

UN Secretary-General Visits and Human Rights Diplomacy

Ha Eun Choi^{*}, JiHwan Jeong[†],
Amanda Murdie[‡], Byungwon Woo[§], Hyunjin Yim^{**}

April 2023

Abstract

Researchers have begun to investigate the effectiveness of a wide range of diplomatic tools used by various international and domestic actors in the field of human rights. Using new data on official state visits by the UN Secretary-General (UNSG), we investigate the conditions under which UN diplomacy improves human rights. We predict that UNSG visits can improve human rights conditions in the visited states for two reasons. First, news and discussions around UNSG visits serve as focal points for the media and civil society's efforts to improve human rights. Second, recognition and endorsement of local civil society organizations and activists by the UNSG can raise the visibility and status of these organizations, and thus empower their organizational capacity. Our empirical analysis lends strong support to the hypothesis that, controlling for the factors associated with the UNSG's visits, these visits substantially improve human rights conditions in the visited countries.

^{*} Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, Michigan State University. E-mail: choiha3@msu.edu, Website: haeunchoi.com

[†] Graduate Student, Department of Political Science & International Studies, Yonsei University. E-mail: joshuazzang0@o365.yonsei.ac.kr

[‡] Professor, Department of International Affairs in the School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia. E-mail: murdie@uga.edu, Website: <https://www.amandamurdie.org/>

[§] Professor, Department of Political Science & International Studies, Yonsei University. E-mail: bwwoo@yonsei.ac.kr

^{**} Graduate Student, Department of Political Science & International Studies, Yonsei University. E-mail: hjyim@yonsei.ac.kr

Introduction

Can the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) improve human rights conditions? As one of the most recognizable figures in international affairs, the UNSG often travels for various purposes, including attending international conferences and diplomatic meetings, promoting peace, mediating conflicts, and campaigning for UN-led initiatives. For instance, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, made 80 state visits, almost one every four days in his last year as the UNSG. The current UNSG, Mr. António Guterres, also made frequent diplomatic visits in 2018 and 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic made it difficult to arrange international travel. When the UNSGs make state visits, they often meet national politicians, opposition leaders, religious leaders, and representatives of various advocacy groups. For instance, in his visit to West Africa in April 2022, Mr. Guterres met with the presidents and senior government officials of Senegal, Niger, and Nigeria, and civil society representatives to discuss various issues, including the conflict in the Sahel, refugees and internally displaced persons in the region, climate change, and COVID-19 recovery.¹

As the UNSG is an international figure whose responsibilities are broad and imprecisely defined, state visits are one way in which they can potentially make an impact. UNSG visits provide an opportunity for various advocacy groups to mobilize to promote their causes, and thus attract considerable attention and lofty expectations from the media, the public, and activists. In turn, by responding to campaigns and highlighting issues raised by advocacy groups, UNSGs can empower activists vis-à-vis the state and amplify their calls for change. For instance, when Mr. Guterres announced his plan to visit Lebanon in 2021, Human Rights Watch (HRW) sent an

¹ <https://unowas.unmissions.org/un-secretary-general-antonio-guterres-visits-senegal-niger-and-nigeria>

open letter urging him to “push the Lebanese authorities to implement much-needed reforms,” so that Lebanon can recover from “the worst economic crises in modern times, with a disastrous impact on human rights.” Human Rights Watch also asked the UNSG to provide “unvarnished assessment of the way they [Lebanese authorities] repeatedly undermined and obstructed efforts to achieve justice in relation to the catastrophic explosion in Beirut’s port on August 4, 2020.”² During his visit to Lebanon, Mr. Guterres met with a group of civil society activists and representatives of humanitarian organizations to whom he expressed admiration for sharing “the suffering of the Lebanese people, including examples of children dropping out of school, their yearning to leave their homeland, the confusion of parents about what to do to protect their children in the current situation, as well as the lack of commitment by those in power, to take care of their own citizens.”³

At a press conference at the end of his three-day trip, Mr. Guterres pushed for the causes raised by Human Rights Watch and Lebanese civil society activists. He pressed for “free and fair parliamentary elections” and told Lebanon leaders that “civil society, women and young people have a critical role to play” in the future of the country.⁴ In answering one of the questions at the press conference, Mr. Guterres leveraged his position as the UNSG and highlighted that the international community would respond to Lebanese calls for broader international assistance only if they saw that “Lebanese institutions are putting the country on the right track, fighting corruption, respecting human rights, and presenting a credible economic recovery plan.”⁵

² <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/16/open-letter-un-secretary-general-ahead-his-visit-lebanon>

³ <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/1108552>

⁴ <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2021-12-21/secretary-generals-remarks-during-press-conference-visit-lebanon-qa>

⁵ <https://lebanon.un.org/en/166234-un-secretary-general-remarks-media-visit-lebanon>

While there is potential for UNSGs to make a difference through their diplomatic visits, skeptics might discount this because of the lack of material resources and enforcement capabilities that UNSGs have at their disposal. UNSGs depend on states for their budgets, and any enforceable actions need to be approved by the Security Council. In addition, UNSG visits are relatively brief; if a government can avoid or deflect attention long enough, civil society pressure can dissipate once the UNSG leaves. In short, while UNSGs can bring attention to domestic issues and may empower civil society when they visit, these may be temporary and unable to lead to long-term changes in state policy and behavior.

Despite their visibility in international politics, there have been no systematic studies—to the best of our knowledge—on UNSGs and their potential influence on the various social, economic, and political aspects of international affairs. In this study, we theorize how UNSGs can improve human rights conditions in the countries they visit. We identify two interrelated causal mechanisms. First, UNSG visits serve as a focal point through which various stakeholders, including domestic and international advocacy groups, mobilize to demand improvement of human rights conditions. UNSG visits grab domestic and international attention via extensive news coverage, and thus provide fruitful grounds for advocacy groups to develop their human rights campaigns. Second, UNSG visits empower domestic civil society organizations (CSOs), often enhancing their organizational capacities. When UNSGs visit a country, they frequently meet with CSO representatives to promote their roles and responsibilities in the public domain. UNSG visits are often the first time that CSO representatives are in the same space as regime leaders, providing an avenue for CSOs to voice their concerns and validation of the CSO's work.

We empirically examine the relationship between UNSG visits and improvements in human rights using our newly built UNSG official state visit dataset, which includes all official travels made by UNSGs over the past 25 years, including Kofi Annan, Ban Ki-moon, and António Guterres, as identified on the official UN website. We find evidence supporting the empirical implications of our argument. After controlling for selection, we find that UNSG visits are associated with increased human rights performance. Specifically, we employ an instrumental variable regression and endogenous treatment regression approach to deal with the presence of endogeneity and find that at least one UNSG visit is predicted to increase the Fariss (2014) human rights score by more than 0.07 points; this predicted change is substantially important and represents an on-the-ground reduction in human rights abuses that could affect millions of individuals. We conduct a series of additional analyses using various measures of human rights and different model specifications, which consistently demonstrate the significant effect of the UNSG in promoting human rights. Furthermore, we seek to directly test our causal claim that underscores the influence of civil society. By using causal mediation analysis, we find compelling evidence that the bulk of the UNSG effect is mediated by CSO participation environment.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we review the relevant literature and provide a background to political leaders' visits and the UNSG's role. Second, we present our theory and introduce two interrelated mechanisms. Third, we present our research design and modeling strategy. Fourth, we discuss the results of the statistical analyses and several additional tests to confirm the robustness of our results. Finally, we conclude with the implications and contributions of this study and suggestions for future research.

Literature Review

Diplomatic Visits in International Relations

Departing from the traditional statistical view of international relations, a growing body of literature has examined the economic, political, and social effects of high-level public diplomacy, namely, visits by state leaders, diplomats, and religious leaders. First, studies explore the effect of state visits on bilateral trade, and most show that political leaders' visits have noticeable economic consequences. Many studies have found that presidential visits and diplomatic missions promote bilateral trade (Malis & Smith, 2021; Nitsch, 2007; Rose, 2007). In the Chinese context, studies have confirmed that state visits to China increase the volume of bilateral trade, with the effects heavily biased toward sectors that hold greater importance for China: transport equipment, arms, and high-tech products (Beaulieu, Lian, and Wan 2020; Fan & Lu, 2021; Lin et al., 2017). Apart from trade, Aleksanyan et al. (2021) finds that leader visits lead to increased merger activity between visiting and hosting countries. However, Head and Ries (2010) cast doubt on the relationship between leader visits and trade promotion, as they fail to find empirical evidence that Canadian trade missions cause an increase in trade.

Foreign aid also responds to leaders' visits. State visits to the U.S. are reciprocated by increased economic and military aid from the U.S. (Malis & Smith, 2021), and recipient leaders visiting Japan also receive an increased amount of aid (Hoshiro, 2021).

