Complying with human rights*

Simon Hug† and Simone Wegmann‡
Département de science politique et relations internationales
Université de Genève

Paper prepared for presentation at the
6th Annual Conference on The Political Economy of International Organizations
Mannheim and Heidelberg, February 7-9, 2013

First version: October 2011, this version: January 25, 2013

Abstract

The empirical assessment of how signatories of human rights conventions comply with their agreed to obligations has yielded so far conflicting results, especially regarding the compliance mechanisms that are the most promising to ensure improving human rights records. We argue in this paper that this has to do with the fact that different compliance mechanisms have been assessed in isolation, without considering possible interactions. To assess this argument, we propose a novel way to assess the effect of these mechanisms by relying on a Markov-transition model and find that human rights violations are time dependent as well as evidence of the effect of independent variables to be conditional on previous human rights violations and on the strength of human rights compliance systems.

*This paper draws on Simone Wegmann's (2011) master thesis. Earlier versions were presented at the Annual Congress of the Swiss Political Science Association (Lucerne, February 2-3, 2012), the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (Chicago, April 12 - 15, 2012) and the 2nd Annual General Conference of the European Political Science Association (Berlin, June 21-23, 2012). We wish to thank the participants at these events and especially Jeff Colgan, Marina Kolb, and Joseph Wright for their helpful comments.

† Département de science politique et relations internationales, Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales; Université de Genève; 40 Bd du Pont d'Arve; 1211 Genève 4; Switzerland; phone ++41 22 379 83 78; email: simon.hug@unige.ch

‡ Département de science politique et relations internationales, Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales; Université de Genève; 40 Bd du Pont d'Arve; 1211 Genève 4; Switzerland; email: simone.wegmann@unige.ch

1 Introduction

During the past decades ratification of human rights conventions has become nearly universal. Most countries have at least ratified one of the core human rights conventions of the United Nations. For example, until to the present day 153 states have ratified the "United Nation's Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment" (CAT)[1] and are expressing their commitment to the rights of the integrity of the person. According to the Cingranelli and Richards (2010) data, however, respect for physical integrity rights has not improved substantially during the last thirty years as the global average shows about the same level in 1981 and 2009, respectively. While there is less torture in the world today than in 1981, there is more political imprisonment as well as more disappearance today than thirty years ago. This shows that there still exists a discrepancy between commitment to human rights and compliance with treaty obligations. This discrepancy between policy and practice underlines the importance of studies on human rights and the government's compliance as a central issue (e.g., Hafner-Burton and Ron, 2009; Simmons, 2009; Carey, Gibney and Poe, 2010). Therefore, it is important to insure that scholarly insights likely to affect policy circles are based on solid empirical footing.

We argue in this paper that this is not the case with many quantitative studies. Especially studies assessing what affects compliance with human rights are subject to such criticism. Such studies have yielded interesting though sometimes conflicting insights. In their excellent survey of the literature Hafner-Burton and Ron (2009) (see also Landman, 2005*b*; Hafner-Burton, 2012) argue that the main differences can be linked to a conflation of theoretical perspectives and empirical strategies. While constructivist scholars emphasizing phenomena such as "norm cascades" (e.g., Sikkink, 1993; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) and "spirals" (e.g., Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; Risse, Jetschke and Schmitz, 2002) find in case studies that non-governmental organizations influence considerably respect for human rights. Scholars starting from a more rationalist perspective emphasize compliance problems (e.g., Hathaway, 2002; Vreeland, 2008; Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2011) and find in quantitative studies a rather mixed picture

[1]Information on treaty ratification is available online: `http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en`

when it comes to the respect of human rights.

In this paper we argue that some of these conflicting results in quantitative studies are due to rather odd specifications of empirical models used to evaluate broader hypotheses on what affects compliance with human rights. Empirical assessments of different mechanisms leading to compliance with human rights have been assessed in isolation, without considering possible interactions. Here, we offer one empirical strategy which reflects much more closely what the likely data-generating process is. Using this approach we assess the effect of different regional human rights compliance systems and find that when these strong management and enforcement mechanisms are combined they allow countries to improve their human rights record.

In the remainder of the paper we proceed as follows. In the next section we briefly review the theoretical literature as it pertains to the compliance with human rights. We devote section three to a discussion of the empirical approaches chosen to evaluate these various theoretical stances. In section four we argue that a Markov transition model (for applications dealing with democratization, see Beck, Epstein, Jackman and O'Halloran, 2001; Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen and O'Halloran, 2006) comes much closer to the data-generating process that is behind most evaluations of human rights compliance. The results that we present in this section underline that some insights presented in the literature are on rather poor empirical footing. We can also show that our approach allows for much more detailed insights into the conditions under which various explanatory factors promote human rights compliance. In the conclusion we draw on these insights to make suggestions in which direction the empirical literature on human rights should evolve.

2 Treaties, enforcement and human rights

Although the global situation shows no major improvements of compliance with human rights, in recent history one can find positive cases pointing toward more respect for human rights. Carey, Gibney and Poe (2010) mention several countries improving their respect for human rights after a period of conflict and violence, among them the development in Rwanda after 1994 and Argentina after the 1970s and 1980s. Despite these positive examples and the fact that the present human rights regime is considered as strong as never before, it is still "one of the most

underdeveloped legal systems in the world" (Simmons, 2009, 114). Lacking the aspects of mutual gains and reciprocity (Simmons, 2009, 123) compliance with human rights conventions can hardly be compared to compliance with other forms of international agreements. As for example compared to trade agreements, human rights conventions do not allow for a threat of retaliatory non-compliance to affect the behavior of other states (Hathaway, 2002, 1951). As highlighted by Simmons (2009, 126) human rights conventions are negotiated at the international level, however, they "engage practically no important interests among states in their mutual relationships with each other." Hence, since human rights conventions show some distinctive features as compared to other international agreements, the empirical assessment of how compliance with such conventions is achieved asks for alternative explanations.

From a rationalist perspective states only comply with international agreements if the agreement is consistent with their interest. Actors comply with an agreement as long as the benefit from continuing the agreement exceeds the short-term value of violating it. Hence, compliance occurs due to the benefit from ongoing cooperation and here, the shadow of the future, reputation as well as reciprocity function as enforcement mechanisms (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985, 249). Looking at the characteristics of human rights conventions, however, such a perspective of self-enforcing agreements functioning through the mechanism of reciprocity offers only limited explanatory leverage. Human rights agreements lack the aspects of reciprocal relationships as states normally do not violate human rights in order to retaliate against human rights abuses in other countries. Accordingly, although human rights conventions are negotiated at the international level and therefore reflect a state-to-state relationship, human rights are respected or violated in state-society relations. It follows that in order to remedy compliance problems due to nonexisting reciprocal relations, ex-post costs have to be raised by third parties. As ex-post costs are defined as the consequence of treaty violation human rights regimes may raise ex-post costs when conventions not only contain managerial aspects but also enforcement mechanisms such as arbitration or prosecution (Simmons, 2009, 2010). Furthermore, countries themselves may have available mechanisms through which human rights can be enforced. In democracies leaders have to expect to be held accountable for their actions, first through retrospective voting and, second, through independent do-

mestic judicial systems. Assuming that a policymaker's preference is to hold office, he has to choose policies which maximize the chance of reelection which, in turn, leads him to consider voters' preferences. This democratic setting makes repression a strategy implying high ex-post costs (Dai, 2005; Carey, Gibney and Poe, 2010).

