ratings of Russia's leadership among respondents interviewed within two weeks before or after the UN condemned Russia in October 2022.

variation in coverage across news cycles. Specifically, our measure of UN visibility indicates the average share of news articles that mentioned the UN and appeared in the respondent's home country on the day of the interview or the three preceding days (out of all articles in that country during that period); a robustness check replicates our results with a different time period (see Appendix Table A.15). This measurement strategy does not imply that we assume that political attitudes only respond to news coverage of the past few days. Of course, public attitudes also reflect information, cues, and frames received from the media at earlier points in time. Our measure of exposure to high or low UN media visibility in the days before the interview aims to capture the marginal effect of media coverage of the UN on attitudes about Russia, which materializes on top of these antecedent media effects to which all respondents in a country are expected to have been exposed regardless of whether they were interviewed during a news cycle with high or low UN visibility. Since we do not know how many and which news articles respondents actually read before they took the survey, we conceive of the news media variables as exposure to media coverage of the UN and not as a measure of individual-level news consumption.

The measures of media framing of the UN's condemnation of Russia are constructed analogously to the variable indicating the institution's media visibility. To record the prominence of the conflict within the institution frame in media reporting, we measure the average share of news articles that mentioned the UN as well as one or more of the countries that dissented in the General Assembly's vote and that appeared in the respondent's country on the day of the interview or the three preceding days (out of all articles in that country during that period). To capture the prominence of the media frame that focuses on the majority's decision and rationale we measure the share of news articles in the interviewee's home country that mentioned the UN and at least one country that supported the UN resolution during the same period. These two measures pick up very subtle instances of media framing. We also replicate our analyses with two alternative measures that aim to capture the share of news articles that contain stronger versions of the same two media frames. One of them indicates the average share of news articles that mentioned the UN and only referenced dissenting countries (but did not reference any countries that supported the resolution) and that appeared in a respondent's home country on the day of the interview or the three preceding days. The other captures the corresponding share of news reports that only referenced the UN and countries that supported the resolution - but no dissenters. To make sure that these four measures capture media framing of the UN's decision rather than the General Assembly vote choice of news companies' home countries, the variables do not record instances of media framing in articles that only refer to the UN and the home country of the article. Moreover, covariate balance tests show that countries' vote choices on the resolution did not correlate with UN media visibility or with the prominence of any of the media frames in UN coverage (see Appendix Table A.13). Russia and Ukraine also cast votes in the General Assembly, but references to the two countries at war do not necessarily capture media frames and are thus not taken into account in coding the media framing measures.

Our news media data yields interesting descriptive results on the UN's media visibility

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of UN visibility and media frames in UN coverage

Measure	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
UN visibility	49	0.037	0.025	0.000	0.150
Media frame focusing on majority's decision	49	0.028	0.022	0.000	0.132
Media frame focusing only on majority's decision	49	0.014	0.010	0.000	0.050
Media frame focusing on vocal dissent in UN	49	0.018	0.018	0.000	0.099
Media frame focusing only on vocal dissent in UN	49	0.004	0.005	0.000	0.024

Note: The table indicates the UN's visibility and the frequency of media frames as shares of all media articles published in the 49 countries in our sample during the period of analysis.

and media frames in UN coverage. The institution was mentioned in 3.7 percent of all articles that appeared in the 49 countries in our sample during the ten days before and after the resolution. This value is somewhat higher than long-term UN visibility, which was estimated at 2.3 percent for 2018-2021 (Parizek 2024). At the same time, Appendix Figure A.1 demonstrates that the UN's visibility at the time of the UN resolution is highly correlated with long-term UN visibility patterns. Moreover, the 49-country sample average during our period of study is close to simultaneous UN's visibility across all states in the world (3.5%). Descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the media frame that focused on the majority's decision and rationale was more prominent than the alternative frame, with the former featured in three in four articles about the UN and the latter in less than half. The alternative versions of these frames were much more rare and were only included in a tenth or a third of articles, respectively. Even so, analyses of both alternative measures of the two frames (reported below) support the same findings.

Control variables include respondents' age, education, employment status, income, and the size of her hometown. Appendix Table A.18 presents more detail and descriptive statistics of all variables.

4.4 Model

The model to test hypothesis 1 has the following specification:

$$DV_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 FE_i + \epsilon. \quad (1)$$

The subscript i refers to the respondent. The DV_i takes the value 1 if the interviewee had a favorable opinion about Russia's leadership and 0 otherwise. The binary treatment variable, T_i, indicates whether the respondent was surveyed before or after the resolution was adopted. $T_i = 1$ if the interview took place after October 12. The control variables contained in X_i describe individual-level socio-economic characteristics. We include country fixed effects FE_i. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent. Hypothesis 1 implies that the coefficient of β_1 will be significantly negative.

To estimate how media coverage moderates the signaling effect of the UN General Assembly's decision, we add an interaction term to the model:

$$DV_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \beta_3 T_i * Z_i + \beta_4 X_i + \beta_5 FE_i + \epsilon. \quad (2)$$

Z_i describes the media coverage of the UN to which respondent i was exposed shortly before taking the survey. Specifically, it indicates the UN's news visibility in models that test hypothesis 2. We expect that β_2, which captures the effect of the UN's media visibility before the condemnation of Russia, will be indistinguishable from 0. In contrast, $\beta_1 + \beta_3$, i.e. the same effect after the General Assembly resolution, should cause a decline in favorable views about Russia's leadership. β_3 is the coefficient of the difference between these effects, and should be negative and significant. In models that test hypotheses 3a and 3b, Z_i indicates the prominence of frames highlighting dissent and the resolution's proponents and their rationale,

respectively. We again expect β_2 to be insignificant. Moreover, β_3 and $\beta_1 + \beta_3$ should be indistinguishable from 0 when Z_i captures a respondent's exposure to media coverage that highlights vocal dissent within the UN. In contrast, β_3 and $\beta_1 + \beta_3$ should be significantly negative in models that estimate the effect of exposure to alternative media frames centered on the majority's decision and its rationale.

5 Results

The UN's condemnation of Russia did not change attitudes about Russia, on average. Thus, country fixed effects models that estimate equation (1) do not support hypothesis 1, which was derived from the conventional wisdom. Model 1 in Appendix Table A.1 predicted average approval of Russia's leadership at 43.9% during the ten days before the UN resolution and at 44.5% over the following ten days; the small change was insignificant. Appendix Table A.1 also shows that this null result is robust to re-estimating our model with a larger sample of interviews conducted during two weeks before or after the resolution (increasing N by 39%) or to restricting the analysis to responses obtained within one week or just four days before or after the UN decision (reducing N by 34% and 63%, respectively). As explained above, the exogenous timing of interviews - shortly before the UN resolution or soon thereafter - enables us to interpret the coefficient of the binary treatment designating whether a respondent was interviewed after the UN condemned Russia as a causal estimate.