State-level visits have also been found to strengthen peace and reinforce leaders' survival. States that receive visits from major power leaders, including the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, and France, are less likely to be targeted in interstate military disputes. The effect of such credible deterrence is most evident when the visits come with supportive statements from the leaders and when the two countries also have defense pacts (McManus, 2018). At the

domestic level, state visits by U.S. presidents reduce the risk of removal from office by 51%–70% (Malis & Smith, 2021) and help improve domestic approval ratings (Cohen, 2022). Cohen (2022) explains the mechanism by which foreign leaders project the prestige of the U.S. president on themselves and enjoy positive media coverage of the meetings. Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Matush (2021) find that high-level diplomatic visits make citizens evaluate the performance of the visiting country’s leadership more positively, driven by the wide media coverage of public diplomacy activities. This effect is also evident in issue-specific public support. Wang et al. (2023) find that visits by high-profile politicians of the U.S. improve bilateral military relations between the U.S. and Taiwan, as Taiwan’s public grows more supportive of the national security policy the U.S. prefers after the visits.

Recent research has found that visits by high-profile religious and political figures influence trade relations and human rights conditions. Widely known as the “Dalai Lama Effect,” hosting politically sensitive religious leaders can affect trade relations (Fuchs and Klann 2013; Lin, Hu, and Fuchs 2019). Fuchs and Klann (2013) find that countries where government members receive the Dalai Lama experience a 12.5% decline in exports to China, with the greatest trade-reducing impacts if visits were made by the head of state. A trade-debilitating effect has also been observed in a firm-level analysis (Lin, Hu, and Fuchs 2019). By contrast, Sverdrup-Thygeson (2015) finds that when Norwegian politicians met with the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, Norwegian exports to China in China’s key industrial sectors remained intact.

Visits made by another prominent religious leader, the Pope, influenced public perceptions of the main social issues through intensified media attention. Pope Francis’s visit to the U.S. increased American perceptions of climate change as a pressing moral issue; this is

referred to as the “Pope Francis Effect” (Landrum & Vasquez, 2020; Schuldt et al., 2017). Moreover, visits by Pope Francis have been found to improve human rights conditions of the receiving country, as governments fear global media coverage on national human rights violations; however, the effect is short-lived and disappears after the papal visit (Endrich & Gutmann, 2020).

Roles and Effects of UNSG

Despite mounting evidence concerning the substantive effects of leader visits, to the best of our knowledge, no extant research has explored UNSG visits. The existing literature largely revolves around assessing the role and legal duties of UNSGs (Johnstone, 2003; Szasz, 1991), or even their personal backgrounds and characteristics (Adebajo, 2007; Kille, 2007; Newman, 1998). Current literature largely emphasizes UNSGs' role as norm entrepreneurs who introduces new norms (e.g., democratic governance), as conflict mediators (Gordenker, 2013; Johnstone, 2007; Rushton, 2008; Skjelsbæk & Fermann, 1996), and as brokers between the UN Security Council and the broader community. Such roles mainly lie in how the literature understands the UNSG to hold moral authority somewhat comparable to the papacy; UNSGs, like the Pope, wield no material power, but their roles are largely normative, speaking for the welfare of global citizens and their human rights (Adebajo, 2007; Kille, 2007; Troy, 2017).

UNSGs are messengers who communicate the core values of the UN globally and engage in agenda-setting to spread such norms (Gordenker, 2013; Johnstone, 2007; Rushton, 2008). Johnstone (2007) illustrates how Kofi Annan, the former UNSG, helped generate the “responsibility to protect” norm and strived to propagate it through speeches and reports. Another pillar of UNSG’s role is to maintain peace and security. UN peacekeeping operations

are one of the central missions of the UN Secretariat, and UNSGs have the influence to mediate conflicts and encourage peace (Kille & Hendrickson, 2010; Skjelsbæk, 1991; Skjelsbæk & Fermann, 1996). UNSGs hold a special position in such political negotiations in that they wield no economic or physical power but stand on a moral and impartial base of influence (Skjelsbæk, 1991). For this reason, they serve as effective communication channels when direct means of interaction between adversaries are limited or absent.

Based on the existing literature on the roles and traits of UNSGs, we see many responses suspecting that UNSGs could influence political outcomes through their visits, including influencing human rights practices.

Theory

UNSGs are some of the most notable international political figures. While often discounted as merely symbolic and representative by skeptics, UNSGs still possess the potential to make a difference. For example, the UNSG can bring the issue of peace and security to the attention of the Security Council, and the information and analysis the UNSG delivers constitute a crucial element of any approach to the Council (Gordenker, 2013).

Official state visits by UNSGs are arguably the most visible and widely promoted activities, because the majority of UNSGs' activities take place behind the scenes. However, little is known about whether these visits have a meaningful impact on international affairs. In this study, we identify two causal pathways through which UNSG visits can improve human rights conditions in host countries. First, we argue that UNSG visits provide a unique opportunity for various stakeholders, including the media, CSOs, and human rights organizations (HROs), to

mobilize to seek improvements in human rights conditions in host countries.⁶ Through increased news coverage, UNSG visits garner domestic and international attention, providing fertile ground for CSOs to promote human rights campaigns. Second, UNSG visits can increase the visibility and reputation of domestic CSOs and HROs, thereby empowering them and enabling them to campaign for better human rights and improve human rights conditions in the future.

UNSG Visits as Opportunities for CSO Campaigning

Building on the transnational advocacy framework of Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Risse et al.'s (1999) “information politics” theory, the existing literature has found that HRO advocacy, namely naming and shaming, influences human rights conditions in targeted countries. HROs seek attention and support by providing, disseminating, and publicizing information about human rights abuses, which can put pressure on other norm-abiding countries to condemn and punish bad behaviors. The spotlight provided by HRO attention can affect a range of foreign policy measures and behaviors, including economic sanctions (Murdie & Peksen, 2013), humanitarian intervention (Murdie & Peksen, 2014), foreign aid (Lebovic & Voeten, 2009), foreign direct investment (Barry, Clay, and Flynn, 2013), and International Monetary Fund participation (Woo & Murdie, 2017).⁷

Given the limited attention and resources HROs have at their disposal, their influence largely depends on their ability to leverage more powerful actors to raise issue salience and affect public opinion via the media (Bob, 2002; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). We contend that UNSG

⁶ CSOs represent a broad segment of non-governmental actors that can be either domestic or international in scope. HROs are a subset of CSOs that have missions focusing on human rights. Many HROs well-known for their naming and shaming strategies are international.

⁷ For more discussion on the direct and indirect HRO information campaigns, see Allendoerfer, Murdie, and Welch (2020).

visits can serve as focal points for media attention, providing an opportunity for HR advocacy groups to campaign. The extant literature suggests that media attention significantly determines which human rights agendas and states HROs would prioritize (Meernik et al. 2012; Ramos, Ron and Thoms 2007; Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005). Chaudoin (2022, 7) contends that international organizations' actions provide "space for a break" from the daily coverage of the issue and allow human rights advocates to mobilize around a distinct event. In a similar vein, UNSG visits draw front-page attention generated by the presence of the UNSG to discuss specific issues with representatives of governments and major stakeholders. These issues are mostly contentious, conflictual, and concern international affairs, which allows the media to highlight various government and non-government actors, including HROs.

A good example is Mr. Ban's surprise visit to the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2014. He visited the CAR to shed an international spotlight on the atrocious crimes ongoing there as well as on the peacekeeping efforts of the African Union and French forces in the CAR.⁸

As UNSG visits receive considerable media coverage, HROs may seek to exploit this opportunity to push their human rights agenda into mainstream political discourse and increase public awareness. During these visits, HR activists can effectively disseminate information on human rights abuses with less effort and resources, but with a broader audience. This allows them to not only publicly condemn rights-violating countries but also make themselves more visible to the media and public. HROs are often conceived as credible sources of information on human rights abuses, primarily motivated by humanitarian purposes (Murdie & Peksen, 2014), and UNSG visits enable HRO campaigning to function most successfully as a means of attracting international attention.

⁸ <https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/04/465502>

HROs can also directly engage with UNSGs, leveraging their authority and responsibility as messengers for human rights in order to galvanize immediate action to halt human rights abuses. For example, in an open letter to the former UNSG Ban Ki-moon, prior to his trip to Central Asia in 2010, HRW emphasized the UNSG's role and the UN's mission to protect human rights:

There has never been a more important time for you to embody the role you envisioned as the “voice for the voiceless” by engaging governments in the region on human rights concerns and signaling to the public that the United Nations will work to promote human rights. (Human Rights Watch, 2010)

This may help hold the UNSG accountable for bringing issues to the table for discussion, which can potentially induce human rights compliance.

