The Political Economy of International Organization
July 7-9, 2022
The PEIO conference brings together economists, political scientists and other scholars to address political economy issues related to any international organization, including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Union, and also other international organizations that have as yet received less attention in the academic literature. Questions we seek to address include how IOs are organized and governed, what are the incentives of governments dealing with IOs as well as the incentives of the bureaucrats who staff them, and what are the effects of IOs on policy outcomes. We also consider the interaction of IOs with transnational actors such as commercial lobbies and NGOs and have a particular interest in the interaction of the international political economy with the domestic political economy of IO members. Submissions on topics more broadly related to international organization—such as foreign aid, international agreements and international law—are welcome.
Conference Venue:
Oxford, United Kingdom
2022 Program Committee:
| Thomas Bernauer (ETH Zurich) | Christina Davis (Harvard) | Axel Dreher (Heidelberg) |
| Thomas Hale (Oxford) | Emily Jones (Oxford) | Christopher Kilby (Villanova) |
| Soo Yeon Kim (Singapore) | Katharina Michaelowa (Zurich) | Karolina Milewicz (Oxford) |
| Helen Milner (Princeton) | Daniel Nielson (UT Austin) | B. Peter Rosendorff (NYU) |
| Christina Schneider (UC-San Diego) | Duncan Snidal (Oxford) | Randall Stone (Rochester) |
| Jennifer Tobin (Georgetown) |
Special issue of the Review of International Organizations: “The Power of the Weak in International Organizations,” eds. Thomas Hale, Emily Jones, Karolina Milewicz, and Duncan Snidal (Oxford University)