Importantly, the overall null effect masks substantial heterogeneity of the UN's signaling effect introduced by media coverage. Thus, both UN media visibility and media frames in UN coverage moderate the organization's signaling effect on public opinion about Russia's leadership. Country fixed effects models that include an interaction between the UN resolution and UN media visibility shortly before each interview (see estimating equation 2) yield results that support hypothesis 2. As expected, the marginal effect of UN media visibility

Figure 2: Effect of UN media visibility before and after the UN resolution



Note: Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals are based on model 5 in Appendix Table A.2.

during the days before the interview was insignificant and close to zero among respondents who took the survey before the UN condemned Russia (see Figure 2). In contrast, a one-standard deviation increase in UN visibility shortly after it condemned Russia significantly decreased favorable attitudes about Russia's leadership by 5.2 percentage points or 11 percent.[7] The coefficient of the interaction term is significant ($p<0.01$), which confirms that the UN's media visibility moderates the signaling effect of the UN's condemnation of Russia (see Figure 2 and Appendix Table A.2). Robustness checks in the same table show that these results hold across all alternative temporal scopes of analysis. The timing of interviews (before or after the UN vote) was exogenously determined, which enables us to causally identify the difference between the effect of UN media visibility among respondents who took the survey before the UN condemned Russia and the corresponding effect observed among residents of the same country who were interviewed shortly after this event. Exogenous interview timing also ensures that those who took the survey during a media cycle with high UN visibility

[7]One standard deviation in UN media visibility amounts to a 4 percentage point increase in the share of news articles that reference the UN on the day of the interview or the three preceding days.

are not expected to be systematically different from those conationals who were interviewed at a time when media paid less attention to the UN. Covariate balance tests summarized below corroborate these identifying assumptions.

In line with our third hypothesis, media frames in UN coverage moderated the signaling effect of the UN's condemnation of Russia. Thus, coverage of the UN that highlighted vocal dissent in the organization muddled the signal from the UN and thereby blunted its impact on public opinion. Consequently, UN coverage that mentioned conflict within the UN or only referenced dissenting countries (but no supporters of the resolution) did not shape public attitudes about Russia's leadership either before or after the UN resolution, and the difference between the effect of this media coverage before and after the event was insignificant (see left panels in Figure 3 and Appendix Table A.3.). In contrast, media coverage of the UN after the resolution that did not reference any dissenters (bottom right panel in Figure 3) or at least highlighted supporting states' positions and rationale (top right panel in Figure 3) significantly reduced favorable views about Russia's leadership. The fact that we did not observe similar media framing effects during the ten days before the UN resolution strengthen our confidence that the effects that we detected for the following ten days are due to the UN's condemnation of Russia, which significantly altered the effect of media coverage that highlighted supporters of the resolution and their stances (see Figure 3 and Appendix Table A.3). Our models causally identify the effect of media framing by leveraging within-country variation in media reporting shortly before each interview, which in turn is a function of the exogenously determined timing of each survey response. The identifying assumption is that confounding determinants of within-country variation in media frames in UN coverage remained constant over the twenty-day period of analysis and are thus captured in the coefficients of our country fixed effects.

Figure 3: Effect of UN media framing before and after the UN resolution



Note: Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals are based on models 9-12 in Appendix Table A.3.

6 Placebo test, covariate balance, and robustness checks

A placebo test verifies that the change in attitudes about Russia did not stem from some seminal shift in public opinion around the world that merely coincided with the UN resolution that denounced Russia. Thus, we examine whether the resolution also affected mass attitudes about the government of a country that was not mentioned in the resolution: the United States. We use the same empirical strategy as in the main analyses summarized above; the question about the United States appeared in the same Gallup survey and has the same wording as as the one about Russia. As expected, we find that the placebo effect was insignificant and close to zero. Thus, perceptions of the United States' government did not change after the UN adopted a resolution on Russia, and UN visibility did not moderate the effect of that event on views about American leaders (see Appendix Table A.4). The same table shows that the two media frames did not affect how publics updated views about the United States' government. Therefore, the placebo test demonstrates that the change in attitudes about Russia's leadership in the wake of the UN resolution condemning Russia was specific to public opinion about that country's government.

A series of covariate balance tests aims to rule out that the effects reported above are artifacts of some imbalance in the composition of our sample. A comparison of respondents that took the survey within ten days before or after the resolution, on the one hand, and those interviewed in the same country at an earlier or later date, on the other, demonstrates that respondents in our main sample are not systematically different on key determinants of political attitudes (such as age and education) from those in the full Gallup samples, which are nationally representative (Appendix Table A.5). Due to exogenous interview timing, responents interviewed before or after the UN resolution/at times of high or low UN visibility/when media in the same country framed news about the UN in terms of dissent in the institution or other frames are expected to have similar sociodemographic characteristics.

Covariate balance tests uncover very few differences between these different treatment and control groups; those differences that exist in our main sample cannot explain our results because these same covariate imbalances are absent in other samples that nonetheless support the same results as the models of our main sample (see Appendix Tables A.6-A.11).[8]

A separate set of covariate balance tests in Appendix Table A.12 compares the 49 countries in our sample to the underlying population of 193 UN member states. It concludes that the countries for which we have survey data are indistinguishable from other countries in terms of their 2022 GDP, government effectiveness (Bank 2024), political regime characteristics (Teorell et al. 2019), 2021-2 UN General Assembly ideal points (Voeten, Strezhnev and Bailey 2024), and UN media visibility (Parizek 2024). Focusing on the 49 countries in our sample, a separate set of tests in Appendix Table A.13 verified that UN visibility and UN media frames did not systematically vary between countries that voted in favor or abstained or were absent from the UN vote to censor Russia.

7 Conclusion

Improving information conditions in member states is a key function of international organizations (e.g., Keohane 1984; Abbott and Snidal 1998). At a time of mass-based electoral backlash against international cooperation and global governance (Walter 2020) it is important to understand how publics learn about the work of international organizations and form opinions about it. This study examines the role of mass media in transmitting and refracting the signals that international institutions convey to public audiences. We argue that media visibility of international organizations determines whether publics receive sig-

[8]The only minor covariate imbalance found in all samples was that, in a given country, those interviewed in a suburb of a large city were less likely to be exposed to UN coverage framed solely in terms of conflict within the institution during the days before the interview. To avoid bias from this imbalance, we include controls for the size of the village or town where a respondent was interviewed in all models. This covariate imbalance did not exist with respect to our alternative measure of the same media frame.

nals emitted by these institutions and that media framing effects moderate the impact of those signals on mass attitudes. Our empirical analyses show that media coverage shaped how publics around the world responded to an important 2022 UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. In the 49 countries where a nationally representative survey was in the field when the UN resolution was adopted, mass opinion about Russia's leadership turned more negative - but only when the UN was visible in media coverage; a one-standard deviation increase in media visibility of the UN during the ten days after the UN condemned Russia deteriorated mass opinion about Russia's government by five percentage points. Media framing effects also shaped publics' responses to the UN resolution. When media coverage highlighted divisions in the United Nations over the merit of condemning Russia, it muddled the UN's message and the effect of the institution's condemnation of Russia vanished. In contrast, media coverage that emphasized the majority's stance and its rationale for condemning Russia resulted in a particularly strong public opinion rally against Russia's government. Exogenous timing of interviews and covariate balance between respondents who took the survey shortly before the resolution's adoption and others who were interviewed soon after this event ensures that the causal effect of the resolution on mass attitudes is cleanly identified.