Building the Organizational Capacity of CSOs

Civil society plays a fundamental role in the UN's work. Mr. Guterres highlighted that “civil society is a key instrument for the success of today's UN” and “[d]ialogue and cooperation with civil society will ... be a central aspect of the activities of the UN in the next few years,” asking for support for CSOs campaigns.⁹ They collect information on human rights abuses through in-depth investigations and face-to-face interviews with journalists, whistleblowers, victims, and other relevant organizations and individuals and communicate this information to larger international organizations (Meernik et al., 2012). We argue that UNSG visits can empower domestic CSOs and HR advocacy groups by promoting their roles and responsibilities at public venues. The legitimizing force of the UNSG and the attention generated by UNSG

⁹ <https://www.1for7billion.org/news/2016/10/21/antonio-guterres-civil-society-is-key-instrument-in-solving-global-problems>

visits can increase the global recognition and legitimacy of the CSOs' campaigns, which would otherwise be challenging (Bob, 2002).¹⁰

Drawing from resource mobilization theory, which underscores the importance of resources that facilitate protest activity, we contend that UNSG visits provide different types of individual and group resources that boost CSOs' organizational capacity. Successful movements often rely on programs that provide collective incentives for group solidarity and moral commitment (Jenkins, 1982), and the development of shared identities and increased connectedness among group members can facilitate the creation of a highly organized group (Tilly, 1977). During visits, the UNSG often meets CSOs and promotes their activities by spreading the organizations' campaign objectives and endorsing the crucial roles they play. Specifically, the messages and remarks that the UNSG conveys often include the specific roles and contributions of civil society. For example, in Mr. Ban's remarks on a meeting of Tunisian civil society groups during his visit to Tunisia in 2011, he praised the role civil society had played during Tunisia's democratic transition and clarified the role and responsibility of civil society in its (then upcoming) first free and fair election in 2011:

I urge you to fully engage in the election process. By mobilizing volunteers and sending election observers throughout the country, you can enhance the transparency and legitimacy of the vote and ensure the election of an inclusive Constituent Assembly.¹¹

¹⁰ Generally speaking, many stories by CSOs rarely gain traction. Thrall, Stecula, and Moyer (2014) find that only about half of 100 organizations active in transnational human rights advocacy appeared in at least one news story from 2000 through 2010. Some organizations are much more likely to have their press releases amplified in the international media (Park, Murdie, Davis 2021).

¹¹ <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2011-03-22/remarks-meeting-civil-society-groups>

Kassem Istanbuli, the head of a Lebanese CSO, stated that the meeting with Mr. Guterres, during which their work was acknowledged and praised, made them “feel proud [of their] team ... and [that their] work is respected,” which they regard as very important. Istanbuli also emphasized that the meeting provided them with an opportunity to speak clearly and openly about the reality of their country, thereby encouraging more people to speak out.¹² The above examples demonstrate that UNSG visits can serve not only as a focal point of attention that informs the general public about the identity and function of CSOs in society but also as a source of empowerment and advocacy for activists.

Moreover, this may help CSOs mobilize participants or material resources, including fundraising, external funding opportunities, or collaborative partnerships with the government, private organizations, or other nonprofit organizations. The most quoted fundraising phrase “People give to people to help people” from Weinstein and Barden (2017, 1), a widely cited book on fundraising guide for nonprofit organizations, also highlights the importance of legitimacy and a clear statement of organizational needs for NGOs’ campaigns to increase.

In summary, we propose two causal mechanisms by which UNSG visits influence human rights conditions in host countries. Building on the literature on the information politics of transnational advocacy, we argue that HROs can leverage the spotlight of UNSG visits to mobilize media attention and promote their campaigns on the human rights agenda. UNSG visits can also help enhance CSOs’ organizational capacity to mobilize domestic support for and interest in campaigning by raising the reputation and visibility of these organizations. Taken together, this leads us to hypothesize the following:

¹² Interview with Kassem Istanbuli (Founder of the Lebanese National Theater and Tiro Association for Arts), December 2022

Hypothesis: Even after accounting for endogeneity, UNSG visits are associated with better human rights conditions.

Research Design

We test our hypothesis using a series of multivariate regressions with a country-year unit of analysis. Owing to the availability of data on our main variables of interest, our final sample includes the years 1997–2018 for 155 countries.

Dependent Variable

Testing our central hypothesis requires an outcome variable that captures the degree of human rights abuses within a country in a given year. We use Fariss's (2014) latent human rights score for this purpose. This variable is a compilation of different human rights indicators related to core physical integrity rights abuses, including the Political Terror Scale and the CIRI Human Rights Dataset Physical Integrity Rights Index (Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, and Filippov 2014; Gibney et al., 2022). Fariss's (2014) score adjusts for the changing standard of accountability regarding human rights over time; a higher score on his final index indicates greater respect for human rights. The variable ranges from -2.56 (Sudan in 2004) to 5.34 (Luxembourg in 2014) in our sample.

For the robustness tests, we use the Amnesty International and U.S. State Department versions of the Political Terror Scale by Gibney et al. (2022) and the physical integrity scale from the CIRI Human Rights and CIRIGHTS data projects (Cingranelli, Filippov, and Mark 2021; Cingranelli and Richards 2010; Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). The Political Terror

Scale ranges from 1 to 5, with a higher number indicating greater abuse. The CIRIGHTS Physical Integrity scale ranges from 0 to 8, with a higher number indicating less abuse.

Key Independent Variable


Our key independent variable is newly collected data on the number of country-level diplomatic visits by the UNSG each year. We relied on UN press releases regarding the UNSG's travel; all documents are available online. For example, on July 8, 2021, a report was released entitled "Activities of Secretary-General in France, 29 June–1 July" (UNSG/T/3298). According to the report, "United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres departed New York on Tuesday, 29 June, for Paris, where he arrived on Wednesday morning" (UNSG/T/3298). The UNSG participated in a bilateral meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron, met with the executive director of UN-Women and civil society members, and spoke at an equality forum. The report concludes that the UNSG left Paris for Spain on Thursday morning, after a dinner Wednesday evening with "Heads of State and Government, heads of international organization and civil society at the invitation of President Macron" (UNSG/T/3298). Using the bidirectional encoder representations from transformer (BERT) text analysis framework, we extracted information on travel location from this report, coding that the UNSG was in France in 2021. We are also able to code that the UNSG went to Spain from information in the next press release regarding the UNSG's travel, entitled "Activities of Secretary-General in Spain, 1–2 July," (UNSG/T/3299).

Figure 1 provides information on the total number of UNSG visits per country for the full time period we collected data, 1997–2021. Most countries had fewer than four visits during the 25-year span, and 18.8% had no visits during the full timespan. Figure 2 shows a heat map of the

geographical distribution of visits over the entire 25-year timespan. The U.S. and a few Western European states received the most visits. Further, as shown in Figure 3, in any one year in our sample, almost 82% of the countries did not receive a visit. When there are multiple visits per year, the UNSG typically goes to the U.S. (as many as 10 visits per year, as in 2001), Switzerland (as many as seven visits per year in 1997, 2016, and 2017), and the U.K. (as many as six visits per year in 2005).

Due to the left skew of this variable, we run all models with two separate key independent variables. First, we use the number of visits by the UNSG to the country in a given year. Second, we use a binary indicator of whether the UNSG made at least one visit to the country during the year. Our main results are consistent across all approaches.

Figure 1: The Total Number of Visits by the UNSG to a Country During 1997–2021



**Figure 2: Heat Map of the Total Number of Visits by the UNSG to a Country During 1997–
2021**





Figure 3: Yearly Number of UNSG Visits, 1997–2021



Controls

We include several potential confounding variables identified in previous research on the determinants of a country's human rights performance (Hill & Jones, 2014; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999). First, we control for the country's overall population size and level of development using the natural log of measures of total population and GDP per capita (constant 2015 U.S. dollars) from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (Azevedo, 2020). We control for the country's regime type using the 21-point indicator from the Polity 5 project by Marshall and Gurr (2020). Finally, we use Version 22.1 of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset to create a dichotomous indicator of whether a country was involved in an international or domestic conflict with at least 25 battle deaths in the calendar year (Davies, Pettersson, and Öberg 2022; Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson, 2022).

Modeling Approach

Although we begin our analysis with single-stage regressions, we acknowledge that endogeneity likely complicates the relationship between UNSG visits and human rights outcomes. We argue that UNSG visits should lead to changes in human rights practices by highlighting repression and providing a focal point that can galvanize activism. However, UNSG visits are not randomly assigned. Observable factors, such as regime type or wealth, could be related to the likelihood of both UNSG visits and human rights practices. Additional troubling and unobservable factors may also have affected our independent and dependent variables. Unobservable processes, such as having a leadership ripe for change or a build-up of international pressure, could also affect decisions regarding where UNSG visits occur and the

likelihood of abuse in a specific country. Not accounting for this self-selection or endogeneity could lead to biased and misleading conclusions.