Constructivist scholars emphasize the importance of values and socialization when it comes to norm compliance. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), for example, analyzes the influence of norms on state behavior by means of a "norm life cycle." Accordingly, states internalize norms driven by their state identity as a member of an international society through which appropriate behavior is defined. Using a similar approach, Risse, Jetschke and Schmitz (2002) emphasize the interaction between a repressive state and international actors. Following a more constructivist rationale, the management approach mentions the ambiguity of treaty language, the limitations on capacity leading to states not being able to establish a regulatory apparatus to secure compliance, and an extreme time lag between a convention and compliance with it as principal factors leading to non-compliance with human rights (Chayes and Chayes, 1995, 10-16). Therefore, human rights conventions including management mechanisms such as a repetitive discourse between signatories as well as monitoring and transparency institutions should enhance compliance with human rights as they lead to more embeddedness in the international society.

Both the reasoning about enforcement and management seem to contribute to the explanation of when signatories of human rights conventions comply with their obligations. Since human rights lack reciprocal relationships and mutual gains, it seems vital to consider the configurations of different human rights compliance systems when it comes to their management and enforcement capacities. The human rights compliance systems of the United Nations, the Americas, and Europe have available different management and enforcement mechanisms and we test for the effects of the respective compliance system on compliance with human rights. We do not argue that previous analyses did not include central aspects determining treaty compliance. We argue, however, that the possible interaction between these variables has not been considered. Therefore, in this paper, we are especially interested in the influence of treaty ratification as a function of different human rights compliance systems.

3 The empirical record

As nicely demonstrated by Hafner-Burton and Ron (2009) it seems that empirical results about the determinants of compliance with human rights are, to some extent, shaped by the choice of a more quantitative or qualitative approach, the latter showing a somewhat more positive picture. Quantitative scholars mainly address two different but overlapping and sometimes linked research questions (e.g. Hathaway, 2007). The first asks why states commit to human rights treaties (e.g., Hathaway, 2007; Vreeland, 2008; Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2011) whereas the second aims at identifying the factors making states comply with their commitments (e.g., Poe and Tate, 1994; Camp Keith, 1999; Zanger, 2000). This latter research area includes analyses of the effect of treaty ratifications such as those by Camp Keith (1999), Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005), Landman (2005*a*), Neumayer (2005), Simmons (2009) or Cole (2012).

Early quantitative work by Park (1987), Mitchell and McCormick (1988) and Henderson (1991) first tried to offer a systematic assessment of what influences the respect of human rights. Both economic and political factors played considerable roles in these explanations. Poe and Tate (1994) proposed to test for different explanatory factors of repression of personal integrity rights. The authors find democracy and the existence of civil or international war to have statistically significant effects on governmental repression. These findings are supported by a later study covering a longer period of time (Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999). In addition to democracy and the existence of civil or international war the authors find the past level of repression, population size, and economic development to be determinants of human rights violations. Proceeding rather similarly Zanger (2000) analyzes the effect of regime change on personal integrity violations. The analysis supports the findings of Poe and Tate (1994) and furthermore shows that violation of human rights decreases during a regime change toward democracy and increases when a regime is changed from democracy to a hybrid regime.

Poe and Tate (1994) as well as Zanger (2000), however, do not include the effect of treaty ratification in their analyses. Using the same empirical approach as Poe and Tate (1994) and Zanger (2000), Camp Keith (1999) presents one of the earliest analysis of the influence of human rights treaties on state behavior. Based on the model by Poe and Tate (1994), Camp Keith (1999) tests whether becoming a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and

its Optional Protocol changes actual respect for human rights. The results do not support, however, the assumption that signatories to the ICCPR respect human rights to a greater extent than non-signatories.

Hathaway (2002) offers a comprehensive assessment of how states having ratified human rights treaties differ from those that have not. She finds rather mixed effects when assessing whether such ratifications improve the human rights record of countries. Addressing the same research question Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) analyse the effect of treaty ratification on compliance with human rights. In line with the results of Camp Keith (1999), the authors find no evidence of human rights improvement due to ratification of human rights treaties. Results show, however, that democracy and the strength of the international civil society positively influence respect for human rights. The findings of this paper are in line with the results of Simmons (2009) who analyses the effect of several United Nations' human rights conventions on compliance with human rights. By focussing on repressive states Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2007) advance the previous findings on the conditionality of treaty effects on democracy and civil society. Similarly, Landman (2005*a*), Neumayer (2005), Hill (2010) and Cole (2012) analyze the effect of different United Nations' human rights conventions such as the ICCPR and its First Optional Protocol, as well as the CAT including Articles 21 and 22, and the Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Moreover, Hathaway (2002) and Neumayer (2005) include several regional treaties, among them the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American Convention of Human Rights as well as the African Charter on Human Rights. Cole (2012) finds that compliance with human rights is dependent on the level of commitment. Hill (2010) attempts to control for the ratification behavior by employing matching techniques[2] and finds mixed effects dependent on the convention considered.[3]

[2]Landman (2005*a*) addresses the endogenous nature of treaty ratification by using instrumental variables, offers, however, no information on the quality of these instruments. Neumayer (2005), on the other hand, approaches this problem by employing a Heckman selection model, criticized by Simmons (2010, 290): "Neumayer checks for the robustness of these results with a Heckman selection model, with a curious justification for instruments: He holds that "newly independent countries receive greater attention with respect to their human rights record as do former colonies" (Neumayer, 2005, 949), but the likelihood of scrutiny seems to be precisely the mechanism that drives his results concerning the importance of INGOs and democracies."

[3]He considers, however, the CIRI physical integrity scale as continuous variable and assumes a constant effect for treaty ratification independent on the time since ratification.

In the next section we briefly outline some problems these empirical approaches are posing and propose a model which comes much closer to the data-generating process lying behind most evaluations of compliance with human rights.

4 An empirical assessment

Much of the empirical work on compliance with human rights norms and treaties relies on often quite problematic empirical specifications. Practically from the start of quantitative work on the respect of human rights (e.g., Park, 1987; Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Henderson, 1991; Poe and Tate, 1994) scholars have relied on ordinal measures to assess the extent of human rights violations culminating in the widely used Cingranelli and Richards (2010) "Human Rights Dataset" and the "Political Terror Scale" (e.g., Poe, Carey and Vazquez, 2001; Wood and Gibney, 2010). Despite the sometimes rather small number of categories, many scholars simply assumed these ordinal measures to be continuous and estimated the effects of various variables with the help of linear regression models (e.g., Park, 1987; Poe and Tate, 1994; Zanger, 2000).

More recent work (e.g., Hathaway, 2002; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Neumayer, 2005; Hill, 2010) relies on ordered logit and probit models, which reflect much more closely the likely data-generating process. In studies of compliance, however, two additional problems loom rather large. First, as more general studies on treaties and compliance have shown (von Stein, 2005; Simmons, 2010), the signing and ratification of treaties also often operates as a screening device, making the assessment of how treaties constrain quite difficult. Second, changes in the respect of human rights by governments often evolves slowly over time, having as a consequence that in a time-series cross-section analysis, time dependence will be quite considerable.

We confront the second of these problems heads-on. Previous work relying on ordered logit or probit models simply included a lagged dependent variable (thus assuming this variable to be continuous) as additional independent variable to control for time-dependence (e.g., Hathaway, 2002; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Neumayer, 2005). Unfortunately, proceeding like this assumes a rather inconsistent data-generating process, as the same variable is simultaneously assumed to be ordinal and continuous.

An important implication of this way to proceed is also that independent of the starting point (i.e., whether a country commits atrocious human rights violations or treats its citizens with silk gloves), the assumed effect of an independent variable, let us say the ratification of a treaty is assumed to be the same. But as the dependent variable is ordinal with a clear upper and lower bound, improvements, for instance, in a country with silk gloved leaders, are clearly limited or even impossible.