We find strong evidence of the proposition that media coverage moderates the effect of international organizations' signals, but the UN's low media visibility explains why the condemnation of Russia did not change average mass opinion about Russia's government in the 49 countries in our sample. This is not just bad news for the proponents of naming and shaming Russia at the UN, but it is also remarkable given that the UN has a higher media visibility than other international organizations with global membership (Parizek 2024). In turn, this finding raises questions about the ability of international institutions with lower media visibility than the UN to convey signals that shape public attitudes. Indeed, estimates of the impact of signals from the World Trade Organization (Bearce and Cook 2018), the UN

Special Rapporteur for Counter-terrorism and Human Rights (Kreps and Wallace 2016), and the UN Environment Program and other UN agencies (Greenhill 2020) only replicate outside these studies' survey-experimental setting to the extent to which publics receive signals of these institutions from their preferred real-world news source. Future scholarship should examine how limits to international organizations' media visibility affects their ability to convey impactful signals to public audiences.

The recent literature has shown a growing interest in how international organizations directly communicate with members of the public (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2018; Hernández and Pannico 2020; Martin 2024). Findings from this study suggest that this line of inquiry should be accompanied by future scholarship on how mass media communicate and refract signals from international organizations, because mass media remain the most common source of information about current events around the world.

References

Abbott, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal. 1998. "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42:3–32.

Aklin, Michaël and Johannes Urpelainen. 2014. "Perceptions of scientific dissent undermine public support for environmental policy." *Environmental Science and Policy* 38:173–177.

Aksoy, Deniz, Ted Enamorado and Tony Yang. 2024. "Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Chinese Public Support for War." *International Organization* 78:341–360.

Alby, Tom and Robert Jäschke. 2022. *Analyzing the Web: Are Top Websites Lists a Good Choice for Research?* Springer pp. 11–25.

Bank, World. 2024. *World Development Indicators*. World Bank.

Baum, Matthew and Philip Potter. 2008. "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11:39–65.

Baum, Matthew and Tim Groeling. 2009. "Shot by the Messenger: Partisan Cues and Public Opinion Regarding National Security and War." *Political Behavior* 31:157–186.

Baum, Matthew and Tim Groeling. 2010. *War Stories: The Causes and Consequences of Public Views of War*. Princeton University Press.

Bearce, David and Thomas Cook. 2018. "The first image reversed: IGO signals and mass political attitudes." *Review of International Organizations* 13:595–619.

Bechtel, Michael, Jens Hainmueller and Yotam Margalit. 2014. "Preferences for International Redistribution: The Divide over the Eurozone Bailouts." *American Journal of Political Science* 58:835–856.

Biden, Joseph. 2022. "Statement on the United Nations General Assembly Vote To Condemn Russia's Illegal Attempts To Annex Ukrainian Territory." *Public Papers of the Presidents* 12 October.

Boomgaarden, Hajo, Rens Vliegenthart, Claes de Vreese and Andreas Schuck. 2010. "News on the move: Exogenous events and news coverage of the European Union." *Journal of European Public Policy* 17:506–526.

Breddels, Maarten and Jovan Veljanoski. 2018. "Vaex: Big data exploration in the era of Gaia." *Astronomy and Astrophysics* 618:1–13.

Brewer, Paul, Joseph Graf and Lars Willnat. 2003. "Priming or Framing: Media Influence on Attitudes toward Foreign Countries." *Gazette* 65:493–508.

Brody, Richard. 1991. *Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support*. Stanford University Press.

Brosius, Anna, Erika van Elsas and Claes de Vreese. 2019. "Trust in the European Union: Effects of the information environment." *European Journal of Communication* 34:57–73.

Brutger, Ryan and Anton Strezhnev. 2022. "International Investment Disputes, Media Coverage, and Backlash Against International Law." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66:983–1009.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2006. *Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public*. Vol. 15 University of Chicago Press.

Carey, Sean. 2002. "Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstactle to European Integration?" *European Union Politics* 3:387–413.

Carter, David and Randall Stone. 2015. "Democracy and multilateralism: The case of vote buying in the un general assembly." *International Organization* 69:1–33.

Chapman, Terrence. 2011. *Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War*. University of Chicago Press.

Chapman, Terrence and Dan Reiter. 2004. "The United Nations Security Council and the Rally 'Round the Flag Effect." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48:886–909.

Chaudoin, Stephen. 2023. "How International Organizations Change National Media Coverage of Human Rights." *International Organization* 77:238–261.

Chernov, Gennadiy. 2023. "The Russian – Ukrainian War: Persistence of Frames and the Media Issue-Cycles." *Athens Journal of Mass Media and Communications* 9:307–320.

Creamer, Cosette and Beth Simmons. 2019. "Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter? Evidence from the Convention Against Torture." *International Studies Quarterly* 63:1051–1064.

Daniele, Gianmarco and Benny Geys. 2015. "Public support for European fiscal integration in times of crisis." *Journal of European Public Policy* 22:650–670.

Davis, David, Amanda Murdie and Coty Steinmetz. 2012. "Makers and shapers: Human rights INGOS and public opinion." *Human Rights Quarterly* 34:199–224.

de Vreese, Claes, Susan Banducci, Holli Semetko and Hajo Boomgaarden. 2006. "The news coverage of the 2004 European parliamentary election campaign in 25 countries." *European Union Politics* 7:477–504.

DellaVigna, Stefano and Ethan Kaplan. 2007. "The Fox news effect: media bias and voting." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122:1187–1234.

Dellmuth, Lisa and Jonas Tallberg. 2021. "Elite Communication and the Popular Legitimacy of International Organizations." *British Journal of Political Science* 51:1292–1313.

Dellmuth, Lisa and Jonas Tallberg. 2023. *Legitimacy Politics: Elite Communication and Public Opinion in Global Governance*. Cambridge University Press.

Dreher, Axel and Jan-Egbert Sturm. 2012. "Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?" *Public Choice* 151:363–397.

Druckman, James. 2011. *What's it all about? Framing in political science*. Psychology Press pp. 291–314.

Dür, Andreas and Bernd Schlipphak. 2021. "Elite cueing and attitudes towards trade agreements: The case of TTIP." *European Political Science Review* 13:41–57.

Ecker-Ehrhardt, Matthias. 2016. "Why do citizens want the UN to decide? Cosmopolitan ideas, particularism and global authority." *International Political Science Review* 37:99–114.

Ecker-Ehrhardt, Matthias. 2018. "International organizations "going public"? An event history analysis of public communication reforms 1950-2015." *International Studies Quarterly* 62:723–736.

Edwards, George. 1983. *The public presidency*. St. Martin's Press.

Egel, Naomi. 2024. "Catching flies with vinegar or honey? Shaming, praising, and public support for international agreements." *Review of International Organizations* 19:1–20.

Eichenberg, Richard. 2005. "Victory Has Many Friends." *International Security* 30:140–177.

Franklin, Mark, Michael Marsh and Lauren McLaren. 1994. "Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 32:455–472.

Gabel, Matthew. 1998. *Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and European Union*. University of Michigan Press.

Galtung, Johan and Mari Ruge. 1965. "The Structure of Foreign News." *Journal of International Peace Research* 2:64–91.