To account for this, we used (a) an instrumental variable regression (also called “two-stage least squares” or “2SLS”) when our key independent variable was the number of UNSG visits to a country in a given year, and (b) an endogenous treatment regression when our key independent variable was the dichotomous indicator of whether any UNSG visit occurred in the country in the year. Both models are two-stage approaches. For the instrumental variable regression, the number of visits was first predicted in a regression in which visits were the dependent variable. This predicted variable was then used as the key independent variable in the second stage. For the endogenous treatment effects model, a model predicting whether there were any UNSG visits in the country-year was used to gather residuals that were then used in the models of potential outcomes. Using both approaches, we concluded that endogeneity is present using standard statistical tests, further justifying the use of two-stage approaches.¹³

In the two-stage models, we added a variable capturing the total number of visits by the UNSG to other countries in the region in a given year to the first-stage equation. This variable is an ideal instrument in that visits within the region are a great predictor of whether a UNSG visits a particular country but is not theoretically linked to a country’s own human rights practices. In coding the UNSG visits, we routinely saw how the UNSG made trips within a specific region, first going to France, for example, before traveling to Spain. These regional trips likely reduce travel time and expenses, making a given country more likely to receive a visit if its neighbors

¹³ For the instrumental variable regression, we tested for endogeneity using a heteroskedasticity-robust Durbin-Wu-Hausmann test (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2003). For the endogenous treatment regression, we rely on a likelihood-ratio test concerning correlated errors between the treatment and outcome models (Andresen 2018).

are also being visited. However, there is no reason to expect more visits to a region to be generally related to a specific country's underlying calculus regarding human rights. A similar regional logic is used in explaining visits by the Catholic Pope in Endrich and Gutmann (2020). The indicator was an excellent instrument in that it was significant in all first-stage models we ran, and the F-statistic of the excluded instrument from the 70s to 90s was well above the conventional rule of thumb of having an F-statistic greater than 10 (Stock & Yogo 2002).

In addition to the two-stage approaches, we ran all models with robust standard errors and included a lagged dependent variable to account for autocorrelation. Owing to the unique nature of the U.S., it is a statistical outlier in the dataset and was therefore excluded from our final analysis. However, results including the U.S. are consistent with our results reported in the text and are provided in the online appendix. As shown below, we ran robustness tests that included fixed effects of the country and year. Our results remained consistent with the addition of these fixed effects.

Results

Table 1 presents the results of the study. Models 1 and 2 present the results of the two-stage approaches used to account for the endogeneity. We provide the results for both the outcome stage and the first or treatment stage in both models. Across the models provided in Table 1, when human rights performance is the dependent variable, the control variables all behave as expected, with regime type and GDP per capita being positively associated with human rights performance and conflict and population size being negatively associated with it.

When accounting for endogeneity or self-selection, as shown in Models 1 and 2, the UNSG visits were associated with increased human rights practices. This result holds only at the

$p < 0.1$ (two-tailed) level when we examine the number of visits in a country-year, as shown in Model 1 in Table 1. This is not unexpected; as shown in Figure 3, there was a strong left skew in the number of visits the UNSG makes to any country in a year, with less than 3% of observations having three or more visits in a year. The results appear even more striking in Model 2 in Table 1, where the key independent variable is the dichotomous indicator of whether at least one UNSG visit occurred in the country in the year. This key independent variable was significant at the $p < 0.05$ level.

Turning to the first or treatment stage results shown at the bottom of Models 1 and 2 in Table 1, we see that UNSG visits are more likely to occur in countries with higher GDP per capita and larger countries. There is some evidence that UNSG visits are more likely to occur in historically poor human-rights-performing countries (Model 1) and non-democracies (Model 2). In both models, we find robust evidence that visits elsewhere in the region encourage visits within a specific country. For example, if a typical country is in a region with no UNSG visits in a year, its likelihood of a visit from the UNSG is 11.14%. However, suppose the same country is instead in a region with the average number of visits a year (10 visits in the region), then the likelihood of a visit from the UNSG increases to 17.99%.

Figure 4 illustrates the expected relationship between the number of UNSG visits and human rights scores, based on the results shown in Model 1. With all other variables at their mean in the sample, moving from no visits to one visit in the year is predicted to increase a country's Fariss (2014) human rights scores from 0.473 to 0.524 (95% confidence intervals of 0.454-0.491 and 0.485-0.563). A 0.0512 increase was predicted for each additional visit, but the confidence intervals became unwieldy as the number of visits increased to over two, as expected, given the low number of observations with more than two visits per year. Nonetheless, this

predicted increase in human rights score that can be attributed to an additional UNSG visit is greater than the predicted increase in human rights score that would occur if a country were to make a one-unit increase in its Polity 5 21-point regime-type score or if a country were to increase its GDP per capita from the sample mean to one standard deviation above the mean. Therefore, this is a substantively important result, indicative of the role that a UNSG visit plays in focusing advocacy attention and empowering domestic civil society to improve human rights practices.

Figure 5 shows the substantive results based on Model 4, in which the key independent variable is the dichotomous indicator of whether the country had at least one visit from the UNSG. As shown, having at least one UNSG visit is predicted to increase the Fariss (2014) human rights score by over 0.07 points, an increase that is larger than having a country move from 5 on the Polity IV regime score scale to 10. In other words, UNSG visits are substantively important, providing civil society with a way to advocate for shifts in police and security force monitoring as well as changes in how regimes use abuses to attempt to control a population. UNSG visits are powerful tools through which the UN can promote human rights, ultimately contributing to the security of its member states.

Table 1: Basic Model Results – Fariss (2014) Human Rights Score as Dependent Variable, UNSG Visits as Key Independent Variable

	Model 1: 2SLS Regression - Number of UNSG Visits as Key Independent Variable	Model 2: Endogenous Treatment Effects Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable
Number of UNSG Visits (instrumented)	0.051 (0.028)†	
Any UNSG Visit (Endogenous Binary Treatment)		0.072 (2.19)**
Lagged Human Rights Score	0.949 (0.007)***	0.950 (134.64)***
Regime Type (-10 to 10)	0.005 (0.001)***	0.005 (6.62)***
UCDP/PRIO Conflict	-0.098 (0.018)***	-0.099 (5.37)***
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.012 (0.006)**	0.012 (2.11)**
Population (ln)	-0.020 (0.005)***	-0.022 (4.60)***
Constant	0.253 (0.092)***	0.275 (2.90)***
<i>First/Treatment Stage</i>		
UNSG Visits Elsewhere in Region	0.014 (0.001)***	0.030 (9.61)***
Lagged Human Rights Score	-0.023 (0.012)†	-0.054 (1.53)
Regime Type (-10 to 10)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.015 (3.11)***
UCDP/PRIO Conflict	-0.004 (0.029)	0.049 (0.58)
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.131 (0.012)***	0.277 (9.86)***
Population (ln)	0.102 (0.008)***	0.287 (13.73)***
Constant	-2.583 (0.144)***	-8.087 (21.43)***

R2 (final stage)	0.97	
N	3,355	3,355
First-stage F-statistic (2SLS)	94.85	
Endogeneity Test P Value	0.04	0.00

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses: † $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Figure 4: Predicted Fariss's (2014) Human Rights Score, as Number of UNSG Visits (Instrumented) Increases





Figure 5: Predicted Fariss's (2014) Human Rights Score, Effect of No UNSG Visit & Any UNSG Visit (Endogenous Treatment Effect)



Robustness Tests

As aforementioned, we performed several tests to gauge the robustness of our results. Table 2 shows the results of a series of models using the Political Terror Scale indicators (Amnesty International-based and U.S. State Department-based) for human rights and the CIRIGHTS Physical Integrity Rights Index. The Political Terror Scales are the opposite of the other human rights indicators used in this project. Unlike the CIRIGHTS and Fariss (2014) scales, a higher score on the Political Terror Scale indicates more human rights abuses. Thus, for these models, our hypothesis leads us to expect a negative relationship between UNSG visits and the Political Terror Scale, which we find in Model 1 (Amnesty International-based Political

Terror Scale and the number of UNSG visits), Model 2 (U.S. State Department-based Political Terror Scale and the number of UNSG visits), Model 4 (Amnesty International-based Political Terror Scale and the dichotomous indicator of UNSG visits), and Model 5 (U.S. State Department-based Political Terror Scale and the dichotomous indicator of UNSG visits). When we used the CIRIGHTS Physical Integrity scale in Models 3 and 6, we found what would be expected based on our hypothesis, with a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the number of visits (Model 3) and a dichotomous indicator of whether any UNSG visit occurred (Model 6). Across all the models in Table 2, our control variables are statistically significant and in the expected direction, as is our instrument, the total number of visits elsewhere in the region. There also continues to be evidence of endogeneity, justifying our continued use of two-stage approaches.

Table 3 shows another series of robustness tests, this time including fixed effects on country (Models 1 and 3) and two-way fixed effects on country and year (Models 2 and 3). We continue to run two-stage models. To our knowledge, endogenous treatment effects models do not have a standard way to include fixed effects. As such, when our key independent variable is dichotomous (Models 2 and 4), we run a panel-data instrumental variable model. As these tests are simply to gauge robustness, we think this approach is appropriate. As shown in Table 3, our main hypothesis continues to receive support with the inclusion of fixed effects. Further, Davidson-MacKinnon tests of endogeneity continue to show that endogeneity is present, validating our use of the two-stage approach shown in Table 3. In short, across many different specifications, our results continue to support a role for the UNSG in the promotion of human rights.