These two problems are elegantly addressed by Markov transition models (e.g., Beck, Epstein, Jackman and O'Halloran, 2001; Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen and O'Halloran, 2006).[4] In these models, for instance in the context of a binary dependent variable, one estimates how independent variables affect the probability of a change in the response category from one year to the next depending on the initial state. Such models, as Beck, Epstein, Jackman and O'Halloran (2001) nicely demonstrate, can easily be estimated with a simple logit or probit model. With ordinal dependent variables, ordered logit and probit allow for the same estimation.

Proceeding this way allows for time dependence, as the level of current respect of human rights will depend on the respect of human rights in the previous period. In addition, the effects of independent variables will vary as a function of the previous state, i.e., the respect of human rights in the previous period. Consequently, proceeding in this way allows us to address two important problems in the current literature on compliance with human rights.[5]

To address the intentional decision of states to sign and ratify human rights convention we resort Roodman's (2009) estimator for mixed-process models (CMP). This allows to estimate at the same time a binary selection equation and an ordinal outcome equation.

4.1 Variables

To assess the extent of human rights violations we rely on the Cingranelli and Richards's (2010) Physical Integrity Rights Index. States are classified according

[4]Kim and Sikkink (2010) refer to having explored such a model in their work on how cases brought before human rights courts affect the respect for human rights. They provide, however, no detailed information.

[5]For simplicity's sake we do not address the related issue of time dependence, namely whether having remained in the same category of our dependent variable affects the likelihood of a transition.

to the annual US State Department as well as Amnesty International reports on human rights. The Physical Integrity Rights Index is an additive index including indicators of extrajudicial killing, torture, political imprisonment, and disappearance. For each of these indicators countries are classified on a three-point scale which leads to an additive index ranging from (0) "no respect for human rights" to (8) "full respect for human rights" (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010).

Our main independent variable measures the compliance systems under which countries fall. Looking more closely at the different human rights regimes shows that the United Nations' as well as the American and the European conventions of the rights of the integrity of the person have available very different management and enforcement mechanisms. Following Donnelly (2003, 127-129), regimes can be classified according to the following four types: (1) Enforcement regimes include binding international decision-making; (2) Implementation regimes including monitoring and policy coordination; (3) Promotion regimes which include assistance of national implementation of norms; and (4) Declaratory regimes without international decision making. A similar but slightly different classification of regimes is provided by Tallberg (2002, 632) describing a "management-enforcement ladder" including the following four elements: (1) Preventive capacity building and rule clarification; (2) Forms of monitoring enhancing transparency of state behavior; (3) A legal system which permits to bring cases against non-compliant states; and (4) a final measure of deterrent sanctions. By means of these classifications it is possible to depict a picture of the different human rights regimes and their configuration of management and enforcement mechanisms. On the one hand, the weakest of the regimes considered in this analysis is the United Nations' human rights regime which is characterized by management mechanisms and does not dispose of any enforcement opportunity based in the CAT. The "Committee against Torture" monitors state compliance with the CAT but is dependent on reports submitted by the countries. Unless signatories explicitly recognize the competence of the Committee against Torture (by recognizing articles 21 and 22 of the CAT which allows another signatory state or individuals to refer to the Committee in case of human rights violations), it cannot undertake any inquiries (United Nations, 2011). Moreover, the Human Rights Council (which replaced the Commission on Human Rights in 2006) provides for further monitoring and transparency by addressing human rights violations and making

recommendations (United Nations, 2011).

On the other hand, the American and the European human rights regimes do dispose of some enforcement mechanisms, however, only the European regime can be classified as applying strong enforcement. The Inter-American System of Human Rights consists of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights established in 1959 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights which came into force in 1979. The function of the Commission on Human Rights is it to "promote the observance and defence of human rights and to serve as a consultative organ (...)" (OAS, 2012), however, in order to conduct investigations, the Commission is dependent on the consent of the government concerned. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has an adjudicatory and an advisory function. But, only states and the Commission on Human Rights may bring cases to the Court and states have to acknowledge the Court's jurisdiction. The monitoring of compliance works through the review of reports issued by the signatories themselves (OAS, 2011). This classifies the American human rights regime as one permitting to bring cases against non-compliant states but without strong international decision-making and enforcement mechanisms.

The European Court of Human Rights does allow individuals to submit cases to the Court and the Court may ask the respondent state the payment of just satisfaction, to take individual measures (such as the reopening of unfair proceedings), or general measure (such as a review of legislation). Furthermore, the office of the Commissioner for Human Rights engages in dialogue with the member states and composes reports and recommendations with reference to the national human rights situations (EHCR, 2011). Within the European context, however, a further differentiation between member states of the Council of Europe and the ones of the European Union (EU) seems to be of importance. For the EU member states, the European Court of Justice, established in 1952, constitutes the judicial authority working together with the national courts. The Court of Justice monitors the uniform application and interpretation of EU law and it may take actions (including a financial penalty) against member states for failure to fulfil obligations (Curia, 2011).

When ratifying the CAT countries fall automatically under the UN compliance system. By ratifying the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture countries are classified as being member of the American compliance sys-

tem. Similarly, when ratifying the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment countries are member of the European compliance systems. Furthermore, when becoming member of the EU, countries are subject immediately to the compliance rules of the EU. To simplify we regroup the compliance regimes into three categories, namely the one provided by the United Nations, the one related to EU-membership and finally the ones prevalent in the remainder of Europe and the Americas (the latter will serve as reference category in the analyses that follow). Furthermore, we use information from the United Nations[6] to determine the year in which a country has ratified the CAT. We also count the number of years since ratification and use this variable and its square term to allow for a curvilinear effect of the CAT ratification.

Another important independent variable is the regime type for which we rely on Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland's (2010) democracy measure. The data provides for a dichotomous variable classifying as democracy a country fulfilling the following conditions: (1) the mode of effective executive selection is direct or indirect; (2) the mode of legislative election is elective (legislators are selected by means of either direct or indirect popular vote); (3) the legislature is elected; (4) multiple parties are legally allowed (de jure status of parties); (5) existence of multiple parties (de facto status of parties); (6) there exist multiple parties outside of regime front; (7) there is a legislature with multiple parties; and (8) the regime year qualifies as a democratic regime which is the case when incumbents did not unconstitutionally close the lower house of the national legislature and rewrite the rules in their favor.

Two final control variables have been suggested by the literature. To control for economic development we rely on the Penn World Tables V7.0 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2011) using their GDP per capita measure in 1995 PPP. To assess the effect of conflict we rely on "Armed Conflict and Intervention Datasets" (Marshall, 2006) coding as 1 all country years in which at least some sort of conflict (internal or external) took place.

Finally, as Roodman's (2009) estimator also requires an exclusion restriction, we argue that ratification behavior of neighboring countries affects the ratification behavior of each country, but not its respect of human rights.[7] For this variable we

[6] `http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en`

[7] Based on logic, we also exclude from the selection/ratification equation the variable on the

employed Weidmann, Kuse and Gleditsch's (2012) `cshapes` package to determine for each year in our analysis all the countries' immediate neighbor and then determined the proportion of ratification in this set of countries.