Gartner, Scott. 2008. "The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An Experimental Approach." *American Political Science Review* 102:95–106.

GDELT. 2022. "The GDELT Project.".
URL: *https://www.gdeltproject.org/*

Ghassim, Farsan, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and Luis Cabrera. 2022. "Public Opinion on Institutional Designs for the United Nations: An International Survey Experiment." *International Studies Quarterly* 66:1–19.

Golby, James, Peter Feaver and Kyle Dropp. 2018. "Elite Military Cues and Public Opinion About the Use of Military Force." *Armed Forces and Society* 44:44–71.

Graber, Doris and Johanna Dunaway. 2018. *Mass Media and American Politics*. 10th ed. CQ Press.

Greenhill, Brian. 2020. "How can international organizations shape public opinion? Analysis

of a pair of survey-based experiments." *Review of International Organizations* 15:165–188.

Grieco, Joseph, Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler and Peter Feaver. 2011. "Let's Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War." *International Studies Quarterly* 55:563–583.

Gubitz, Sam. 2019. *Political dynamics of framing*. Routledge pp. 29–52.

Guisinger, Alexandra and Elizabeth Saunders. 2017. "Mapping the boundaries of elite cues: How elites shape mass opinion across international issues." *International Studies Quarterly* 61:425–441.

Harteveld, Eelco, Tom van der Meer and Catherine de Vries. 2013. "In Europe we trust? Exploring three logics of trust in the European Union." *European Union Politics* 14:542–565.

Hayes, Danny and Matt Guardino. 2011. "The Influence of Foreign Voices on U.S. Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science* 55:830–850.

Hernández, Enrique and Roberto Pannico. 2020. "The impact of EU institutional advertising on public support for European integration." *European Union Politics* 21:569–589.

Hobolt, Sara. 2012. "Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy in the European Union." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50:88–105.

Hobolt, Sara. 2014. "Ever closer or ever wider? Public attitudes towards further enlargement and integration in the European Union." *Journal of European Public Policy* 21:664–680.

Holsti, Ole. 2004. *Public opinion and American foreign policy*. University of Michigan Press.

Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. 2005. "Calculation, Community and Cues." *European Union Politics* 6:419–443.

Ikeda, Maki and Atsushi Tago. 2014. "Winning over foreign domestic support for use of force: power of diplomatic and operational multilateralism." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 14:303–324.

Iyengar, Shanto. 1991. *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues*.

University of Chicago Press.

Iyengar, Shanto and Donald Kinder. 2010. *News that matters: Television and American opinion*. 2nd ed. University of Chicago Press.

Jentleson, Bruce. 1992. "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force." *International Studies Quarterly* 36:49–74.

Johns, Robert and Graeme Davies. 2014. "Coalitions of the willing? International backing and British public support for military action." *Journal of Peace Research* 51:767–781.

Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press.

Kertzer, Joshua, Kathleen Powers, Brian Rathbun and Ravi Iyer. 2014. "Moral support: How moral values shape foreign policy attitudes." *Journal of Politics* 76:825–840.

Kertzer, Joshua and Thomas Zeitzoff. 2017. "A Bottom-Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy." *American Journal of Political Science* 61:543–558.

King, Jeffrey and Andrew Lugg. 2023. "Politicising pandemics: Evidence from US media coverage of the World Health Organisation." *Global Policy* 14:247–259.

Kleider, Hanna and Florian Stoeckel. 2019. "The politics of international redistribution: Explaining public support for fiscal transfers in the EU." *European Journal of Political Research* 58:4–29.

Koliev, Faradj, Douglas Page and Jonas Tallberg. 2022. "The Domestic Impact of International Shaming." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 86:748–761.

Kreps, Sarah E. and Geoffrey Wallace. 2016. "International law, military effectiveness, and public support for drone strikes." *Journal of Peace Research* 53:830–844.

Kuypers, Jim. 1997. *Presidential Crisis Rhetoric and the Press in the Post-Cold War World*. Praeger.

Laurer, Moritz, Wouter van Atteveldt, Andreu Casas and Kasper Welbers. 2024. "Building Efficient Universal Classifiers with Natural Language Inference." *Working Paper* .

Leetaru, Kalev and Philip Schrodt. 2013. "GDELT: Global Data on Events, Location and Tone, 1979-2012.".

URL: *http://data.gdeltproject.org/documentation/ISA.2013.GDELT.pdf*

Mader, Matthias. 2024. "Increased support for collective defence in times of threat: European public opinion before and after Russia's invasion of Ukraine." *Policy Studies* 45:402–422.

Maliniak, Daniel, Eric Parajon and Ryan Powers. 2021. "Epistemic Communities and Public Support for the Paris Agreement on Climate Change." *Political Research Quarterly* 74:866–881.

Mansfield, Edward and Diana Mutz. 2009. "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety." *International Organization* 63:425–457.

Martin, Lisa. 2024. "Global Governance Confronts the Onslaught of Disinformation." *Perspectives on Politics* 22:7–10.

McManus, John. 1994. *Market-driven journalism. Let the citizen beware.* Sage.

Mikulaschek, Christoph. 2023. "The responsive public: How European Union decisions shape public opinion on salient policies." *European Union Politics* 24:645–665.

Mikulaschek, Christoph. 2024. "Cueing Foreign Elite Consensus or Divisions: The Effect of Unanimity in International Organizations on Public Opinion." *Working Paper* .

Morse, Julia and Bridget Coggins. 2024. "Your silence speaks volumes: Weak states and strategic absence in the UN General Assembly." *Review of International Organizations* 19:515–544.

Mueller, John. 1973. *War, presidents, and public opinion.* Wiley.

Murray, Shoon. 2014. "Broadening the Debate about War: The Inclusion of Foreign Critics in Media Coverage and Its Potential Impact on US Public Opinion." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10:329–350.

Nations, United. 2022*a*. "Resolution adopted by the General Assembly." *2 March* .

Nations, United. 2022*b*. "Resolution adopted by the General Assembly." *24 March* .

Nations, United. 2022*c*. "Resolution adopted by the General Assembly." *7 April* .

Nations, United. 2022*d*. "Resolution adopted by the General Assembly." *12 October* .

Nelson, Thomas, Rosalee Clawson and Zoe Oxley. 1997. "Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance." *American Political Science Review* 91:567–583.

Neuman, Russell, Marion Just and Ann Crigler. 1992. *Common Knowledge: News and the Construction of Political Meaning*. University of Chicago Press.

Omoera, Osakue and Emeke Nwaoboli. 2023. "Sahara Reporters and Premium Times online coverage of the Russia–Ukraine war." *Online Media and Global Communication* 2:250–272.

OpenAI. 2024. "ChatGPT GPT-4 API.".

Page, Benjamin and Rober Shapiro. 1992. *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences*. University of Chicago Press.

Paletz, David. 2002. *The Media in American Politics*. Longman.

Parizek, Michal. 2023. "Worldwide Media Visibility of NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations in Connection to the Russia-Ukraine War." *Czech Journal of International Relations* 58:15–44.

Parizek, Michal. 2024. "Less in the West: The tangibility of international organizations and their media visibility around the world." *Review of International Organizations* forthcomin.