As another test of the robustness of our finding, Table 4 presents a more direct empirical analysis of our theoretically-informed hypothesis that UNSG visits help to improve human rights conditions through their influence on the civil society sector. We employ causal mediation analysis to determine the extent to which any effect of a UNSG visit on the human rights situation in the host country can be attributed indirectly to the influence a UNSG visit has on domestic civil society conditions. Our argument again is that UNSG visits provide a boost to CSO involvement in a country, ultimately increasing domestic pressure for better human rights. Dippel, Ferrara, and Hebllich (2020)'s instrumental variables version of causal mediation analysis allows us to examine this potential causal process while simultaneously accounting for the possible endogeneity of any UNSG visit. In this analysis, we continue to use any UNSG visit as the endogenous treatment variable and use the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) CSO participation environment (“v2csprtpt”) as the mediating variable (Coppedge et al. 2022). V-Dem’s CSO participation environment variable captures the involvement of people in CSOs within a country, with a higher score meaning there are “diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them” (Coppedge et al. 2022, 197). Like in our two-stage approaches discussed above, we use total regional UNSG visits in the country-year as our instrumental variable. In these instrumental variable causal mediation models, we include all control variables from the main analysis and robust standard errors.

Across the variable measures of our dependent variable, Models 1 through 4 in Table 4 show strong support for our theoretical contention that the effect of the UNSG visit on human rights is statistically significantly mediated by the empowerment of CSOs of the host country. Moreover, the results indicate that over 90 percent of the impact of the UNSG's visit on the human rights situation in the visited country is mediated by improvements to the CSO participatory

environment. Lastly, even after accounting for the lagged dependent variable, as shown in the appendix, these empirical findings are consistently supported with respect to the total and indirect effect of UNSG visits.

Table 2: Robustness Model Results – Alternative Dependent Variables

	Model 1: 2SLS Regression - Number of UNSG Visits as Key Independent Variable - Political Terror Scale - Amnesty	Model 2: 2SLS Regression - Number of UNSG Visits as Key Independent Variable - Political Terror Scale - State Dept	Model 3: 2SLS Regression - Number of UNSG Visits as Key Independent Variable - CIRIGHTS Physical Integrity Index	Model 4: Endogenous Treatment Effects Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable - Political Terror Scale - Amnesty	Model 5: Endogenous Treatment Effects Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable - Political Terror Scale - State Department	Model 4: Endogenous Treatment Effects Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable - CIRIGHTS Physical Integrity Index
Number of UNSG Visits (instrumented)	-0.313 (0.102)***	-0.184 (0.079)**	0.583 (0.167)***			
Any UNSG Visit (Endogenous Binary Treatment)				-0.531 (0.060)***	-0.376 (0.061)***	0.839 (0.145)***
Lagged DVAR	0.643 (0.017)***	0.679 (0.014)***	0.649 (0.015)***	0.651 (0.017)***	0.682 (0.014)***	0.657 (0.015)***
Regime Type (-10 to 10)	-0.017 (0.002)***	-0.015 (0.002)***	0.040 (0.004)***	-0.019 (0.002)***	-0.017 (0.002)***	0.042 (0.004)***
UCDP/PRIO Conflict	0.407 (0.043)***	0.353 (0.032)***	-0.746 (0.070)***	0.407 (0.044)***	0.357 (0.034)***	-0.728 (0.070)***
GDP per Capita (ln)	-0.017 (0.019)	-0.065 (0.014)***	0.067 (0.029)**	-0.015 (0.012)	-0.057 (0.009)***	0.083 (0.019)***
Population (ln)	0.102 (0.014)***	0.081 (0.011)***	-0.241 (0.024)***	0.116 (0.011)***	0.094 (0.008)***	-0.240 (0.019)***

Constant	-0.513 (0.315)	0.107 (0.235)	4.797 (0.552)***	-0.697 (0.199)***	-0.120 (0.159)	4.562 (0.379)***
<i>First/Treatment Stage</i>						
UNSG Visits Elsewhere in Region	0.015 (0.002)***	0.014 (0.001)***	0.014 (0.001)***	0.028 (0.003)***	0.028 (0.003)***	0.030 (0.003)***
Lagged Human Rights Index	0.008 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.007)**	-0.003 (0.037)	0.032 (0.038)	0.017 (0.020)
Regime Type (-10 to 10)	-0.003 (0.002)†	-0.003 (0.002)†	-0.004 (0.002)***	-0.019 (0.005)***	-0.018 (0.005)***	-0.019 (0.005)***
UCDP/PRIO Conflict	0.003 (0.033)	0.019 (0.029)	0.049 (0.031)	0.094 (0.088)	0.047 (0.084)	0.184 (0.086)**
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.139 (0.012)***	0.121 (0.011)***	0.117 (0.010)***	0.294 (0.026)***	0.269 (0.025)***	0.249 (0.025)***
Population (ln)	0.109 (0.009)***	0.109 (0.008)***	0.118 (0.009)***	0.300 (0.023)***	0.300 (0.020)***	0.305 (0.021)***
Constant	-2.779 (0.170)***	-2.615 (0.143)***	-2.800 (0.179)***	-8.420 (0.442)***	-8.310 (0.387)***	-8.241 (0.404)***
R2 (final stage)	0.96	0.97	0.96			
N	2,485	3,355	3,153	2,505	3,355	3,174
First-stage F-statistic (2SLS)	78.25	94.84	91.72			
Endogeneity Test P Value	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses: † $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Fixed Effects 2SLS Regressions – Fariss’s (2014) Human Rights Score as Dependent Variable

	Model 1: 2SLS Regression - Number of UNSG Visits as Key Independent Variable- Country Fixed Effects	Model 2: 2SLS Regression - Number of UNSG Visits as Key Independent Variable – Country and Year Fixed Effects	Model 3: 2SLS Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable- Country Fixed Effects	Model 4: 2SLS Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable – Country and Year Fixed Effects
Number of UNSG Visits (instrumented)	0.085 (2.49)**	0.062 (1.71)†		
Any UNSG Visit (instrumented)			0.114 (2.49)**	0.084 (1.71)†
Lagged Human Rights Score	0.830 (87.47)***	0.820 (86.32)***	0.831 (87.51)***	0.821 (86.20)***
Regime Type (-10 to 10)	0.013 (6.30)***	0.013 (6.28)***	0.013 (6.26)***	0.013 (6.24)***
UCDP/PRIO Conflict	-0.210 (12.14)***	-0.219 (12.74)***	-0.209 (12.10)***	-0.219 (12.71)***
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.061 (2.90)***	-0.050 (1.81)†	0.060 (2.86)***	-0.050 (1.80)†
Population (ln)	-0.088 (2.71)***	-0.276 (6.23)***	-0.092 (2.81)***	-0.278 (6.25)***
Constant	0.965 (1.94)†	4.857 (6.05)***	1.036 (2.05)**	4.891 (6.07)***
<i>N</i>	3,355	3,355	3,355	3,355

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses: † $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Dippel, Ferrara, and Heblich (2020) (2020) Instrumental Variables Causal Mediation Analysis

	Model 1: 2SLS Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable – Fariss (2014) Human Rights Score	Model 2: 2SLS Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable – Political Terror Scale – Amnesty	Model 3: 2SLS Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable – Political Terror Scale – State Dept	Model 4: 2SLS Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable – CIRIGHTS – Physical Integrity Index
Total Effect	2.399*** (0.355)	-1.886*** (0.322)	-1.070*** (0.229)	2.903*** (0.500)
Direct Effect	0.201† (0.121)	-0.121 (0.0943)	-0.103† (0.0620)	0.300† (0.156)
Indirect Effect	2.198** (0.916)	-1.766*** (0.660)	-0.967** (0.430)	2.603** (1.138)
Observations	3,356	2,714	3,356	3,167
F-statistic of excluded instrument first stage	78.96	76.17	78.96	80.86
F-statistic of excluded instrument second stage	16.02	21.43	16.02	14.57
Percentage of total effect explained by mediator (CSO Participatory Environment)	91.62	93.60	90.34	89.68

Treatment: Any UNSG Visit, Instrument: UNSG Visits Elsewhere in Region

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses: † $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Conclusions

Do UNSGs have meaningful influence on international affairs? Critics often discount their role as symbolic and representative, which rarely influences state behavior. In this study, we show that UNSGs play a vital role in promoting human rights conditions, one of the core missions of the UN. We focus on the UNSG's official state visits, a highly visible and significant activity that garners widespread attention, and argue that they can improve human rights conditions in host countries by providing an opportunity for human rights campaigning and enhancing the organizational capacity of CSOs.