In our empirical analysis we wish to cover as many countries as possible over the period between 1990-2008. Due to missing data in some of our variables we are unable to extend the data much further back or more to the present day. In addition, for some countries even between 1990 and 2008 missing data appears. In the appendix (table 1) we provide information on the 156 countries covered and the time periods during which they appear in our sample.[8]

4.2 Results

Table 3 of the appendix presents the results of three models, each of them estimated as a simple ordinal probit and a mixed-process ordinal probit with a selection equation. The first model simply uses as independent variables the ones discussed above without taking into consideration the time dependence in the data. The second model includes as additional independent variable the lagged dependent variable, taking into account, however, its ordinal character. The estimated coefficients for the various dichotomous indicators for the different categories clearly indicate that the assumption of a continuous variable is not reflected in the data. Finally, the last model is our preferred Markov transition model, where all independent variables appear also as interactions with the previous state of human rights (i.e., the lagged dependent variable).[9]

When considering the first model we find that conflict, the political regime, ratification, as well as the compliance regimes of the United Nations and the European Union show statistically significant results. However, when including as additional independent variable the lagged dependent variable as done in the second model, we find that the independent variables of the United Nations' compliance regime and the ratification no longer show statistically significant

compliance regimes, as these are linked to having signed a treaty.

[8] We also report in table 2 of the appendix descriptive statistics of all the variables employed in our analysis.

[9] As conflicts are extremely rare in countries with good human rights records we had to regroup the interactions between previous state of human rights records and conflict for the three highest categories (i.e., the values 6, 7, and 8.). Similarly, among the EU member states there are no cases with extremely poor human rights records which is why the interactions of the EU compliance system and the previous state of human rights records is only reported for the four highest categories (i.e., the values 5, 6, 7, and 8).

effects. In this second model, only the political regime, conflict and being a member of the compliance regime of the European Union display systematically statistically significant effects on the respect of human rights. Furthermore, in this second model we find strong evidence for time dependence, i.e., the extent to which a country has violated human rights norms in the previous year contributes considerably to the level of its violations in the next year. When considering the estimated coefficients for the various dichotomous indicators for the different categories of the lagged dependent variable we also find strong evidence that the categories of this ordinal variable are not equally spaced out. When turning to our third model we find that, as compared to the second model, being a member of the compliance regime of the European Union no longer shows statistically significant results. However, we find additional support for using our preferred model, as for a series of our independent variables we find that their effect is conditional on the level of previous human rights violations. For instance, the independent variables of democracy as well as the years since ratification show statistically significant results for some of the previous levels of human rights violations.

For this third model we are, however, faced with a long list of coefficients the interpretation of which is far from self-evident, also because the statistical tests for individual coefficients only offer partial relevant information. For these reasons we rely on changes in predicted probabilities due to the key independent variables in our model[10] to illustrate our main findings.

Given that our main research question is how different compliance regimes affect human rights records we depict in the following figures (1-3) how the ratification of the CAT and joining one of the compliance regimes affects the human rights record. Figure 1 depicts how the probabilities of belonging to the various categories of our dependent variable change when a country ratifies the CAT and only becomes member of the UN compliance regime. These changes of probabilities obviously depend on the previous level of respect of human rights, which corresponds to the different panels in figure 1.[11] In general the predicted changes

[10]To do so we relied on *clarify* (Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2003).

[11]We keep all remaining variables at their lowest level except GDP per capita which we kept fixed at 4540 $ and the political regime which was fixed at the value of democracies. We chose this latter option as a non-democracy ratifying the CAT and joining the EU compliance regime is an impossibility. For comparisons we nevertheless report the same figures also for non-democracies, with the caveat concerning the EU compliance regime.

in the probabilities suggest that CAT ratification and UN compliance regime reduce the probability of sliding back in compliance, with the exception of countries already having high human rights standards (e.g., a value of 8). These changes are, however, very small and not surprisingly, given that none of the estimated coefficients is statistically significant, we find no significant changes in behavior by democratic states due to the ratification of the CAT.

Figure 2 depicts the same changes in the predicted probabilities for a country ratifying the CAT and entering either the American or European compliance regime. Again, as to be expected with the statistically non-significant coefficients, none of the changes in predicted probabilities is statistically significant. In addition, the pattern in the direction of the changes is not as systematic as it was for the UN compliance regime. For instance, when having an awful human rights record (value of 0) the ratification increases the likelihood of maintaining this record and decreases the likelihood of small improvements. When having slightly better values (e.g., 1 and 2) the ratification increases the likelihood of improvement and reduces the risk of backsliding. But to reiterate, these predicted changes are small and statistically not significant.

Finally, when turning to the EU compliance regime (figure 3) we do find statistically significant changes in the predicted probabilities. Especially when a country with a good though not stellar human rights record (values of 5 or 6) ratifies the CAT and becomes part of the EU compliance regime the likelihood that it improves its human rights record statistically significantly improves. The risk of sliding back a category or two is also reduced. When a country already has a very good human rights record, however, ratifying the CAT and joining the EU compliance regime hardly effects the likelihood of changing this very record.

Figure 1: Changes in predicted probabilities due to a ratification of CAT, average GDP, UN compliance regime, in a democracy



Figure 2: Changes in predicted probabilities due to a ratification of CAT, average GDP, in European or American compliance regime, in a democracy



Figure 3: Changes in predicted probabilities due to a ratification of CAT, average GDP, EU compliance regime, in a democracy



Obviously figures 1-3 only inform us about the short term effect of a treaty ratification, but clearly changing human rights policies, if influenced by a treaty ratification, will take some time to be implemented. For this reason we depict in figure 4 the marginal effect of a treaty ratification on the latent variable inherent in an ordinal logit model as a function of the years since ratification.[12] We use for this the case of European and American compliance system. We chose this compliance system as illustration as the previously discussed results suggest that it is more effective than the UN, but less so than the EU's, so that we depict in some sense the median marginal effect.

Figure 4 clearly demonstrates that for most of the initial states, the effect of a treaty ratification over time hardly differs and is rather negative and limited.[13] The single exception is the set of countries with no respect for physical integrity at all, for which the CAT ratification increases the respect for human rights over the first ten years before to tamper off. Interesting to note is that for remaining countries the ratification of the CAT in the European or American compliance regime actually reduces the respect of human rights over time.

This figure 4 depicting the long-term effect of treaty ratification clearly shows that the strongest marginal effect of a CAT ratification is observable among the worst offenders of human rights. As figure 4 only depicts the marginal effects, the overall changes in the respect of human rights is obviously considerably larger, as for human rights violators, the transition probabilities toward higher response categories (better human rights records), increase over several years, before being reduced again (after year 8).[14]

[12]This is obviously only an imperfect assessment of the long term effects of a treaty ratification, as the Markov transition model setup implies that the transition probabilities will affect the likelihood of belonging to any response category in a multiplicative fashion.

[13]We chose a time span of 11 years as the maximum number of years since ratification in our sample is 23, but the effect for higher numbers of years since ratification our estimates are much less precise.

[14]It is worth noting that this differential effects of treaty ratification completely escaped the scholarly attention, as the empirical models used so far simply assumed that the time effect would in a monotonic way affect all countries the same way, independent of their previous extent of human rights violations.

Figure 4: Marginal effect on latent variable of years since ratification (European and American compliance system)



5 Discussion and conclusion

Our results suggest that the compliance regimes affect considerably how treaty ratifications affect the human rights record of a country. More specifically we find that especially the EU compliance regime leads to an improved respect of human rights when the CAT is signed. Obviously this result has to be put into perspective as admission to the EU since the Eastern enlargement in 2004 is conditional on human rights standards. This might also be the reason why in our robustness analyses (see appendix) controlling for country fixed effects the effect of the EU compliance regime is much reduced.

These insights have been generated by employing a novel empirical strategy. While we do not pretend to have solved all empirical challenges that compliance studies in the area of human rights pose to scholars, it seems to us, however, that we offered in this paper a solution to one of the more pernicious problems in this area, namely the often rather huge gap between the possible data-generating process and the empirical model employed.