Parizek, Michal and Jakub Stauber. 2024. "The Global Media Visibility of States Dataset v.1." *OSF* .

Patterson, Thomas. 1993. *Out of Order*. Knopf.

Pavlichenko, Larysa. 2022. "Polarization in Media Political Discourse on the War in Ukraine: Critical Discourse Analysis." *Alfred Nobel University Journal of Philology* 2:214–223.

Rafeeq, Ali. 2023. "Examining the role of peace journalism in news coverage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict: A study of Gulf News and Khaleej Times." *Cogent Social Sciences* 9:1–13.

Ray, Leonard. 2003. "When Parties Matter: The Conditional Influence of Party Positions on Voter Opinions about European Integration." *Journal of Politics* 65:978–994.

Schneider, Christina. 2019. *The Responsive Union: National Elections and European Governance*. Cambridge University Press.

Schuck, Andreas and Claes de Vreese. 2006. "Between Risk and Opportunity." *European Journal of Communication* 21:5–32.

SCImago. 2024. "SCImago Media Rankings.".
URL: *https://www.scimagomedia.com/*

Semetko, Holli and Patti Valkenburg. 2000. "Framing European politics: A content analysis of press and television news." *Journal of Communication* 50:93–109.

Service, Alexa Web Information. 2022. "Alexa Web Information Service.".
URL: *https://aws.amazon.com/marketplace/pp/B07Q71HJ3H*

Slantchev, Branislav, Anna Alexandrova and Erik Gartzke. 2005. "Probabilistic Causality, Selection Bias, and the Logic of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 99:459–462.

Sniderman, Paul and Sean Theriault. 2004. *The Structure of Political Argument and the Logic of Politics and Nonattitudes*. Princeton University Press pp. 133–165.

Sobel, Richard. 1993. *What have we learned about public opinion in U.S. foreign policy*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers p. 269–278.

Steenbergen, Marco, Erica Edwards and Catherine de Vries. 2007. "Who's Cueing Whom? Mass-Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration." *European Union Politics* 8:13–35.

Stolle, Dietlind. 2024. "Aiding Ukraine in the Russian war: Unity or new dividing line among Europeans?" *European Political Science* 23:218–233.

Tago, Atsushi and Maki Ikeda. 2013. "An 'A' for Effort: Experimental Evidence on UN Security Council Engagement and Support for US Military Action in Japan." *British Journal of Political Science* 45:391–410.

Teorell, Jan, Michael Coppedge, Staffan Lindberg and Svend Skaaning. 2019. "Measuring

Polyarchy Across the Globe, 1900–2017." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 54:71–95.

Terman, Rochelle and Joshua Byun. 2022. "Punishment and Politicization in the International Human Rights Regime." *American Political Science Review* 116:385–402.

Thompson, Alexander. 2009. *Channels of power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq*. Princeton University Press.

Thomson, Catarina, Matthias Mader, Felix Münchow, Jason Reifler and Harald Schoen. 2023. "European public opinion: united in supporting Ukraine, divided on the future of NATO." *International Affairs* 99:2485–2500.

Tingley, Dustin and Michael Tomz. 2012. "How does the UN Security Council Influence Public Opinion ?" *Working Paper* .

Tingley, Dustin and Michael Tomz. 2022. "The Effects of Naming and Shaming on Public Support for Compliance with International Agreements: An Experimental Analysis of the Paris Agreement." *International Organization* 76:445–468.

Tuchman, Gaye. 1972. *Making news: A study in the construction of reality*. MacMillan.

van Cranenburgh, Andreas. 2022. "readability 0.3.1.".

URL: *https://pypi.org/project/readability/*

Vliegenthart, Rens, Andreas Schuck, Hajo Boomgaarden and Claes De Vreese. 2008. "News coverage and support for European integration, 1990-2006." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 20:415–439.

Voeten, Erik, Anton Strezhnev and Michael Bailey. 2024. "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data.".

URL: *https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LEJUQZ*

Vreese, Claes De and Hajo Boomgaarden. 2006. "Media effects on public opinion about the enlargement of the European union." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44:419–436.

W3newspapers. 2024. "World Newspapers, News Sites, and Magazines Online.".

URL: *https://www.w3newspapers.com/*

Wallace, Geoffrey. 2019. "Supplying protection: The United Nations and public support for humanitarian intervention." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 36:248–269.

Walter, Stefanie. 2020. "The Mass Politics of International Disintegration." *CIS Working Paper* 105.

Walter, Stefanie, Elias Dinas, Ignacio Jurado and Nikitas Konstantinidis. 2018. "Noncooperation by Popular Vote: Expectations, Foreign Intervention, and the Vote in the 2015 Greek Bailout Referendum." *International Organization* 72:969–994.

Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge University Press.

Zink, James, James Spriggs and John Scott. 2009. "Courting the public: The influence of decision attributes on individuals views of court opinions." *Journal of Politics* 71:909–925.

Zollmann, Florian. 2023. "A war foretold: How Western mainstream news media omitted NATO eastward expansion as a contributing factor to Russia's 2022 invasion of the Ukraine." *Media, War and Conflict* 17:373–392.

How media coverage shapes the effect of IOs on public attitudes: Quasi-experimental evidence on mass opinion about Russia's leadership in 49 countries

Online appendix of supporting information

Main results

Table A.1: Effect of UN resolution on attitudes about Russia's leadership: Results from country fixed effects OLS models testing hypothesis 1

Sample	**± 10 days**	**± 2 weeks**	**± 1 week**	**± 4 days**
Model	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
(Intercept)	0.03	0.08*	0.04	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)
UN resolution	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Secondary education	0.03*	−0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Tertiary education	0.02	−0.02	0.04	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Unemployed	0.02	0.06*	0.02	0.08*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Not gainfully employed	−0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Household income	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small town or village	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Suburb of large city	−0.03	0.00	−0.04	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Large city	−0.01	0.01	−0.02	−0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Country f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,700	15,169	7,109	4,189
Countries	49	53	42	40
Adj. R-squared	0.30	0.29	0.23	0.27

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.2: Effect of UN resolution and UN visibility on attitudes about Russia's leadership: Results from country fixed effects OLS models testing hypothesis 2

Sample	**± 10 days**	**± 2 weeks**	**± 1 week**	**± 4 days**
Model	**(5)**	**(6)**	**(7)**	**(8)**
(Intercept)	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
UN resolution	0.07*	0.05*	0.08*	0.08*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
UN media visibility	−0.00	0.55*	0.63	0.63
	(0.35)	(0.26)	(0.50)	(0.50)
UN resolution * UN visibility	−1.77**	−1.46*	−2.21**	−2.21**
	(0.61)	(0.59)	(0.70)	(0.70)
Age	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Secondary education	0.03*	−0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Tertiary education	0.02	−0.02	0.04	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Unemployed	0.02	0.07*	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Not gainfully employed	−0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Household income	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small town or village	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Suburb of large city	−0.03	0.00	−0.04	−0.04
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Large city	−0.01	0.00	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Country f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,700	15,169	7,109	4,189
Countries	49	53	42	40
Adj. R-squared	0.30	0.28	0.23	0.27

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.3: Effect of UN resolution and UN media framing on attitudes about Russia's leadership: Results from country fixed effects OLS models testing hypotheses 3a and 3b