We find strong support for our argument using a novel dataset on UNSG official travels. We employ two-stage models as our main modeling strategy to account for self-selection and endogeneity, and subsequently conduct a number of tests to confirm the robustness of the results. In sum, our results demonstrate that the human rights promoting effect of the UNSG is significantly influenced by CSO empowerment, supporting our causal claim that highlights the role of civil society.

This study contributes to the literature on HRO advocacy and human rights promotion by demonstrating that HROs have significant effects on human rights, particularly when equipped with sufficient resources brought about by UNSG visits. The results also contribute to the literature on visits by political and religious leaders by identifying a previously unrecognized causal pathway through which concentrated media attention can be leveraged to influence political outcomes. This study also provides several avenues for future research. Future studies could examine how the purpose of UNSG visits or the people they meet with influences the level of media exposure.

Works Cited

- Abouharb, M. R., & Cingranelli, D. L. (2009). IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003. *The Review of International Organizations*, 4(1), 47-72. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-008-9050-5>
- Adebajo, A. (2007). Pope, pharaoh, or prophet? The Secretary-General after the Cold War. In S. Chesterman (Ed.), *SECRETARY OR GENERAL? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Aleksanyan, M., Hao, Z., Vagenas-Nanos, E., & Verwijmeren, P. (2021). Do state visits affect cross-border mergers and acquisitions? *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 66, 101800. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101800>
- Allendoerfer, M. G., Murdie, A., & Welch, R. M. (2020). The Path of the Boomerang: Human Rights Campaigns, Third-Party Pressure, and Human Rights. *International Studies Quarterly*, 64(1), 111-119. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz082>
- Andresen, M. E. (2018). Exploring marginal treatment effects: Flexible estimation using Stata. *The Stata Journal*, 18(1), 118-158.
- Ausderan, J. (2014). How naming and shaming affects human rights perceptions in the shamed country. *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(1), 81-95. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313510014>
- Azevedo, J. P. (2020). *WBOPENDATA: Stata module to access World Bank databases*. In <https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocode:s457234>
- Barry, C. M., Chad Clay, K., & Flynn, M. E. (2013). Avoiding the Spotlight: Human Rights Shaming and Foreign Direct Investment¹. *International Studies Quarterly*, 57(3), 532-544. <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12039>

- Baum, C. F. (2007). ivreg2: Stata module for extended instrumental variables/2SLS, GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression.
<http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s425401.html>
- Baum, C. F., Schaffer, M. E., & Stillman, S. (2003). Instrumental variables and GMM: Estimation and testing. *The Stata Journal*, 3(1), 1-31.
- Beaulieu, E., Lian, Z., & Wan, S. (2020). Presidential Marketing: Trade Promotion Effects of State Visits. *Global Economic Review*, 49(3), 309-327.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1226508x.2020.1792329>
- Bell, S. R., Clay, K. C., & Murdie, A. (2012). Neighborhood Watch: Spatial Effects of Human Rights INGOs. *The Journal of Politics*, 74(2), 354-368.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381611001642>
- Blanton, R. G., Blanton, S. L., & Peksen, D. (2015). The Impact of IMF and World Bank Programs on Labor Rights. *Political Research Quarterly*, 68(2), 324-336.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912915578462>
- Bob, C. (2002). Globalization and the social construction of human rights campaigns. *Globalization and human rights*, 133. files/1060/NHckDQAAQBAJ.html
- Bob, C. (2005). *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Carnegie, A., & Samii, C. (2019). International Institutions and Political Liberalization: Evidence from the World Bank Loans Program. *British Journal of Political Science*, 49(4), 1357-1379. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000187>

- Chaudoin, S. (2022). How International Organizations Change National Media Coverage of Human Rights. *International Organization*, 1-24.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818322000273>
- Chyzh, O. (2016). Dangerous liaisons: An endogenous model of international trade and human rights. *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(3), 409-423.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316629605>
- Cingranelli, D., Fajardo-Heyward, P., & Filippov, M. (2014). Principals, Agents and Human Rights. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(3), 605-630.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123413000070>
- Cingranelli, D., & Filippov, M. (2010). Electoral Rules and Incentives to Protect Human Rights. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(1), 243-257. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381609990594>
- Cingranelli, D., Filippov, M., & Mark, S. (2021). *The CIRIGHTS Dataset* Version 2021.01.21).
www.binghamton.edu/institutes/hri/
- Cingranelli, D., Richards, D. L., & Clay, K. C. (2014). *The CIRI Human Rights Dataset* Version 2014.04.14.).
- Cingranelli, D. L., & Richards, D. L. (2010). The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 32(2), 401-424.
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/hurq32&i=405>
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/PrintRequest?handle=hein.journals/hurq32&collection=journals&div=28&id=405&print=section&scition=28> (424)
- Cohen, J. E. (2022). Travel to and from the United States and Foreign Leader Approval. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 52(3), 490-508. <https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12789>

- Conrad, C. R. (2012). Divergent Incentives for Dictators: Domestic Institutions and (International Promises Not to) Torture. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 58(1), 34-67.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712459707>
- Davenport, C. (2007). State Repression and Political Order. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10(1), 1-23. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216>
- Davies, S., Pettersson, T., & Öberg, M. (2022). Organized violence 1989–2021 and drone warfare. *Journal of Peace Research*, 59(4), 593-610.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221108428>
- Davis, D. R., Murdie, A., & Steinmetz, C. G. (2012). "Makers and Shapers": Human Rights INGOs and Public Opinion. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 34(1), 199-224.
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/hurq34&i=205>
<https://heinonline.org/HOL/PrintRequest?handle=hein.journals/hurq34&collection=journals&div=11&id=205&print=section§ion=11> (224)
- De Mesquita, B. B., Downs, G. W., Smith, A., & Cherif, F. M. (2005). Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights. *International Studies Quarterly*, 49(3), 439-457. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00372.x>
- De Soysa, I., & Vadlammanati, K. C. (2013). Do pro-market economic reforms drive human rights violations? An empirical assessment, 1981–2006. *Public Choice*, 155(1-2), 163-187. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9847-2>
- Demeritt, J. H. R. (2012). International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming and Shaming Save Lives? *International Interactions*, 38(5), 597-621.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2012.726180>

- Demeritt, J. H. R., & Conrad, C. R. (2019). Repression Substitution: Shifting Human Rights Violations in Response to UN Naming and Shaming. *Civil Wars*, 21(1), 128-152.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2019.1602805>
- DeMeritt, J. H. R., & Young, J. K. (2013). A political economy of human rights: Oil, natural gas, and state incentives to repress. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 30(2), 99-120.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894212473915>
- Detraz, N., & Peksen, D. (2016). The Effect of IMF Programs on Women's Economic and Political Rights. *International Interactions*, 42(1), 81-105.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2015.1056343>
- DiBlasi, L. (2020). From Shame to New Name: How Naming and Shaming Creates Pro-Government Militias. *International Studies Quarterly*, 64(4), 906-918.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa055>
- Dippel, C., Ferrara, A., & Heblich, S. (2020). Causal mediation analysis in instrumental-variables regressions. *The Stata Journal*, 20(3), 613-626.
- Dreher, A., Gassebner, M., & Siemers, L.-H. R. (2012). Globalization, Economic Freedom, and Human Rights. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56(3), 516-546.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002711420962>
- Endrich, M., & Gutmann, J. (2020). Pacem in Terris: Are Papal Visits Good News for Human Rights? *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3672171>
- Fan, J., & Lu, B. (2021). The impact of summit visits on bilateral trade: Empirical evidence from China. *The World Economy*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.13191>

- Fariss, C. J. (2014). Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability. *American Political Science Review*, 108(2), 297-318. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055414000070>
- Franklin, J. C. (2008). Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression in Latin America. *International Studies Quarterly*, 52(1), 187-211. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00496.x>
- Fuchs, A., & Klann, N.-H. (2013). Paying a visit: The Dalai Lama effect on international trade. *Journal of International Economics*, 91(1), 164-177. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2013.04.007>
- Gibney, M., Cornett, L., Wood, R., Haschke, P., Arnon, D., Pisano, A., Barrett, G., & Park, B. (2022). *The political terror scale 1976–2021*. <https://www.politicalterrorsscale.org/>
- Gleditsch, N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., & Strand, H. (2002). Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(5), 615-637. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343302039005007>
- Goldsmith, B. E., Horiuchi, Y., & Matush, K. (2021). Does Public Diplomacy Sway Foreign Public Opinion? Identifying the Effect of High-Level Visits. *American Political Science Review*, 115(4), 1342-1357. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055421000393>
- Gordenker, L. (2013). *The UN Secretary-General and Secretariat*. Routledge.
- Greenhill, B., & Reiter, D. (2022). Naming and shaming, government messaging, and backlash effects: Experimental evidence from the Convention Against Torture. *Journal of Human Rights*, 21(4), 399-418. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2021.2011710>