Including various dichotomous indicators of the lagged dependent variable, which allowed for the consideration of its ordinal character, we found strong evidence for time dependence of human rights violations. This is to say that the

level of human rights violations in the previous year strongly contributes to the level of violations in the next year. Moreover, as for our independent variables we find that their influence on compliance with human rights is as well conditional on the level of previous human rights violations. Our results offer some evidence that stronger compliance systems strengthen the effect of democracy on compliance with human rights. Also, we found some evidence for the managerial argument that there is a time lag between the ratification of a convention and compliance with it. The strongest marginal effect of ratification of the CAT can be found among the worst human rights offenders implying here as well the dependence of the time effect on the previous extent of human rights violations.

Hence, in this paper we were able to show that assuming the dependent variable of compliance with human rights to be continuous causes misleading results. Further analysis is needed in order to assess the long term effects of treaty ratification and time dependence in more detail. In this relation, the inclusion of some additional variables might allow for a more comprehensive picture of the determinants of compliance with human rights.

Appendix

In table 1 we list the countries covered in our empirical analysis as well as the time periods for which we have all the required data. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables employed in our analysis. Table 3 reports the results of our three models discussed in section 4.2. In figures 5-7 we depict the same changes in predicted probabilities as those appearing in figures 1-3 for non-democracies. Needless to say that figure 7, covering non-democratic EU member states, is based on values not covered in our dataset.

In table 4 we report on a robustness check based on the idea of conditional logit. As our time-series cross-section analysis could be affected by omitted country specific factors, fixed (or random) effects should be tested for. In our analysis controlling for such effects would create, however, an incidental parameter problem, as the asymptotic properties of the estimator could not be achieved by increasing the number of countries covered. Conditional logit deals with this issue, but has no direct extension toward ordinal dependent variables. Baetschmann, Staub and Winkelman (2011) propose to expand the dataset by letting appear each observation as many times as breaks in the ordinal variable might generate a dichotomous dependent variable. In such an expanded dataset with the appropriate dependent variable conditional logit with clustered standard errors per country and breakpoint yields an appropriate estimator. We report the results of the last model in table using this estimator in column 2. In column 1 we report the original results already discussed in the main text.

Not surprisingly, these new estimation results suggest that variables varying largely between countries, for instance conflict, no longer significantly affect human rights compliance. This variable, however, affects human rights compliance depending on the level of previous violations. Interesting to note, however, is that the ratification of the CAT, according to the conditional logit results, reduces this compliance even more significantly. Looking at the estimated coefficients for the interaction effects with the lagged dependent variable suggests, that for most levels of respect of human rights the ratification of the CAT has a negative effect, but for intermediary values the effect is slightly positive. As in the analyses presented in the main text we also find that the EU compliance system appears to influence positively the human rights record for countries with just not perfect human rights records. For the UN compliance system we find, however, negative

effects for some levels of physical integrity rights. Consequently, even though there are some differences to be found compared to the results discussed in the main text, the differences are of minor substantive interest.

Table 1: Countries covered in the analysis

country	min(year)	max(year)	n
Afghanistan	1991	2008	10
Albania	1991	2008	18
Algeria	1991	2008	18
Angola	1991	2008	16
Argentina	1991	2008	18
Armenia	1993	2008	16
Australia	1991	2008	18
Austria	1991	2008	18
Azerbaijan	1993	2008	16
Bahrain	1991	2008	18
Bangladesh	1991	2008	18
Belarus	1993	2008	16
Belgium	1991	2008	18
Benin	1991	2008	18
Bhutan	1991	2008	18
Bolivia	1991	2008	18
Bosnia Herzegovenia	2002	2008	7
Botswana	1991	2008	18
Brazil	1991	2008	18
Bulgaria	1991	2008	18
Burkina Faso	1991	2008	18
Burundi	1991	2008	14
Cambodia	1991	2008	18
Cameroon	1991	2008	18
Canada	1991	2008	18
Central African Republic	1991	2008	18
Chad	1991	2008	18
Chile	1991	2008	18
China	1991	2001	11
Colombia	1991	2008	16
Comoros	2004	2008	5
Congo, Democratic Republic of	1991	2008	8
Congo, Republic of	1991	2008	18
Costa Rica	1991	2008	18
Cote d'Ivoire	1991	2008	18
Croatia	1993	2008	16
Cuba	1991	2008	18
Cyprus	1991	2008	18
Czech Republic	1994	2008	15
Denmark	1991	2008	18
Djibouti	2004	2008	5
Dominican Republic	1991	2008	18
Ecuador	1991	2008	18
Egypt	1991	2008	18
El Salvador	1991	2008	18
Equatorial Guinea	2004	2008	5
Eritrea	1994	2008	15
Estonia	1993	2008	16
Ethiopia	1993	2008	16
Fiji	1991	2008	18
Finland	1991	2008	18
France	1991	2008	18
Gabon	1991	2008	18
Gambia	1991	2008	18
Georgia	1993	2008	16
Germany	1992	2008	17
Ghana	1991	2008	18
Greece	1991	2008	18
Guatemala	1991	2008	18
Guinea	1991	2008	18
Guyana	1991	2008	18
Haiti	1991	2008	18
Honduras	1991	2008	18
Hungary	1991	2008	18
India	1991	2008	18
Indonesia	1991	2008	18
Iran	1991	2008	14
Iraq	1991	2008	15
Ireland	1991	2008	18
Israel	1991	2008	18
Italy	1991	2008	18
Jamaica	1991	2008	18
Japan	1991	2008	18
Jordan	1991	2008	18
Kazakhstan	1993	2008	16
Kenya	1991	2008	18
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	1996	2008	13

Kuwait	1992	2008	17
Kyrgyz Republic	1993	2008	16
Laos	1991	2008	18
Latvia	1993	2008	16
Lebanon	2002	2008	7
Lesotho	1991	2008	16
Liberia	1997	2008	12
Libya	1991	2008	18
Lithuania	1993	2008	16
Macedonia	1994	2008	15
Madagascar	1991	2008	18
Malawi	1991	2008	18
Malaysia	1991	2008	18
Mali	1991	2008	18
Mauritania	1991	2008	18
Mauritius	1991	2008	18
Mexico	1991	2008	18
Moldova	1993	2008	16
Mongolia	1991	2008	18
Montenegro	2007	2008	2
Morocco	1991	2008	18
Mozambique	1991	2008	18
Namibia	1991	2008	18
Nepal	1991	2008	18
Netherlands	1991	2008	18
New Zealand	1991	2008	18
Nicaragua	1991	2008	18
Niger	1991	2008	18
Nigeria	1991	2008	18
Norway	1991	2008	18
Oman	1991	2008	18
Pakistan	1991	2008	18
Panama	1991	2008	18
Papua New Guinea	1991	2008	18
Paraguay	1991	2008	18
Peru	1991	2008	18
Philippines	1991	2008	18
Poland	1991	2008	18
Portugal	1991	2008	18
Qatar	2004	2008	5
Romania	1991	2008	18
Russia	1993	2008	16
Rwanda	1991	2008	18
Saudi Arabia	1991	2008	18
Senegal	1991	2008	18
Serbia and Montenegro	1993	2005	9
Sierra Leone	1991	2008	13
Singapore	1991	2008	18
Slovak Republic	1994	2008	15
Slovenia	1993	2008	16
Solomon Islands	2004	2008	5
South Africa	1991	2008	18
Spain	1991	2008	18
Sri Lanka	1991	2008	18
Sudan	1991	2008	18
Swaziland	1991	2008	18
Sweden	1991	2008	18
Switzerland	1991	2008	18
Syria	1991	2008	18
Taiwan	1991	2008	18
Tajikistan	1993	2008	16
Tanzania	1991	2008	18
Thailand	1991	2008	18
Togo	1991	2008	18
Tunisia	1991	2008	18
Turkey	1991	2008	18
Turkmenistan	1993	2008	16
Uganda	1991	2008	18
Ukraine	1993	2008	16
United Arab Emirates	1991	2008	18
United Kingdom	1991	2008	18
United States of America	1991	2008	18
Uruguay	1991	2008	18
Uzbekistan	1993	2008	16
Venezuela	1991	2008	18
Vietnam	1991	2008	18
Yemen	1992	2008	17
Zambia	1991	2008	18
Zimbabwe	1991	2008	18