Sample	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**
Model	**(9)**	**(10)**	**(11)**	**(12)**
(Intercept)	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
UN resolution	0.03	0.02	0.06*	0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Dissent media frame	0.34			
	(0.56)			
UN res. * dissent frame	−1.51			
	(0.81)			
Only dissent media frame		−0.61		
		(0.94)		
UN res. * only dissent frame		−2.37		
		(2.17)		
Support media frame			0.18	
			(0.36)	
UN res. * support frame			−2.10**	
			(0.73)	
Only support media frame				−0.05
				(0.48)
UN res. * only support frame				−3.65**
				(1.40)
Age	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Secondary education	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Tertiary education	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Unemployed	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Not gainfully employed	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Household income	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small town or village	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Suburb of large city	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Large city	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Country f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,700	10,700	10,700	10,700
Countries	49	49	49	49
Adj. R-squared	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Placebo test

Table A.4: Placebo effect of UN resolution and UN media framing on attitudes about United States leadership: Results from country fixed effects OLS models

Sample	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**
Model	**(13)**	**(14)**	**(15)**	**(16)**	**(17)**	**(18)**
(Intercept)	0.98***	0.98***	0.97***	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
UN resolution	−0.01	−0.02	0.01	−0.00	−0.01	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
UN media visibility		0.07				
		(0.41)				
UN resolution * UN visibility		0.37				
		(0.67)				
Dissent media frame			1.11			
			(0.72)			
UN res. * dissent frame			−1.01			
			(0.84)			
Only dissent media frame				3.15*		
				(1.55)		
UN res. * only dissent frame				−1.44		
				(2.24)		
Support media frame					−0.34	
					(0.45)	
UN res. * support frame					0.28	
					(0.77)	
Only support media frame						−0.82
						(0.68)
UN res. * only support frame						2.23
						(1.53)
Age	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Secondary education	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Tertiary education	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Unemployed	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Not gainfully employed	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Household income	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small town or village	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Suburb of large city	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Large city	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Country f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,700	10,700	10,700	10,700	10,700	10,700
Countries	49	49	49	49	49	49
Adj. R-squared	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Covariate balance

Table A.5: Covariate balance test: analysis of effect of covariates on observations' inclusion in (or exclusion from) ± 10-day sample: Results from country fixed effects OLS model

Sample	**± 10 days**
Model	**(19)**
(Intercept)	1.00***
	(0.00)
Age	−0.00
	(0.00)
Female	−0.00
	(0.00)
Secondary education	−0.00
	(0.00)
Tertiary education	−0.00
	(0.00)
Unemployed	0.00
	(0.00)
Not gainfully employed	0.00
	(0.00)
Household income	−0.00
	(0.00)
Small town or village	−0.00
	(0.00)
Suburb of large city	0.00
	(0.00)
Large city	0.00
	(0.00)
Country f.e.	Yes
Observations	14,097
Countries	49
Adj. R-squared	0.50

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.6: Covariate balance between respondents interviewed before or after UN resolution: Results from country fixed effects OLS models

Sample	**± 10 days**	**± 2 weeks**	**± 1 week**	**± 4 days**
Model	**(20)**	**(21)**	**(22)**	**(23)**
(Intercept)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	−0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Secondary education	0.02*	0.02*	0.03*	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Tertiary education	0.03*	0.02*	0.06**	0.08**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Unemployed	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Not gainfully employed	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Household income	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small town or village	0.00	0.01	−0.02	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Suburb of large city	−0.02	−0.01	−0.08***	−0.05
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Large city	−0.02	−0.00	−0.04*	0.04
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Country f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,700	15,169	7,109	4,189
Countries	49	53	42	40
Adj. R-squared	0.55	0.60	0.44	0.37

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.7: Covariate balance between respondents interviewed at times of high or low UN visibility: Results from country fixed effects OLS models

Sample	**± 10 days**	**± 2 weeks**	**± 1 week**	**± 4 days**	**± 10 days**
DV	**UN visibility 4-day avg**	**UN visibility 4-day avg**	**UN visibility 4-day avg**	**UN visibility 4-day avg**	**UN visibility 3-day avg**
Model	**(24)**	**(25)**	**(26)**	**(27)**	**(28)**
(Intercept)	0.02***	0.03***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.00	−0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Secondary education	0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tertiary education	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Not gainfully employed	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Household income	0.00	0.00*	−0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small town or village	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00**	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Suburb of large city	0.00*	−0.00	−0.00*	−0.00**	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Large city	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00	−0.00***	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Country f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,700	15,169	7,109	4,189	10,700
Countries	49	53	42	40	49
Adj. R-squared	0.77	0.75	0.86	0.88	0.74

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.8: Covariate balance between respondents interviewed at times of frequent or infrequent UN coverage framed in terms of conflict in the UN: Results from country fixed effects OLS models

Sample	**± 10 days**	**± 2 weeks**	**± 1 week**	**± 4 days**	**± 10 days**
DV	**UN coverage featuring dissent frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring dissent frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring dissent frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring dissent frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring dissent frame 3-day avg**
Model	**(29)**	**(30)**	**(31)**	**(32)**	**(33)**
(Intercept)	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00*	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.00	−0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Secondary education	0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tertiary education	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00*	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Not gainfully employed	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Household income	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small town or village	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Suburb of large city	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Large city	−0.00*	−0.00**	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Country f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,700	15,169	7,109	4,189	10,700
Countries	49	53	42	40	49
Adj. R-squared	0.77	0.74	0.82	0.86	0.68

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.9: Covariate balance between respondents interviewed at times of frequent or infrequent UN coverage framed only in terms of conflict in the UN: Results from country fixed effects OLS models

Sample	**± 10 days**	**± 2 weeks**	**± 1 week**	**± 4 days**	**± 10 days**
DV	**UN coverage featuring only dissent frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring only dissent frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring only dissent frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring only dissent frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring only dissent frame 3-day avg**
Model	**(34)**	**(35)**	**(36)**	**(37)**	**(38)**
(Intercept)	0.00	0.00*	0.00	0.00**	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.00	−0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Secondary education	0.00*	0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tertiary education	0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Not gainfully employed	0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Household income	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small town or village	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Suburb of large city	−0.00**	−0.00*	−0.00	−0.00*	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Large city	−0.00*	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Country f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,700	15,169	7,109	4,189	10,700
Countries	49	53	42	40	49
Adj. R-squared	0.59	0.58	0.56	0.56	0.45

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.10: Covariate balance between respondents interviewed at times of frequent or infrequent UN coverage framed in terms of supporters' position and rationale: Results from country fixed effects OLS models

Sample	**± 10 days**	**± 2 weeks**	**± 1 week**	**± 4 days**	**± 10 days**
DV	**UN coverage featuring support frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring support frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring support frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring support frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring support frame 3-day avg**
Model	**(39)**	**(40)**	**(41)**	**(42)**	**(43)**
(Intercept)	0.01***	0.02***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Secondary education	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tertiary education	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Not gainfully employed	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Household income	0.00	0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small town or village	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Suburb of large city	0.00*	−0.00	−0.00*	−0.00***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Large city	−0.00	−0.00***	−0.00	−0.00***	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Country f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,700	15,169	7,109	4,189	10,700
Countries	49	53	42	40	49
Adj. R-squared	0.74	0.71	0.87	0.90	0.73