- Hafner-Burton, E. M. (2005). Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression. *International Organization*, 59(3), 593-629.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050216>
- Hafner-Burton, E. M. (2008). Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem. *International Organization*, 62(4), 689-716.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818308080247>
- Head, K., & Ries, J. (2010). Do trade missions increase trade? [<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5982.2010.01593.x>]. *Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique*, 43(3), 754-775. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5982.2010.01593.x>
- Hendrix, C. S., & Wong, W. H. (2013). When Is the Pen Truly Mighty? Regime Type and the Efficacy of Naming and Shaming in Curbing Human Rights Abuses. *British Journal of Political Science*, 43(3), 651-672. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123412000488>
- Hill, D. W., & Jones, Z. M. (2014). An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression. *American Political Science Review*, 108(3), 661-687.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055414000306>
- Hoshiro, H. (2021). Do diplomatic visits promote official development aid? Evidence from Japan. *Political Science*, 1-21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1948344>
- Human Rights Watch. (2010). Letter to UN Secretary General in Advance of His Trip to Central Asia. *Human Rights Watch*. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/18/letter-un-secretary-general-advance-his-trip-central-asia>
- Jenkins, J. C. (1982). Why do Peasants Rebel? Structural and Historical Theories of Modern Peasant Rebellions. *American Journal of Sociology*, 88(3), 487-514.
<https://doi.org/10.1086/227705>

- Johnstone, I. (2003). The Role of the UN Secretary-General: The Power of Persuasion Based on Law. *Global Governance*, 9(4), 441-458. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800496>
- Johnstone, I. (2007). The Secretary-General as norm entrepreneur. In S. Chesterman (Ed.), *SECRETARY OR GENERAL? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Joshi, D. K., Maloy, J. S., & Peterson, T. M. (2019). Popular versus Elite Democracies and Human Rights: Inclusion Makes a Difference. *International Studies Quarterly*, 63(1), 111-126. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy057>
- Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics*. Cornell University Press. files/1048/y-YH95YHliwC.html
- Kille, K. J. (2007). *The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International Leadership*. Georgetown University Press.
- Kille, K. J., & Hendrickson, R. C. (2010). Secretary-General Leadership Across the United Nations and NATO: Kofi Annan, Javier Solana, and Operation Allied Force. *Global Governance*, 16(4), 505-523. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29764964>
- Krain, M. (2012). J'accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or Politicides?1. *International Studies Quarterly*, 56(3), 574-589. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00732.x>
- Landrum, A. R., & Vasquez, R. (2020). Polarized U.S. publics, Pope Francis, and climate change: Reviewing the studies and data collected around the 2015 Papal Encyclical. *WIREs Climate Change*, 11(6). <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.674>

- Lebovic, J. H., & Voeten, E. (2009). The Cost of Shame: International Organizations and Foreign Aid in the Punishing of Human Rights Violators. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(1), 79-97. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343308098405>
- Lee, S.-H., & Woo, B. (2020). IMF = I'M Fired! IMF Program Participation, Political Systems, and Workers' Rights. *Political Studies*, 69(3), 514-537. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720905318>
- Lin, F., Hu, C., & Fuchs, A. (2019). How do firms respond to political tensions? The heterogeneity of the Dalai Lama Effect on trade. *China Economic Review*, 54, 73-93. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2018.10.009>
- Lin, F., Yan, W., & Wang, X. (2017). The impact of Africa-China's diplomatic visits on bilateral trade. *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*, 64(3), 310-326. <https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12128>
- Malis, M., & Smith, A. (2021). State Visits and Leader Survival. *American Journal of Political Science*, 65(1), 241-256. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12520>
- Marshall, M. G., & Gurr, T. (2020). *Polity5: Dataset Users' Manual*. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p5manualv2018>
- McManus, R. W. (2018). Making It Personal: The Role of Leader-Specific Signals in Extended Deterrence. *The Journal of Politics*, 80(3), 982-995. <https://doi.org/10.1086/697462>
- Meernik, J., Aloisi, R., Sowell, M., & Nichols, A. (2012). The Impact of Human Rights Organizations on Naming and Shaming Campaigns. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56(2), 233-256. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002711431417>
- Meyer, W. H. (1996). Human rights and MNCs: Theory versus quantitative analysis. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 18(2), 368-397.

- Murdie, A. (2009). The Impact of Human Rights NGO Activity on Human Rights Practices. *International NGO Journal*, 4, 421-440.
- Murdie, A., & Peksen, D. (2013). The impact of human rights INGO activities on economic sanctions. *The Review of International Organizations*, 8(1), 33-53.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-012-9146-9>
- Murdie, A., & Peksen, D. (2014). The Impact of Human Rights INGO Shaming on Humanitarian Interventions. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(1), 215-228.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613001242>
- Murdie, A., & Peksen, D. (2015). Women's rights INGO shaming and the government respect for women's rights. *The Review of International Organizations*, 10(1), 1-22.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-014-9200-x>
- Murdie, A. M., & Davis, D. R. (2012). Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs¹. *International Studies Quarterly*, 56(1), 1-16.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00694.x>
- Newman, E. (1998). *The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the new era: a global peace and security mandate?* Springer.
- Nitsch, V. (2007). State Visits and International Trade. *The World Economy*, 30(12), 1797-1816.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01062.x>
- Park, B., Murdie, A., & Davis, D. R. (2021). Turning up the volume: The amplification of shame. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 43(1), 168-196.
- Pettersson, T. (2022). *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook v 22.1*.
<https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads>

- Poe, S. C., Tate, C. N., & Keith, L. C. (1999). Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993. *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(2), 291-313. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00121>
- Ramos, H., Ron, J., & Thoms, O. N. T. (2007). Shaping the Northern Media's Human Rights Coverage, 1986—2000. *Journal of Peace Research*, 44(4), 385-406. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307078943>
- Richards, D. L., Gelleny, R. D., & Sacko, D. H. (2001). Money with a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries. *International Studies Quarterly*, 45(2), 219-239. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00189>
- Risse, T., Risse-Kappen, T., Ropp, S. C., & Sikink, K. (1999). *The power of human rights: International norms and domestic change* (Vol. 66). Cambridge University Press.
files/1057/kpsDPvaCOCAC.html
- Ron, J., Ramos, H., & Rodgers, K. (2005). Transnational Information Politics: NGO Human Rights Reporting, 1986–2000. *International Studies Quarterly*, 49(3), 557-588. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00377.x>
- Rose, A. K. (2007). The Foreign Service and Foreign Trade: Embassies as Export Promotion [<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.00870.x>]. *The World Economy*, 30(1), 22-38. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.00870.x>
- Rushton, S. (2008). The UN Secretary-General and Norm Entrepreneurship: Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Democracy Promotion. *Global Governance*, 14(1), 95-110. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800693>

- Schuldt, J. P., Pearson, A. R., Romero-Canyas, R., & Larson-Konar, D. (2017). Brief exposure to Pope Francis heightens moral beliefs about climate change. *Climatic Change*, 141(2), 167-177. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-016-1893-9>
- Skjelsbæk, K. (1991). The UN Secretary-General and the Mediation of International Disputes. *Journal of Peace Research*, 28(1), 99-115. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343391028001010>
- Skjelsbæk, K., & Fermann, G. (1996). The UN Secretary-General and the mediation of international disputes. In L. Riesen (Ed.), *Resolving International Conflict: The Theory and Practice of Negotiation* (pp. 75-104).
- Stock, J. H., & Yogo, M. (2002). Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression. <https://www.nber.org/papers/t0284>
- Stubbs, T., & Kentikelenis, A. (2017). International financial institutions and human rights: implications for public health. *Public Health Reviews*, 38(1). <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40985-017-0074-3>
- Sverdrup-Thygeson, B. (2015). The Flexible Cost of Insulting China: Trade Politics and the “Dalai Lama Effect”. *Asian Perspective*, 39(1), 101-123. <https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2015.0011>
- Szasz, P. C. (1991). The role of the U.N. Secretary-General: some legal aspects. *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 24(1), 161-198.
- Thomson, M., Kentikelenis, A., & Stubbs, T. (2017). Structural adjustment programmes adversely affect vulnerable populations: a systematic-narrative review of their effect on child and maternal health. *Public Health Reviews*, 38(1). <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40985-017-0059-2>

- Thrall, A. T., Stecula, D., & Moyer, R. (2014). Building a Better Boomerang? Human Rights NGOs and the New Media. In F. Oehmer (Ed.), *Politische Interessenvermittlung und Medien* (pp. 425-441). Nomos. http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/index.php?doi=10.5771/9783845245683_425
- Tilly, C. (1977). From mobilization to revolution.
- Troy, J. (2017). Two “Popes” to Speak for the World: The Pope and the United Nations Secretary General in World Politics. *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, 15(4), 67-78. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2017.1392712>
- UNSG/T/3298. (2021). *Activities of Secretary-General in France, 29 June–1 July* <https://press.un.org/en/2021/sgt3298.doc.htm>
- UNSG/T/3299. (2021). *Activities of Secretary-General in Spain, 1-2 July*. <https://press.un.org/en/2021/sgt3299.doc.htm>
- Wang, A. H.-E., Wu, C. K. S., Yeh, Y.-Y., & Chen, F.-Y. (2023). High-Level Visit and National Security Policy: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Taiwan. *International Interactions*, 1-15. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2023.2162512>
- Weinstein, S., & Barden, P. (2017). *The complete guide to fundraising management* (Fourth edition ed.). Wiley.
- Woo, B., & Murdie, A. (2017). International Organizations and Naming and Shaming: Does the International Monetary Fund Care about the Human Rights Reputation of Its Client? *Political Studies*, 65(4), 767-785. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717715397>