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
CIRI physical integrity	2270	4.628194	2.232635	0	8
conflict	2270	.1969163	.3977562	0	1
democracy	2270	.5154185	.4998723	0	1
gdp ppp pc	2270	4472.879	2491.69	1	8726
ratification	2270	.6629956	.4727906	0	1
years since ratification	2270	7.003524	6.617683	0	23
years since ratification^2	2270	92.82379	123.025	0	529
compliance system UN	2270	.345815	.475738	0	1
compliance system EU	2270	.1110132	.3142177	0	1

Table 3: Ordered probit on physical integrity scores (clustered standard errors by country or mixed-process model (CMP))

	model 1		model 2		model 3	
	oprobit	CMP	oprobit	CMP	oprobit	CMP
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
conflict_{t-1}	-1.445***	-1.339***	-0.486***	-0.460***	-0.537*	-0.476*
	(0.060)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.234)	(0.238)
democracy_{t-1}	0.587***	0.456***	0.223***	0.181**	-0.424	-0.441
	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.065)	(0.327)	(0.325)
gdp ppp pc_{t-1}	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
$\text{ratification}_{t-1}$	0.303*	0.836***	0.152	0.337	-1.159	-0.915
	(0.130)	(0.177)	(0.134)	(0.194)	(0.897)	(0.905)
years since ratification	-0.022	-0.025	-0.010	-0.012	0.285	0.283
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.145)	(0.145)
years since ratification^2	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.014*	-0.014*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.007)
compliance system UN_{t-1}	-0.247***	-0.230***	-0.128	-0.124	0.362	0.409
	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.515)	(0.513)
compliance system EU_{t-1}	1.044***	1.018***	0.472***	0.472***	1.475	1.528
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(1.057)	(1.050)
$\text{physical integrity}_{t-1}$ 1			0.762***	0.736***	0.157	0.064
			(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.421)	(0.425)
$\text{physical integrity}_{t-1}$ 2			1.242***	1.200***	1.508***	1.423***
			(0.133)	(0.137)	(0.374)	(0.380)
$\text{physical integrity}_{t-1}$ 3			1.648***	1.617***	1.700***	1.612***
			(0.135)	(0.138)	(0.368)	(0.374)
$\text{physical integrity}_{t-1}$ 4			2.356***	2.325***	2.797***	2.746***
			(0.136)	(0.140)	(0.354)	(0.357)
$\text{physical integrity}_{t-1}$ 5			2.838***	2.821***	3.051***	3.027***
			(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.358)	(0.360)
$\text{physical integrity}_{t-1}$ 6			3.534***	3.513***	3.993***	3.926***
			(0.145)	(0.148)	(0.365)	(0.371)
$\text{physical integrity}_{t-1}$ 7			4.155***	4.120***	4.507***	4.482***
			(0.150)	(0.155)	(0.362)	(0.364)
$\text{physical integrity}_{t-1}$ 8			5.111***	5.078***	5.253***	5.244***
			(0.166)	(0.170)	(0.423)	(0.425)
$\text{physical integrity}_{t-1}$ 1					0.000	0.000
× gdp ppp pc_{t-1}					(0.000)	(0.000)
2					0.000	0.000
					(0.000)	(0.000)
3					-0.000	0.000
					(0.000)	(0.000)
4					-0.000	-0.000
					(0.000)	(0.000)
5					-0.000	-0.000
					(0.000)	(0.000)
6					-0.000	-0.000
					(0.000)	(0.000)
7					-0.000	-0.000
					(0.000)	(0.000)
8					-0.000	-0.000
					(0.000)	(0.000)
$\text{physical integrity}_{t-1}$ 1					0.208	0.161
× democracy_{t-1}					(0.397)	(0.397)
2					0.763*	0.743*
					(0.370)	(0.369)
3					0.750*	0.737*
					(0.366)	(0.365)
4					0.742*	0.733*
					(0.354)	(0.353)
5					0.850*	0.855*
					(0.353)	(0.352)
6					0.628	0.556
					(0.357)	(0.359)
7					0.604	0.472
					(0.368)	(0.375)
8					1.035*	0.876
					(0.441)	(0.451)
$\text{physical integrity}_{t-1}$ 1					-0.162	-0.166
× Compliance system UN_{t-1}					(0.601)	(0.597)
2					-0.155	-0.184
					(0.561)	(0.558)
3					-0.184	-0.209
					(0.563)	(0.560)
4					-0.439	-0.471
					(0.548)	(0.545)
5					-0.213	-0.266
					(0.552)	(0.550)
6					-0.660	-0.716
					(0.547)	(0.545)
7					-0.657	-0.717
					(0.546)	(0.545)
8					-0.624	-0.658
					(0.584)	(0.581)
$\text{physical integrity}_{t-1}$ 5					-0.572	-0.628

× Compliance system EU$_{t-1}$					(1.104)	(1.096)
6					-0.541	-0.582
					(1.079)	(1.071)
7					-1.374	-1.429
					(1.068)	(1.060)
8					-1.347	-1.406
					(1.073)	(1.065)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1					1.525	1.524
× Ratification$_{t-1}$					(1.048)	(1.042)
2					0.828	0.840
					(1.005)	(1.000)
3					0.761	0.738
					(0.982)	(0.977)
4					1.591	1.576
					(0.964)	(0.959)
5					1.464	1.462
					(0.972)	(0.967)
6					1.559	1.575
					(0.963)	(0.958)
7					1.312	1.340
					(0.955)	(0.950)
8					1.117	1.166
					(0.995)	(0.990)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1					-0.382*	-0.383*
× years since ratification					(0.175)	(0.174)
2					-0.315	-0.317
					(0.164)	(0.163)
3					-0.224	-0.225
					(0.158)	(0.157)
4					-0.361*	-0.363*
					(0.155)	(0.154)
5					-0.394*	-0.394*
					(0.158)	(0.157)
6					-0.341*	-0.342*
					(0.156)	(0.156)
7					-0.216	-0.215
					(0.154)	(0.154)
8					-0.275	-0.276
					(0.163)	(0.162)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1					0.021*	0.021*
× years since ratification^2					(0.008)	(0.008)
2					0.016*	0.016*
					(0.008)	(0.008)
3					0.011	0.011
					(0.008)	(0.007)
4					0.016*	0.017*
					(0.007)	(0.007)
5					0.018*	0.018*
					(0.007)	(0.007)
6					0.015*	0.016*
					(0.007)	(0.007)
7					0.011	0.011
					(0.007)	(0.007)
8					0.014	0.014
					(0.008)	(0.008)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1					0.493	0.485
× conflict$_{t-1}$					(0.306)	(0.306)
2					0.242	0.208
					(0.276)	(0.277)
3					-0.168	-0.199
					(0.276)	(0.277)
4					0.009	-0.037
					(0.284)	(0.285)
5					-0.079	-0.103
					(0.328)	(0.329)
6-8					-0.461	-0.412
					(0.372)	(0.373)
cut 1	-2.179***	-1.821***	-0.354**	-0.272	-0.151	-0.058
	(0.079)	(0.127)	(0.132)	(0.146)	(0.318)	(0.324)
cut 2	-1.656***	-1.318***	0.365**	0.443**	0.597	0.684*
	(0.071)	(0.116)	(0.134)	(0.147)	(0.319)	(0.325)
cut 3	-1.127***	-0.807***	1.108***	1.183***	1.363***	1.445***
	(0.066)	(0.106)	(0.137)	(0.147)	(0.321)	(0.325)
cut 4	-0.675***	-0.369***	1.763***	1.836***	2.034***	2.111***
	(0.064)	(0.100)	(0.139)	(0.148)	(0.322)	(0.326)
cut 5	-0.118	0.172	2.590***	2.660***	2.878***	2.950***
	(0.063)	(0.093)	(0.141)	(0.149)	(0.324)	(0.327)
cut 6	0.397***	0.675***	3.366***	3.434***	3.675***	3.743***
	(0.063)	(0.088)	(0.144)	(0.150)	(0.325)	(0.328)
cut 7	0.948***	1.211***	4.181***	4.247***	4.512***	4.576***
	(0.065)	(0.084)	(0.148)	(0.153)	(0.327)	(0.329)
cut 8	1.856***	2.098***	5.441***	5.504***	5.799***	5.857***
	(0.073)	(0.084)	(0.156)	(0.160)	(0.330)	(0.332)
ratification$_{t-1}$						
conflict$_{t-1}$		-0.162*		-0.271**		-0.614*
		(0.070)		(0.086)		(0.274)