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.11: Covariate balance between respondents interviewed at times of frequent or infrequent UN coverage framed in terms of supporters' position and rationale: Results from country fixed effects OLS models

Sample	**± 10 days**	**± 2 weeks**	**± 1 week**	**± 4 days**	**± 10 days**
DV	**UN coverage featuring only support frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring only support frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring only support frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring only support frame 4-day avg**	**UN coverage featuring only support frame 3-day avg**
Model	**(44)**	**(45)**	**(46)**	**(47)**	**(48)**
(Intercept)	0.01***	0.02***	0.00***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age	0.00***	0.00	0.00**	0.00	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Secondary education	0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Tertiary education	0.00*	0.00	0.00**	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Unemployed	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Not gainfully employed	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Household income	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small town or village	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00***	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Suburb of large city	0.00*	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Large city	0.00	−0.00**	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Country f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,700	15,169	7,109	4,189	10,700
Countries	49	53	42	40	49
Adj. R-squared	0.53	0.53	0.56	0.80	0.54

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.12: Covariate balance between 49 countries in main sample and other states: Results from OLS models

Model	**(49)**	**(50)**	**(51)**	**(52)**	**(53)**	**(54)**	**(55)**	**(56)**
(Intercept)	0.24***	0.27***	0.25***	0.34***	0.24***	0.28***	0.30***	0.18
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.14)
Population size	0.00							0.00*
	(0.00)							(0.00)
GDP (PPP)		−0.00						−0.00
		(0.00)						(0.00)
Government effectiveness			−0.03					−0.02
			(0.03)					(0.05)
Pol. regime characteristics (polyarchy)				−0.13				0.19
				(0.12)				(0.22)
UNGA ideal point					−0.03			−0.13
					(0.04)			(0.09)
UN media visibility						−0.13		−0.45
						(0.49)		(0.47)
UN group: Asia - Pacific							−0.06	−0.01
							(0.09)	(0.12)
UN group: Eastern Eur.							0.31*	0.43**
							(0.12)	(0.16)
UN group: Latin America & Carr.							−0.18*	−0.17
							(0.09)	(0.13)
UN group: Western Eur. & others							−0.23**	−0.07
							(0.09)	(0.18)
Observations	195	185	195	172	192	180	191	147
Adj. R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.10

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.13: Covariate balance tests detecting no correlation between countries' UNGA vote on media coverage of the UN in those countries: Results from OLS models

Sample	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**
DV	**UN media visibility**	**UN coverage featuring dissent frame**	**UN coverage featuring only dissent frame**	**UN coverage featuring support frame**	**UN coverage featuring only support frame**
	4-day avg	**4-day avg**	**4-day avg**	**4-day avg**	**4-day avg**
Model	**(57)**	**(58)**	**(59)**	**(60)**	**(61)**
(Intercept)	0.04^{***}	0.02^{***}	0.00^{**}	0.04^{***}	0.02^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Absence from UNGA vote	0.00	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Yes vote in UNGA	−0.01	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Observations	47	47	47	47	47
Adj. R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Note: The omitted baseline category is an abstention from the vote on the draft resolution condemning Russia. The set of 49 countries in the main sample does not include the countries that voted against the resolution (Belarus, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Syria).

Table A.14: Covariate balance tests examining potential effects of UN resolution and UN media coverage on likelihood of item non-response on survey question about Russia's leadership: Results from country fixed effects OLS models

Sample	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**
Model	**(62)**	**(63)**	**(64)**	**(65)**	**(66)**	**(67)**
(Intercept)	0.07*	0.07*	0.08*	0.07*	0.07*	0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
UN resolution	0.01					
	(0.01)					
UN media visibility		−0.03				
		(0.16)				
Dissent media frame			−0.28			
			(0.24)			
Only dissent media frame				−0.84		
				(0.56)		
Support media frame					−0.04	
					(0.17)	
Only support media frame						0.03
						(0.21)
Age	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Secondary education	−0.09***	−0.09***	−0.09***	−0.09***	−0.09***	−0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Tertiary education	−0.11***	−0.11***	−0.11***	−0.11***	−0.11***	−0.11***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Unemployed	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Not gainfully employed	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Household income	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small town or village	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Suburb of large city	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Large city	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Country f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,097	14,097	14,097	14,097	14,097	14,097
Countries	49	49	49	49		
Adj. R-squared	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Robustness checks

Table A.15: Effect of UN resolution and UN media coverage on attitudes about Russia's leadership: Results from country fixed effects OLS models with alternative measures of UN visibility and media framing, which indicate rolling averages of media coverage on the day of each interview and the two preceding days

Sample	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**
Model	**(68)**	**(69)**	**(70)**	**(71)**	**(72)**
(Intercept)	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
UN resolution	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
UN media visibility	0.02				
	(0.34)				
UN res. * UN visibility	−1.43*				
	(0.64)				
Dissent media frame		0.63			
		(0.49)			
UN res. * dissent frame		−1.26			
		(0.80)			
Only dissent media frame			−0.27		
			(0.79)		
UN res. * only dissent frame			−1.58		
			(2.21)		
Support media frame				0.14	
				(0.36)	
UN res. * support frame				−1.68*	
				(0.78)	
Only support media frame					−0.43
					(0.48)
UN res. * only support frame					−3.29*
					(1.59)
Age	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Secondary education	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Tertiary education	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Unemployed	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Not gainfully employed	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Household income	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small town or village	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Suburb of large city	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Large city	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Country f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,700	10,700	10,700	10,700	10,700
Countries	49	49	49	49	49
Adj. R-squared	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.16: Effect of UN resolution, UN visibility, and media framing on attitudes about Russia's leadership: Results from country fixed effects OLS models without Laos

Sample	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	
Model	**(73)**	**(74)**	**(75)**	**(76)**	**(77)**	
(Intercept)	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
UN resolution	0.01	0.06*	0.03	0.02	0.06*	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
UN media visibility		−0.06				
		(0.57)				
UN res. * UN visibility		−1.69*				
		(0.75)				
Dissent media frame			0.14			
			(0.71)			
UN res. * dissent frame			−1.25			
			(0.88)			
Only dissent media frame				−0.75		
				(1.04)		
UN res. * only dissent frame				−2.17		
				(2.17)		
Support media frame					0.27	
					(0.56)	
UN res. * support frame					−2.17*	
					(0.97)	
Only support media frame						0.01
						(1.03)
UN res. * only support frame						−3.64
						(1.96)
Age	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Secondary education	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Tertiary education	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Unemployed	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Not gainfully employed	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Household income	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Small town or village	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Suburb of large city	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Large city	−0.01	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Country f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,700	10,700	10,700	10,700	10,700	10,700
Countries	49	49	49	49	49	49
Adj. R-squared	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A.17: Effect of UN resolution, UN visibility, and media framing on attitudes about Russia's leadership: Results from 60 country fixed effects OLS models estimated after dropping observations from the ten countries with the smallest number of respondents in the main sample