Appendix to Accompany “UN Secretary General Visits & Human Rights Diplomacy”

Table of Contents

Table OA1: Basic Model Results with US Included

Table OA2: Robustness Model Results with US Included

Table OA3: Fixed Effects 2SLS Regressions with US Included

Table OA4: Instrumental Variable Causal Mediation Analysis with Lagged Dependent Variable

Table OA1: Basic Model Results – Fariss (2014) Human Rights Score as Dependent Variable, UNSG Visits as Key Independent Variable

	Model 3- 2SLS Regression - # of UNSG Visits as Key Independent Variable	Model 4- Endogenous Treatment Effects Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable
# of UNSG Visits		
Any UNSG Visit		
# of UNSG Visits (instrumented)	0.077 (0.041)*	
Any UNSG Visit (Endogenous Binary Treatment)		0.071 (2.23)**
Lagged Human Rights Score	0.948 (0.007)***	0.950 (135.13)***
Regime Type (-10 to 10)	0.005 (0.001)***	0.005 (6.63)***
UCDP/PRIO Conflict	-0.111 (0.020)***	-0.101 (5.55)***
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.005 (0.008)	0.011 (2.04)**
Population (ln)	-0.026 (0.007)***	-0.023 (4.80)***
Constant	0.403 (0.157)**	0.290 (3.10)***
<i>First/Treatment Stage</i>		
UNSG Visits Elsewhere in Region	0.010 (0.002)***	0.029 (9.44)***
Lagged Human Rights Score	0.000 (0.015)	-0.051 (1.44)
Regime Type (-10 to 10)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.014 (3.04)***
UCDP/PRIO Conflict	0.153 (0.052)***	0.079 (0.96)
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.172 (0.015)***	0.287 (10.30)***
Population (ln)	0.142 (0.012)***	0.296 (14.27)***
Constant	-3.544 (0.249)***	-8.314 (22.43)***
R2 (final stage)	0.97	
N	3,378	3,378
First Stage F Statistic (2SLS)	35.96	
Endogeneity Test P Value	0.03	0.00

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA2: Robustness Model Results – Alternative Dependent Variables

	Model 1- 2SLS Regression - # of UNSG Visits as Key Independent Variable – Political Terror Scale – Amnesty	Model 2- 2SLS Regression - # of UNSG Visits as Key Independent Variable – Political Terror Scale – State Dept	Model 3- 2SLS Regression - # of UNSG Visits as Key Independent Variable – CIRIGHTS Physical Integrity Index	Model 4- Endogenous Treatment Effects Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable – Political Terror Scale – Amnesty	Model 5- Endogenous Treatment Effects Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable – Political Terror Scale – State Department	Model 4- Endogenous Treatment Effects Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable – CIRIGHTS Physical Integrity Index
# of UNSG Visits (instrumented)	-0.410 (0.154)***	-0.184 (0.079)**	0.762 (0.261)***			
Any UNSG Visit (Endogenous Binary Treatment)				-0.531 (0.060)***	-0.376 (0.061)***	0.839 (0.145)***
Lagged DVAR	0.622 (0.022)***	0.679 (0.014)***	0.624 (0.022)***	0.651 (0.017)***	0.682 (0.014)***	0.657 (0.015)***
Regime Type (-10 to 10)	-0.017 (0.002)***	-0.015 (0.002)***	0.041 (0.004)***	-0.019 (0.002)***	-0.017 (0.002)***	0.042 (0.004)***
UCDP/PRIO Conflict	0.481 (0.059)***	0.353 (0.032)***	-0.884 (0.108)***	0.407 (0.044)***	0.357 (0.034)***	-0.728 (0.070)***
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.012 (0.033)	-0.065 (0.014)***	0.025 (0.048)	-0.015 (0.012)	-0.057 (0.009)***	0.083 (0.019)***
Population (ln)	0.129 (0.027)***	0.081 (0.011)***	-0.295 (0.048)***	0.116 (0.011)***	0.094 (0.008)***	-0.240 (0.019)***
Constant	-1.112 (0.601)*	0.107 (0.235)	6.078 (1.146)***	-0.697 (0.199)***	-0.120 (0.159)	4.562 (0.379)***
<i>First/Treatment Stage</i>						
UNSG Visits Elsewhere in Region	0.011 (0.002)***	0.014 (0.001)***	0.010 (0.002)***	0.028 (0.003)***	0.028 (0.003)***	0.030 (0.003)***
Lagged Human Rights Index	-0.052 (0.023)**	-0.003 (0.014)	0.050 (0.011)***	-0.003 (0.037)	0.032 (0.038)	0.017 (0.020)
Regime Type (-10 to 10)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)*	-0.005 (0.002)***	-0.019 (0.005)***	-0.018 (0.005)***	0.657 (0.015)***
UCDP/PRIO Conflict	0.200 (0.064)***	0.019 (0.029)	0.256 (0.061)***	0.094 (0.088)	0.047 (0.084)	0.042 (0.004)***
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.184 (0.016)***	0.121 (0.011)***	0.153 (0.013)***	0.294 (0.026)***	0.269 (0.025)***	-0.728 (0.070)***
Population (ln)	0.157 (0.015)***	0.109 (0.008)***	0.170 (0.014)***	0.300 (0.023)***	0.300 (0.020)***	0.083 (0.019)***
Constant	-3.743 (0.282)***	-2.615 (0.143)***	-4.059 (0.325)***	-8.420 (0.442)***	-8.310 (0.387)***	-0.240 (0.019)*** 0.839 (0.145)*** (0.379)***
N	2,505	3,355	3,174	2,505	3,355	

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA3: Fixed Effects 2SLS Regressions - – Fariss (2014) Human Rights Score as Dependent Variable

	Model 1- 2SLS Regression - # of UNSG Visits as Key Independent Variable- Country Fixed Effects	Model 2- 2SLS Regression - # of UNSG Visits as Key Independent Variable – Country and Year Fixed Effects	Model 3- 2SLS Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable- Country Fixed Effects	Model 4- 2SLS Regression - Any UNSG Visit as Key Independent Variable – Country and Year Fixed Effects
# of UNSG Visits (instrumented)	0.078 (2.51)**	0.056 (1.67)*		
Any UNSG Visit (instrumented)			0.114 (2.51)**	0.082 (1.67)*
Lagged Human Rights Score	0.829 (88.15)***	0.820 (87.14)***	0.831 (88.02)***	0.821 (86.87)***
Regime Type (-10 to 10)	0.013 (6.37)***	0.013 (6.36)***	0.013 (6.32)***	0.013 (6.31)***
UCDP/PRIO Conflict	-0.210 (12.27)***	-0.219 (12.88)***	-0.207 (12.15)***	-0.218 (12.79)***
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.062 (3.00)***	-0.050 (1.81)*	0.060 (2.86)***	-0.050 (1.81)*
Population (ln)	-0.085 (2.66)***	-0.275 (6.24)***	-0.092 (2.82)***	-0.277 (6.26)***
Constant	0.917 (1.86)*	4.858 (6.07)***	1.040 (2.07)**	4.883 (6.08)***
<i>N</i>	3,378	3,378	3,378	3,378

Table OA4: Dippel et al. (2020) Instrumental Variable Causal Mediation Analysis with Lagged Dependent Variable

VARIABLES	(1) Fariss (2014) Human Rights Score	(2) Political Terror Scale - Amnesty	(3) Political Terror Scale – State Dept	(4) CIRIGHTS – Physical Integrity Index
Total Effect	0.0959* (0.0525)	-0.574*** (0.191)	-0.340** (0.147)	1.057*** (0.307)
Direct Effect	-0.000128 (0.0106)	0.00147 (0.0359)	-0.0340 (0.0275)	0.0826 (0.0621)
Indirect Effect	0.0960* (0.0560)	-0.575** (0.238)	-0.306* (0.172)	0.974** (0.431)
Observations	3,355	2,485	3,355	3,153
F-statistic of excluded instrument first stage	79.28	68.19	78.46	77.21
F-statistic of excluded instrument second stage	33.26	32.50	19.62	20.34
Percentage of total effect explained by mediator (CSO Participatory Environment)	100.1	100.3	90	92.19

Treatment: Any UNSG Visit
Instrument: UNSG Visits Elsewhere in Region
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1