democracy$_{t-1}$		0.464***		0.532***		0.315
		(0.060)		(0.065)		(0.282)
gdp ppp pc$_{t-1}$		0.000		0.000		0.000*
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
ratification in neighbors$_{t-1}$		1.248***		1.266***		1.244***
		(0.089)		(0.092)		(0.096)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1				0.249		0.680
				(0.164)		(0.435)
2				0.523***		0.590
				(0.155)		(0.393)
3				0.333*		0.791*
				(0.154)		(0.386)
4				0.312*		0.375
				(0.152)		(0.370)
5				-0.027		-0.040
				(0.156)		(0.377)
6				-0.032		0.152
				(0.160)		(0.384)
7				0.181		-0.215
				(0.163)		(0.393)
8				0.021		-0.425
				(0.178)		(0.479)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1						-0.000*
× gdp ppp pc$_{t-1}$						(0.000)
2						-0.000
						(0.000)
3						-0.000**
						(0.000)
4						-0.000
						(0.000)
5						-0.000
						(0.000)
6						-0.000*
						(0.000)
7						-0.000
						(0.000)
8						-0.000**
						(0.000)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1						0.626
× democrcay$_{t-1}$						(0.404)
2						0.026
						(0.358)
3						0.143
						(0.345)
4						0.072
						(0.326)
5						-0.461
						(0.318)
6						0.424
						(0.323)
7						0.966**
						(0.335)
8						1.218**
						(0.425)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1						0.114
× conflict$_{t-1}$						(0.368)
28						0.458
						(0.336)
3						0.413
						(0.330)
4						0.563
						(0.339)
5						0.458
						(0.404)
6-8						-0.350
						(0.459)
constant		-0.597***		-0.765***		-0.874**
		(0.085)		(0.156)		0.332)
$atan(\rho)$		-0.352***		-0.116		-0.156
		(0.089)		(0.090)		(0.095)
N	2270	2270	2270	2270	2270	2270
aic	8426.507	10941.498	6915.347	9423.849	6922.806	9387.066

Figure 5: Changes in predicted probabilities due to a ratification of CAT, average GDP, UN compliance regime, in a non-democracy



Figure 6: Changes in predicted probabilities due to a ratification of CAT, average GDP, in European or Amrican compliance regime, in a non-democracy



Figure 7: Changes in predicted probabilities due to a ratification of CAT, average GDP, EU compliance regime, in a non-democracy



Table 4: Comparison with conditional ordered logit with clustered standard errors by country - level)

	b/se	b/se
conflict$_{t-1}$	-0.537*	0.197
	(0.234)	(0.480)
democracy$_{t-1}$	-0.424	0.451
	(0.327)	(0.655)
gdp ppp pc$_{t-1}$	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
ratification$_{t-1}$	-1.159	-4.719*
	(0.897)	(2.008)
years since ratification	0.285	0.436
	(0.145)	(0.285)
years since ratification^2	-0.014*	-0.017
	(0.007)	(0.013)
compliance system UN$_{t-1}$	0.362	2.289
	(0.515)	(1.182)
compliance system EU$_{t-1}$	1.475	-0.305
	(1.057)	(0.719)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1	0.157	0.265
	(0.421)	(0.927)
2	1.508***	2.128*
	(0.374)	(0.863)
3	1.700***	1.636
	(0.368)	(0.969)
4	2.797***	3.249***
	(0.354)	(0.881)
5	3.051***	3.239***
	(0.358)	(0.913)
6	3.993***	4.069***
	(0.365)	(0.812)
7	4.507***	4.261***
	(0.362)	(0.853)
8	5.253***	4.729***
	(0.423)	(0.964)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1 ×	0.000	0.000
gdp ppp pc$_{t-1}$	(0.000)	(0.000)
2	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
3	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
4	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
5	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
6	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
7	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
8	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1 ×	0.208	-0.316
democracy$_{t-1}$	(0.397)	(1.003)
2	0.763*	0.770
	(0.370)	(0.946)
3	0.750*	0.668
	(0.366)	(0.851)
4	0.742*	-0.052
	(0.354)	(0.836)
5	0.850*	0.392
	(0.353)	(0.883)
6	0.628	0.072
	(0.357)	(0.810)
7	0.604	-0.045
	(0.368)	(0.888)
8	1.035*	0.300
	(0.441)	(1.036)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1 ×	-0.162	-1.886
compliance system UN$_{t-1}$	(0.601)	(1.140)
2	-0.155	-2.235
	(0.561)	(1.190)
3	-0.184	-1.717
	(0.563)	(1.143)
4	-0.439	-2.565*
	(0.548)	(1.092)
5	-0.213	-1.860
	(0.552)	(1.204)
6	-0.660	-2.750*
	(0.547)	(1.189)
7	-0.657	-2.171
	(0.546)	(1.239)
8	-0.624	-1.735
	(0.584)	(1.240)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ <6 ×	-0.572	0.189
compliance system EU$_{t-1}$	(1.104)	(0.825)
6	-0.541	0.837