Sample	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**	**± 10 days**
Coefficient →	**UN resolution**	**UN res. * UN visibility**	**UN res. * dissent frame**	**UN res. * only dissent frame**	**UN res. * support frame**	**UN res. * only support frame**
Sample ↓						
Dropping EST	0.01	−1.77**	−1.52	−2.37	−2.10**	−3.65**
	(0.02)	(0.61)	(0.81)	(2.17)	(0.73)	(1.40)
Dropping EST, GIN	0.01	−1.77**	1.52	−2.37	−2.10**	−3.65**
	(0.02)	(0.61)	(0.81)	(2.17)	(0.73)	(1.40)
Dropping EST, GIN, GTM	0.01	−1.77**	1.52	−2.38	−2.10**	−3.65**
	(0.02)	(0.61)	(0.81)	(2.17)	(0.73)	(1.40)
Dropping EST, GIN, GTM, HKG	0.01	−1.78**	1.52	−2.41	−2.11**	−3.72**
	(0.02)	(0.61)	(0.81)	(2.17)	(0.74)	(1.41)
Dropping EST, GIN, GTM, HKG,	0.01	−1.78**	1.52	−2.41	−2.11**	−3.72**
HND	(0.02)	(0.61)	(0.81)	(2.17)	(0.74)	(1.41)
Dropping EST, GIN, GTM, HKG,	0.01	−1.78**	1.54	−2.44	−2.10**	−3.70**
HND, MLI	(0.02)	(0.61)	(0.81)	(2.17)	(0.74)	(1.41)
Dropping EST, GIN, GTM, HKG,	0.01	−1.71**	−1.43	−1.64	−2.21**	−4.15**
HND, MLI, SVK	(0.02)	(0.60)	(0.80)	(2.07)	(0.72)	(1.34)
Dropping EST, GIN, GTM, HKG,	0.01	−1.84**	−1.57*	−2.17	−2.30**	−4.26**
HND, MLI, SVK, PRI	(0.02)	(0.59)	(0.79)	(2.17)	(0.72)	(1.33)
Dropping EST, GIN, GTM, HKG,	−0.00	−1.61**	−1.38	−2.30	−2.05**	−3.84**
HND, MLI, SVK, PRI, ZAF	(0.02)	(0.58)	(0.78)	(1.99)	(0.71)	(1.30)
Dropping EST, GIN, GTM, HKG,	−0.00	−1.60**	−1.37	−1.87	−2.05**	−3.80**
HND, MLI, SVK, PRI, ZAF, AZE	(0.02)	(0.57)	(0.78)	(1.97)	(0.71)	(1.31)
Other variables and country f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Note: The table displays the coefficient (with s.e. in parentheses) of the variable of interest, which is listed at the top of each column, of a model that replicates our main models while sequentially dropping all observations from the ten countries with the smallest number of observations in our sample, which are listed in the first column. Thus, each coefficient estimate is from a different model, which includes the same variables as the main models in Tables A.1-A.3 above. The other coefficients are omitted so that the results from the 60 models can displayed in a single table.

Descriptive statistics

Table A.18: Descriptive statistics of the main sample

Variable	*N*	Mean	S.d.	Min.	Max.
Dependent variables					
Favorable view of Russian leadership	11,640	0.439	0.496	0	1
Favorable view of US leadership	11,833	0.547	0.497	0	1
Quasi-experimental treatments					
UN resolution	15,319	0.349	0.477	0	1
UN media visibility (4-day avg.)	14,312	0.042	0.040	0	0.353
UN media visibility (3-day avg.)	14,312	0.042	0.042	0	0.353
Dissent media frame (4-day avg.)	14,312	0.022	0.026	0	0.188
Dissent media frame (3-day avg.)	14,312	0.022	0.028	0	0.200
Only dissent media frame (4-day avg.)	14,312	0.005	0.009	0	0.059
Only dissent media frame (3-day avg.)	14,312	0.005	0.011	0	0.100
Support media frame (4-day avg.)	14,312	0.033	0.036	0	0.294
Support media frame (3-day avg.)	14,312	0.032	0.036	0	0.294
Only support media frame (4-day avg.)	14,312	0.015	0.022	0	0.235
Only support media frame (3-day avg.)	14,312	0.016	0.024	0	0.235
Pretreatment covariates					
Age	15,319	38.20	16.80	15	100
Female	15,319	0.525	0.499	0	1
Educ. attainment: primary education	15,260	0.347	0.476	0	1
Educ. attainment: secondary education	15,260	0.512	0.500	0	1
Educ. attainment: tertiary education	15,260	0.141	0.348	0	1
Employed[1]	15,319	0.553	0.497	0	1
Unemployed	15,319	0.078	0.268	0	1
Not gainfully employed[2]	15,319	0.368	0.482	0	1
Household income (international dollars)	14,154	12,137	24,693	0	616,382
Small town or village	11,251	0.400	0.490	0	1
Suburb of large city	11,251	0.486	0.500	0	1
Large city	11,251	0.114	0.317	0	1

Note: The main sample includes respondents who were interviewed no more than ten days before or after the UN resolution was adopted. Note that Laos is an outlier in terms of UN media coverage during the period of analysis (see also Figure A.1 below). Therefore, a robustness check in Table A.16 above replicates our analyses without Laotian survey respondents.

[1] Includes full and part time employment for an employer and self-employment.
[2] Out of workforce, e.g. students, retirees, and homemakers.

Figure A.1: UN visibility during the 10 days before and after the UN resolution and between 2018 and 2021, by country



Note: For each of the 49 countries in our main sample, the figure depicts the association between long-term UN media visibility in 2018-2021 as reported in Parizek (2024) on the x-axis and UN media visibility during the 10 days before and after the UN resolution in October 2022 on the y-axis. The line depicts the bivariate correlation between short-term and long-term UN media visibility. Note that Laos is an outlier in terms of UN visibility in October 2022; a robustness check in Table A.16 shows that results are robust to dropping all interviews conducted there.

Table A.19: Dictionary of search terms used to detect references to the United Nations in the corpus of news media data

	ent3	ent3n	ent_searchterm
1	UNG	UNG01	(|\.|:|,|;|\A|\s)United Nations General Assembly(|\.|:|,|;|\Z|\s)
2	UNG	UNG02	(|\.|:|,|;|\A|\s)UN General Assembly(|\.|:|,|;|\Z|\s)
3	UNG	UNG03	(|\.|:|,|;|\A|\s)UN GA(|\.|:|,|;|\Z|\s)
4	UNO	UNO01	united nations
5	UNO	UNO02	(|\.|:|,|;|\A|\s)un(|\.|:|,|;|\Z|\s)
6	UNO	UNO03	(|\.|:|,|;|\A|\s)u\.n\.(|\.|:|,|;|\Z|\s)
7	UNO	UNO04	(|\.|:|,|;|\A|\s)Guterres(|\.|:|,|;|\Z|\s)
8	USC	USC01	united nations security council
9	USC	USC02	un security council
10	USC	USC03	(?<!national)security council
11	USC	USC04	(|\.|:|,|;|\A|\s)UN SC(|\.|:|,|;|\Z|\s)