	(1.079)	(0.797)
7	-1.374	-0.281
	(1.068)	(0.728)
8	-1.347	-0.643
	(1.073)	(0.749)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1 ×	1.525	2.873
ratification$_{t-1}$	(1.048)	(2.295)
2	0.828	3.168
	(1.005)	(2.201)
3	0.761	3.651
	(0.982)	(2.059)
4	1.591	5.425**
	(0.964)	(2.102)
5	1.464	4.902*
	(0.972)	(2.148)
6	1.559	5.158*
	(0.963)	(2.108)
7	1.312	4.022
	(0.955)	(2.102)
8	1.117	3.208
	(0.995)	(2.210)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1 ×	-0.382*	-0.283
years since ratification$_{t-1}$	(0.175)	(0.355)
2	-0.315	-0.408
	(0.164)	(0.324)
3	-0.224	-0.354
	(0.158)	(0.296)
4	-0.361*	-0.623*
	(0.155)	(0.314)
5	-0.394*	-0.705*
	(0.158)	(0.296)
6	-0.341*	-0.613*
	(0.156)	(0.306)
7	-0.216	-0.328
	(0.154)	(0.301)
8	-0.275	-0.341
	(0.163)	(0.327)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1 ×	0.021*	0.016
years since ratification$^2_{t-1}$	(0.008)	(0.016)
2	0.016*	0.016
	(0.008)	(0.015)
3	0.011	0.012
	(0.008)	(0.013)
4	0.016*	0.024
	(0.007)	(0.014)
5	0.018*	0.027*
	(0.007)	(0.013)
6	0.015*	0.022
	(0.007)	(0.014)
7	0.011	0.012
	(0.007)	(0.014)
8	0.014	0.013
	(0.008)	(0.015)
physical integrity$_{t-1}$ 1 ×	0.493	-0.476
conflict$_{t-1}$	(0.306)	(0.556)
2	0.242	-0.752
	(0.276)	(0.530)
3	-0.168	-1.154*
	(0.276)	(0.576)
4	0.009	-0.999
	(0.284)	(0.633)
5	-0.079	-0.661
	(0.328)	(0.666)
678	-0.461	-1.555*
	(0.372)	(0.694)
cut1	-0.151	
	(0.318)	
cut2	0.597	
	(0.319)	
cut3	1.363***	
	(0.321)	
cut4	2.034***	
	(0.322)	
cut5	2.878***	
	(0.324)	
cut6	3.675***	
	(0.325)	
cut7 4	.512***	
	(0.327)	
cut8 5	.799***	
	(0.330)	
N	2270.000	7640.000
AIC	6922.806	5500.542

References

Axelrod, Robert and Robert Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics* 38(1):226–254.

Baetschmann, Gregori, Kevin E. Staub and Rainer Winkelman. 2011. "Consistent Estimation of the Fixed Effects Ordered Logit Model." IZA DP No. 5443 January 2011.

Beck, Nathaniel, David Epstein, Simon Jackman and Sharyn O'Halloran. 2001. "Alternative Models of Dynamics in Binary Time-Series-Cross-Section Models: The Example of State Failure." Prepared for delivery at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology, Emory University Atlanta.

Camp Keith, Linda. 1999. "The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior." *Journal of Peace Research* 36:95–118.

Carey, Sabine C., Mark Gibney and Steven C. Poe. 2010. *The Politics of Human Rights*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chayes, Abram and Antonia Chayes. 1995. *The New Sovereignty. Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press.

Cheibub, Jos, Jennifer Gandhi and James Vreeland. 2010. "Democracy and dictatorship revisited." *Public Choice* 143:67–101.

Cingranelli, David L. and David L. Richards. 2010. "The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project." *Human Rights Quarterly* 32:401–424.

Cole, Wade M. 2012. "Human Rights as Myth and Ceremony? Reevaluating the Effectiveness of Human Rights Treaties, 1981?2007." *American Journal of Sociology* 117(4):1131–1171.

Curia. 2011. "The European Court of Justice.". Online: `http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/`. Accessed: december 2011.

Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism." *International Organization* 59(2):363–398.

Donnelly, Jack. 2003. *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice*. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press.

EHCR. 2011. "The European Court of Human Rights.". Online: `http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/Homepage_EN`. Accessed: december 2011.

Epstein, David L., Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen and Sharyn O'Halloran. 2006. "Democratic Transitions." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3):551–569.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* 54(2):887–917.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2012. "International Regimes for Human Rights." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15(1):265–286.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. and James Ron. 2009. "Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes." *World Politics* 61(2):360–401.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie Marie and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 2005. "Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises." *American Journal of Sociology* 110(5):1373–411.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie Marie and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 2007. "Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights Law To Matter Where Needed Most." *Journal of Peace Research* 44(4):407–425.

Hathaway, Oona A. 2002. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" *Yale Law Journal* 111:1935–2042.

Hathaway, Oona A. 2007. "Why do countries commit to human rights treaties?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(4):588–621.

Henderson, Conway W. 1991. "Conditions affecting the use of Political Repression." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(1):120–142.

Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten. 2011. "Penn World Table Version 7.0." Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania.

Hill, Daniel W. 2010. "Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior." *The Journal of Politics* 72(4):1161–1174.

Hollyer, James R. and Peter Rosendorff. 2011. "Domestic Politics and the Accession of Authoritarian Regimes to Human Rights Treaties." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* .

Kim, Hunjoon and Kathryn Sikkink. 2010. "Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(4):939–963.

Landman, Todd. 2005*a*. *Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study*. Georgetown University Press.

Landman, Todd. 2005*b*. "Review Article: The Political Science of Human Rights." *British Journal of Political Science* 35:549–572.

Marshall, Monty G. 2006. "Codebook: Major Episodes of Political Violence." Center for Systemic Peace. Online: http://www.systemicpeace.org [February 23 2010].

Mitchell, Neil J. and James M. McCormick. 1988. "Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations." *World Politics* 40(4):476–498.

Neumayer, Eric. 2005. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(6):925–953.

OAS. 2011. "The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.". Online: `http://www.oas.org/en/topics/human_rights.asp`. Accessed: december 2011.

OAS. 2012. "The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.". Online: `http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/functions.asp`. Accessed: march 2012.

Park, Han S. 1987. "Correlates of Human Rights: Global Tendencies." *Human Rights Quarterly* 9(3):405–413.

Poe, Steven C. and C. Neal Tate. 1994. "Repression of Human Rights to Personal integrity in the 1980s: a global analysis." *American Political Science Review* 88(4):853–872.

Poe, Steven C., C. Neal Tate and Linda Camp Keith. 1999. "Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993." *International Studies Quarterly* 43(2):291–313.

Poe, Steven C., Sabine C. Carey and Tanya C. Vazquez. 2001. "How are these Pictures Different? A Quantitative Comparison of the US State Department and Amnesty International Human Rights Reports, 1976-1995." *Human Rights Quarterly* 23(3):650–677.

Risse, Thomas, Anja Jetschke and Hans Peter Schmitz. 2002. *Die Macht der Menschenrechte : internationale Normen, kommunikatives Handeln und politischer Wandel in den Lndern des Sdens*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 1999. *The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roodman, David. 2009. "Estimating Fully Observed Recursive Mixed-Process Models with cmp - Working Paper 168." Center for Global Development Working Paper Number 168.

Sikkink, Kathryn. 1993. "Human Rights, Principled issue-networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America." *International Organization* 47(3):411–441.

Simmons, Beth. 2010. "Treaty Compliance and Violation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 13:273?296.

Simmons, Beth A. 2009. *Mobilizing for human rights : international law in domestic politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tallberg, Jonas. 2002. "Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union." *International Organization* 56(3):609–643.

Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg and Gary King. 2003. "Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results." *Journal of Statistical Software* 8(1):1–30.

United Nations. 2011. "United Nations Human Rights. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: Human Rights Bodies.".

von Stein, Jana. 2005. "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *American Political Science Review* 99:611–622.

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2008. "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture." *International Organization* 62(1):65–101.

Wegmann, Simone. 2011. "Regional Human Rights Systems. A Comparative Analysis." Master's thesis in political science, Université de Genève.

Weidmann, Nils B., Doreen Kuse and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2012. "CShapes Dataset and Utilities." CRAN Archive.

Wood, Reed M. and Mark Gibney. 2010. "The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction and a Comparison to CIRI." *Human Rights Quarterly* 32:367–400.

Zanger, Sabine C. 2000. "A Global Analysis of the Effect of Political Regime Changes on Life Integrity Violations, 1977-1993." *Journal of Peace Research* 37(2):213–233.